Comments on: What Will a Post-NATO Afghanistan Look Like? https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/ Military, Politics, Economy, Energy Security, Environment, Commodities Geopolitical Analysis & Forecasting Mon, 30 Apr 2018 20:45:20 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.5.15 By: Mandar Salaye https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-750 Wed, 05 Mar 2014 13:00:24 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-750 Only one scenario is certain that is resurgence of Taliban especialy in Southern and South Western part of Afganistan. Their objective will be to take control of Kabul,and if that suceeds,it will take back this country to similar scenario post withdrawal of Russian forces. Pakistan will ensure that Taliban take control of these two regions and ultimately takeover Kabul for their own strategic purpose. ANP will be controlled by Warlords who will form their fiefdom in own stronholds and ethnicaly strong bases with already acquired ISAF weapons in hand. Best scenario, fragment the country on the basis of ethnic majority for the purpose of limited independence in local governance, economy. Form a coalition goverment in Kabul representing all groups only to deal with national defence, foreign relations, communication to maintain national identity. This will meet aspirations of all ethnic groups. Looking at the culture, history of the nation, such an option is viable and will help to bring in lasting peace.

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By: Dennis_C https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-730 Sun, 02 Mar 2014 22:03:17 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-730 There is no practical reason to maintain Western troops in Afghanistan. Aside from the opium issue, it presents no threat to Western countries and even neighboring countries.

The Western withdrawal will unfortunately create a problem greater than the one following the Soviet withdrawal. The government be able to finance the ANP and ANA, thereby providing at least 300,000 trained fighters (complete with their weapons and ammunition) to the highest bidder (ie. warlord). One again the country will be fragmented along tribal lines, but this time with ex-ANA and ex-ANP fighters taking sides according to the warlord willing to pay the highest premium. Even the Taliban will have a difficult time to reassert itself – at least in the north. Kandahar and the south-east has been a lost cause for at least 12 years and will remain under Taliban dominance for the foreseeable future. Al Qaeda remains a formidable international terrorist organization, but is now so distributed across much of the Muslim world that it will have no significant role to play in Afghanistan – nor does it want to do so (as there are bigger fish to fry across the globe).

So the sooner that Western forces leave, the better – not necessarily for the Afghans but rather for the Western soldiers and their countries.

What a waste.

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By: Davor https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-695 Thu, 20 Feb 2014 02:23:59 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-695 Look in what I look-have found, it is not up to date, but for some realization is great.

AFGHANISTAN ( Doulat and Padshahi ye Afghanistan )

Afghanistan land is already around -500 BC belonged to the great Persian state. Alexander the Great had conquered A. -330 to -329. During the further century A. was ruled by various invaders. From the 226- western parts of Afghanistan belong to the Persian Sassanid state, and the southern part in th VII century conquered Arabs, and there spread Islam. In X century alternate insurgents Arab- Indian governors against the caliph, with goal to gain independence in the ruling. So at the end of X century in Ghazni became independent ruler Sabuktigin whose dynasty ruled til 1186 in large areas of India, Badakhshan, Turkmenistan and Persia. From the late XII century, the area ruled by various dynasties ( Ghor , Kurt ), a country often attack Mongol and Tatar invaders. real Afghan state ( whose name is known from X century) was founded after the assassination of Nadir Shah of Iran ( 1747 ), Ahmad Khan Abdali ( 1747-73 ) – twice won the Punjab and Delhi.

In the internal conditions of Afghanistan have intervened in 1838 the British, who in 1839 entered into Kabul and impose a ruler-ward shah Shu. The uprising in Kabul has forced the British to leave Afghanistan in 1842, and on the power comes Dost Mohammed, recognized by Britain as the Emir of Afghanistan. After his death (1863 ) battle for the throne last until 1869, when Dost, Mohammed’s son, won over the Sher Alikhban. In the second half of the XIX century, Afghanistan was the scene of imperialist rivalry between Russia and Britain, whose Afghan wards(tutors-vasals) fighting between themself. In 1907 Russia and Britain have agreed on their spheres of interest in Asia, also including Afghanistan. During the first World War, Afghanistan was neutral. In May 1919 began an armed struggle against the British, who in August 1919 had recognized the independence of Afghanistan. 1924 – 25 Brits encourage rebel elements under the leadership of the Islamic clergy and raised the revolt against Amanullah Khan ( 1919-29 ), during whose reign in Afghanistan are conducted advanced reforms. Afghanistan in 1937 concluded under the then ruler Mohamed Zahir shah, with, Iraq, Persia( Iran ) and Turkey the Eastern Entente. Loans and economic transactions of Nazi Germany received a stronger influence in Afghanistan, under the pressure of Britain and the then USSR, German emissaries and agents must in October 1941 to leave Afghanistan, but despite Afghanistan until the end of the Second World war refused to join the anti-fascist coalition, and in 1946 became a member of the UN. -same year was determined border towards the USSR, and in 1963 towards China.

AFGHAN LITERATURE
evolved in the languages ​​Pashto ( afghan language) – Farsi (Persian ) . Were found fragmentary texts of pashto language of VIII and XIII century. First larger liturgical memorial description was conquest of Swat principality ( 1413-24 ) which the author himself conqueror sheik Mali , and his successor Kadu Khan writes about his wartime successes ( 1494 ). A new impulse gets pashto with litterary movement Rosana" who strikes on the reigning sunitisam and seeks social reforms. The founder Sheikh Bayezid writes his work " too lenient news " on the pashto language , Arabic , Farsi and Urdu. The most prominent representative of the feudal pashto poetry was Khushal Khan, chief of Khatak tribes ( 1613-89 ) ; Afzal – Khan Khatak ( XVIII century) wrote a history of Afghan . Abdul Hamid of the tribe Momand (1660-1732) writes pessimistic love poetry. Afghan authors are influenced by the Persians, and less of Indian literature, poetry greatly surpasses fiction. Ahmad Shah Durrani ( 1721-71 ), founder of afghan state, writes songs about his war campaigns and love poetry. When ( due to political events ) at the end of the XIX century, the capital was transferred to Kabul, the importance of the Farsi language growing ( and literature ). However pashto literature flourishes in Peshavar ( today’s Pakistan ), while Mihr-i-Dil-khan established at the end of the XIX century academy in Kandahar for the upliftment of afghan pashto literature. The author of modern pashto prose is- Ahmad Maulavi ( XIX – XX ). At the beginning of the XX century, the so-called. afghanyouth movement who seeks liberation from the British authorities, the spread of education, creating their own intelligence, new literature, etc. Mahmud Khan implemented reforms in poetry ( circa 1900 ), he rises afghan Farsi dialect ( so called.kabuli who is also an official language til 1936). Kandahar and Kabul Academy united in 1937 with the aim of studying the development of pashto language and literature, more recently evolving translation , prose and dramatic literature. The most famous are the new writers Benava, Taraki, Hadim, Ulfat, Salimi, Zahir, Kari, Abdulla, Halil, Latifi and Nazih.

POLITY
Afghanistan is a constitutional, hereditary monarchy with a male line descendants. A new constitution of the fourth August 1964 abolished the feudal privileges, and members of the ruling dynasty and their relatives can no longer be prime ministers, members of the government, National Assembly and judges of the Supreme Court. The head of state is the king, who has the right of legislative veto. The executive power has a government led by the president and the legislature parliament consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly. 50 senators appointed by the king for life, while the 171 members of the National Assembly are elected by direct ballot in three years. The voting right belongs to all citizens from the age of 20 years, while women are excluded from passive voting rights that have only men 30(?20)-70 years old. At the forefront of reorganized 29 provinces are, instead of the earlier tribal chief, civil governors. The judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court, as well as provincial and district courts.

LANGUAGE
Among the most widespread languages ​​of Afghanistan is one somewhat archaic form of Persian language. More recent efforts go for those that for general state language would adopted pashto, wich is spoken mostly by Afghan ( Pathans ), the dominant group" in Afghanistan.

Taking into account that about 90 percent of the population was illiterate, for now I do not know, but enough to conclude that a large, if not the biggest problem of afghan is that they are not aware of themselves, their identity, because militant Islam frosted their brains. Therefore I would suggest the following, to get out of their history out something noteworthy, and that are printed small pocket books for soldiers from a couple of pages, that every soldier should get, and it would be good to call a special unit or another by the name of a some of the afghan ruler or a poet. And in order to wake them up.
Seems to me.

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By: Richard D. Rosenblatt https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-700 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 22:30:16 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-700 The British, then the Soviets, then we lost generations of soldiers and money only to find that tribals don’t accept foreigners.

This entire superstructure we’ve built of military force and Washington "aid" doesn’t die easily. Too many vested interests and official US mouths to be fed keeping the war mills going.

We need the courage to cut and run. We can leave with grace if we admit failure and move on to fighting our own poverty at home.

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By: Robert A. Vrilakas https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-699 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 22:29:17 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-699 Iin the haste to Blame Obama for all the ills of Afghanistan we need to do some serious thinking about the problems of inserting our country into a civil war between secular factions in Afghanistan.

We also need to consider that aside from gaining very little we are exhausting our military by send them bac or multiple tours in that country.

We are pouring billions into a rathole with no assurance that much of it isn’t siphoned off by Karzai and his buddies.

To those that feel we should continue to sacrifice soldiers and pour billions doen that drain I would only hope that they are not the same ones bitterly complaining about our national debt.

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By: Lynda https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-698 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 21:29:51 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-698 For all the importance placed upon developing the ANA and ANP, remarkably the US military did little coordination with Afghans. The composition and size of the combined Afghan security ministries was not shared with the Afghan government, but was based on US estimates which were largely based upon the level of funding authority from Congress. Leading up to the Chicago Conference, the Afghan principles had no information upon which to develop a position. (The reason given me was that that information was classified and could not be shared with Afghan nationals.)

The surveys on security tend to show that the Afghan people are more concerned about land disputes, murders, robberies, kidnapping, water rights, and the like. The ANP tend to be used as cannon fodder for the ANA, in maintaining check points. (The value of check points has always intrigued me.) When I spoke with the US procurement advisor to the Ministry of Interior, he could not point to any training, mentoring, or other activity that would have prepared the Ministry’s finance and procurement staff to take responsibility for the support contracts being transitioned to the Afghans. Nor was he aware that Afghan procurement law (a World Bank reform initiative) considered this transition as a new contract option, rather than an assignment. Over the years of support, NTM-A had focused on training Afghans battlefield skills, rather than on developing support skills. This oversight is most interesting given the importance of logistics and other support to the warfighter. (I recall a 10:1 ratio, support to warfighter mentioned during the Viet Nam war.)

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By: Tim https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-692 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 21:03:58 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-692 The comment, " Poor training is also evident in the increasing number of beatings, lootings, and extrajudicial executions being reported by the UNAMA" is quite interesting. During my two trips into Afghanistan in 2006 and 2008 I had the opportunity to engaged with young ANA and ANP troops and a couple of senior officers. I find it curious that we think six or eight weeks of training in fighting skills with maybe one or two hours of ethics and humanitarian training will change someone’s values that have been inculcated for 20 years. That might include a young person who might come from a challenged cultural strata where criminal acts were the only resource for putting food on the table and someone else that might have spent four or five years in an ethnic warrior group lead by a war lord who cares not a whit about our or Afghan national objectives and goals. Keep in mind that some research indicates that most entry level troops in the ANA are paid less than an entry level soldier-warrior in a warrior group opposing the ANA. I wonder what our success rate would be in fundamentally changing the average inner city gang member into a stellar citizen if recruited into the U.S. military?

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By: Jesse https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-696 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 18:50:13 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-696 Well you can’t undo the past. Fact is that when the U.S. went in there King Mohammed Zahir Shah and his family were waiting in exile, could have been re-established and would have unified the tribal animosity effectively returning afghanistan to its 1960s levels of civilization (effectively no worse than a banana republic). But no, we couldn’t do that, we had to bring Karzai over who is little better than a Falafal hut resturaunteer and we picked winners and loser for the drug trade (*ahem* General Dostum). Thanks to US short-sightedness from two administrations Afghanistan is not much better off than it was. Really sad. Especially for those of us who have spent so much blood tears and sweat over that country.

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By: DockyWocky https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-697 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 14:00:41 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-697 Our illustrious president, in yet another classic example of failure to lead, will allow the corrupt Karzai to get away with totally negating the sacrifice in blood and material the USA made supposedly fighting the world’s leading terrorist organization in the world’s most worthless geographical location – Afghanistan.
With one swipe of his left-handed imperious self, Obama could solve the entire problem by merely issuing an order for an American drone aircraft to make an example of Karzai by blowing his carcass to smithereens via use of a couple of Hellfire missiles.
Instead, Obama gives Karzai unneccesary credulity by allowing this two-bit, green caped political hack to make the entire US sacrifice of lives and treasure into nothing.
Afghanistan deserves Karzai, Afghanistan deserves the cheap political hack, Obama. Both deserve visits from drones.

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By: Sarmajor https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-694 Tue, 18 Feb 2014 13:24:39 +0000 http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/what-will-a-post-nato-afghanistan-look-like-4925/#comment-694 At this point we have again shown an incredible level of naiveté in dealing with a culture that we do not understand while openly declaring progress. In 2006/07 when I was assigned for 6 months with the ANA and another 6 months with the ANP I saw all of the things that people are still observing and reporting today. At the time I thought it was a slow process knowing that we had already invested over 5 years and billions of dollars. With no continuity of effort at a clearly defined end-state all we have done is confused those Afghans that do take their security seriously with new tactics (over the old Eastern Bloc methods) and new, more difficult to maintain equipment. In the field they still rely on the western alliance for fire support, medical evacuation and strategic as well as tactical guidance. It is my belief that no matter how long we are there they will always want us to carry the burden so they have a scapegoat when any issues pop up. If left to their own abilities there will never be a stable government. Delaying that inevitability is not an option. Get out now and keep a good eye on the area by keeping some money rolling into a network of “friends” who can keep us informed about developments. That is something we were lacking in the pre 9-11 days.

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