Georgia
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 in many ways served as a template and further incentive for the Ukraine war. In the wake of the 2003 Rose Revolution, the country had been moving toward the Western orbit, a trend that culminated in a promise of eventual NATO membership during the now-infamous 2008 Bucharest Summit. The ultimate decision to invade came after Georgian armed forces moved on troops in South Ossetia – a Russia-backed and ethnically distinct enclave that fought several wars of independence with Tbilisi following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The war lasted just three days and ended in total defeat for Georgia, with the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remaining de facto independent to the present day.
While one might assume that the Ukraine war has infused pro-Western politicians in Georgia with a newfound hope of escaping the Russian orbit, this is simply not the case. Former president Mikheil Saakashvili, heir to the Rose Revolution and leader during the 2008 war, was swept from power in 2012 parliamentary elections and replaced by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a pro-Kremlin billionaire with alleged close ties to Russia-based oligarchs. While Ivanishvili has held office only temporarily, he is believed to continue to exert considerable influence through the ruling Georgian Dream party that he founded. The current government is broadly anti-West, as recently evidenced in a recent tirade against an EU ambassador for, among other things, ‘not treating Georgia as a sovereign nation.’
The legacy of the Rose Revolution seems to live on in the wider polity, however, with high levels of support for joining both the EU (over 80%) and NATO (over 70%). Yet absent a change at the highest levels of Georgian politics, it seems unlikely that Tbilisi will attempt to take advantage of Russia’s relative weakness and isolation amid the Ukraine war.
Moldova
Transnistria, another largely unrecognized ex-Soviet republic, is composed of a narrow strip of territory along the eastern border of Moldova. The region fought a war of succession against the newly-established government of Moldova in 1992, eventually acquiring the status of de facto independence which prevails to this day. Similar to the pre-war sociopolitical schism between eastern and western Ukraine, Transnistria is largely composed of ethnic Russians in contrast to the ethnic Moldovans and Romanians in the west.
Unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the territory of Transnistria is not congruous with the Russian Federation, which poses a logistical challenge in terms of supplying troops and maintaining equipment there. The Russian military deployment generally numbers around 1,700, and is split into a peacekeeping contingent and an additional group tasked with guarding a huge, Soviet-era ammunition depot at Cobasna. The Russian deployment supplements an active duty Transnistrian force numbering anywhere from 4,500-7,000.
Transnistria’s geopolitical positioning also poses a challenge in terms of realizing its long-held ambition of joining the Russian Federation. The objective might have once seemed feasible under the wildly optimistic war aims at the onset of the conflict, which imagined Ukraine’s entire southern coast as a target for either annexation, occupation, or bargaining chip at the negotiating table. But such an outcome to the conflict seems highly unlikely at this point.
A landlocked country of just 3.5 million people, Moldova won’t be a game-changer in the context of the outcome of the Ukraine war, though the small contingent of Russian troops along Ukraine’s southwestern border has necessitated a Ukrainian counter-deployment in opposition. It should be noted however that Transnistria was the site of a series of unexplained explosions through April which hit various government and military targets. Both sides blamed the other for the attacks, with Ukraine claiming a false flag by Russia and the Russians blaming Ukraine. In the event of an actual hot conflict between Ukraine and Transnistria, the republic would be extremely vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery attack given its small size.
Regarding longer-term consequences, Transnistria may find itself eventually deprived of a powerful patron in Moscow and increasingly diplomatically and militarily isolated as Moldova moves deeper into the EU orbit (the country officially became an EU candidate along with Ukraine in June 2022). Moreover, if Russia decides to extend official recognition to Transnistria, it’s likely that Moldova – a de jure neutral state as per its constitution – would align itself militarily to the West and seek outright NATO ascension.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The long-disputed territories of Nagorno-Karabakh have already been the subject of a recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, backed by their external patrons of Turkey and Russia respectively – though with varying levels of commitment. The 2020 clash resulted in a comprehensive victory for Azerbaijan, with large swathes of formerly Armenia-controlled land passing to Baku’s control via the fighting and subsequent ceasefire agreement.
Moscow played a major role in these events. For one, Russia remains the de jure guardian of Armenia under the auspices of the CSTO collective security framework which both states belong to. However, from the onset it was clear that the Kremlin had no appetite for direct armed support of its ally, perhaps owing to a desire to teach Armenia a lesson for its recent political drift Westward, or alternatively because the international consensus views much of the disputed land as legally belonging to Azerbaijan. Russia also played a significant diplomatic role in getting Armenia to sign on to the final agreement, and the post-2020 border equilibrium is now backstopped by the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers.
Now two years later, the ceasefire agreement is looking much more tenuous and there are fears within Armenia that Azerbaijan-Turkey may look to push their advantage while Russia is militarily bogged down in Ukraine. Another possibility is that adjustments to the 2020 ceasefire/future status quo could arise as a potential bargaining chip between Turkey and Russia against the backdrop of the Ukraine war; for example, in exchange for Ankara lessening Moscow’s international isolation, the Kremlin acquiesces to additional parts of Nagorno-Karabakh coming under Azerbaijani control.
The ground-level situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is already unsettled. With the most experienced parts of the Russian peacekeeping contingent apparently redeployed to Ukraine, small-scale clashes along the line of control have become commonplace, with both sides tending to blame the other. For its part, Russia has blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the clashes and has called for restraint on all sides. However, unless something changes, it appears only a matter of time before a localized clash spirals into something larger.
