Lebanon is a consociational democracy, a system that Arend Lijphart defines as a power-sharing model specific to a given state or society based on ethnic, religious, or linguistic considerations. In these circumstances, a consociational democracy can help maintain stability in diverse and polarized societies through policies such as grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportionality in elections, and segmental autonomy through decentralization.
Yet in Lebanon’s case, consociationalism has plagued the political system due to sectarian tension and the inability to form consensus around policies. Within this system, a social-political and militant group, Hezbollah, grew into prominence starting in 1982. A 1985 open letter articulates the worldview of Hezbollah as an entity opposing Zionism and its supporters. Locally, it undertook an anti-sectarian stance and called for greater consensus within the state, moving away from the Maronite-dominated system. Hezbollah became a complex apparatus of numerous intertwined bodies and multilevel militant structures. Its governance was delegated to the Shura Council, which elects the Secretary-General and oversees various entities like the Executive and Jihad Councils responsible for administrative and military tasks.
The Taef Agreement that ended the civil war became the new framework upon which the consociational system of Lebanon took shape, starting in the early 1990s. Yet the document was never fully implemented as it stipulated the disarmament of all militia groups. Hezbollah argued that it was not a militia but a resistance group against Israel and kept its weapons through foreign support and intervention by Syria and Iran.
Hence, Hezbollah became an anomaly within the Lebanese system, shaped by foreign interventionism and resistance against Israel. But Lebanese public opinion steadily began to evolve following the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000. In the beginning, the Lebanese public had celebrated the triumph of Hezbollah, cementing Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as a popular and influential figure in Lebanon’s politics. However, as time passed, and specifically following the 2006 July War against Israel, Hezbollah increasingly overextended itself both domestically and externally, ultimately becoming involved in the Syria civil war. Sections of the Lebanese public began to argue that Hezbollah’s claims of resistance against Israel could not be justified through its entanglements in Syria and other far-flung locations where there was no Israeli presence to fight.
On the domestic political side, the entrenchment of Hezbollah as a political entity within the Lebanese system through its participation in parliamentary elections and successive governments gave rise to a sense of malaise among the Lebanese who opposed the party. The group’s political turn was not an inevitability: Hezbollah’s own leadership deliberated and clashed throughout the third General Congress in 1992 about whether to participate in elections. Ultimately, the faction headed by Hassan Nasrallah won and embarked on the process of transforming Hezbollah from a resistance and social movement to a political party.
Hezbollah Comes to Dominate Lebanon’s Politics
Throughout the decades, Hezbollah played a key role in shaping Lebanese politics and governance by heading the pro-Syria March 8 Alliance against the anti-Syria March 14 Alliance. More recently, Hezbollah has actively shaped government policy through power-sharing agreements with non-Shia factions, such as Sunnis, Christians, and Druze. However, many have condemned the party for employing its weapons to influence politics. For example, in May 2008, Hezbollah staged an armed coup against the government for trying to dismantle its communications systems at Rafic Hariri International Airport, describing it as a declaration of war against the resistance. The subsequent Doha Agreement gave the March 8 Alliance and Hezbollah veto power within future governments, which reinforced the political dominance of the party within the political sphere.
Subsequently, in 2011, after repeated threats by Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah triggered the collapse of the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri due to the work of the UN Special Tribunal tasked with resolving the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The tribunal was expected to indict Hezbollah members as suspects in the assassination of the late prime minister. March 8 Alliance ministers resigned from the cabinet precisely at the moment Prime Minister Saad Hariri met with US President Barack Obama. The move was ultimately a successful power grab, as the March 8 Alliance, led by Hezbollah, subsequently formed a new cabinet where their interests dominated. Incidentally, the court later found Hezbollah members guilty for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2020.
The political entanglement of Hezbollah continued during the 2014-2016 Lebanese presidential elections, as the party sought to nominate Michel Aoun, Leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and member of the March 8 Alliance, as president. The Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah had signed a memorandum of understanding in 2006, paving the way for Aoun to enter the March 8 Alliance. After extensive legislative and government disruptions, a consensus was formed, and Michel Aoun was elected president. Naturally, this election empowered Hezbollah further to influence government policies throughout the presidency, a term plagued by economic crisis, civil unrest, and finally the 2019 Revolution. As researchers continue to examine the path taken by Hezbollah over the decades, focus naturally falls on the impact of Hezbollah’s entry into domestic politics, and whether the group’s resistance was affected by this dramatic change.
The Assassination of Hassan Nasrallah
Currently, Hezbollah is entangled in a war against Israel, which began as border incidents on 8 October 2023, following the start of the Israel-Hamas War. As the conflict expands, it becomes difficult to assess the potential consequences in Lebanon. However, the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024 is one central issue of political debate, as he was a figure who had dominated Lebanese politics for decades. Currently, Lebanese leaders are repeatedly stating that the government wants to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah. Yet it’s difficult to imagine that a caretaker government, with a deadlocked parliament and a vacant presidency no less, would possibly have the political will and ground-level strength to implement such a resolution.
Thus, in the context of the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, this article explores three potential scenarios on where Lebanon’s domestic politics go from here:
Scenario One: Radicalization of Shi’ites and Further Deadlock
Lebanon’s Shia community is dominated by Hezbollah, which, during most recent parliamentary elections, received the highest number of total votes and Shia votes. Domestically, the Shia community has been fiercely loyal to Hezbollah as it views the organization as the resistance that liberated Shia-dominated Southern Lebanon and supported the Shia community economically and socially. Additionally, Shia anger over the assassination of their Secretary-General may give rise to a more radical leader in the future. For example, after the assassination of Secretary-General Abbas al Musawi in 1992, most did not expect his replacement to be more forceful. However, Hassan Nasrallah proved to be a more capable leader and expanded the scope and power of the group. As such, a more radical leader may rise from within the party and lead to further sectarian tensions within the Lebanese system as Hezbollah fights to preserve its considerable influence. Such a scenario affects Lebanon negatively as the country requires consensus more than ever to resolve structural, economic, and social crises.
Scenario Two: Hezbollah’s Partial Retreat from Politics
Hezbollah did not specifically intend to enter the political sphere originally, focused as it was on resistance against Israel. Currently, and after decades of having to strike a careful balance between political and military considerations, the organization stands at a crossroads, one where it may choose to devote resources to one or the other imperative. A hypothetical partial retreat of Hezbollah from politics would have numerous consequences. First and foremost, it could improve the ability of Lebanon’s political parties to arrive at a consensus. Yet there would still be difficulties. Currently, the system operates mainly through Sunni, Shia, and Christian factions. Lebanese Christians are polarized and divided over key issues regarding support or opposition toward Hezbollah and disagreements on the identity of the next president, who is always a Maronite Christian. On the other hand, the Sunnis lack a unifying figure to lead them due to the absence of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who retired from politics in 2022 and urged his Sunni-dominated Future Movement to follow suit. The Shia community remains in mourning, while Hezbollah focuses on its fight against Israel. In this context, the only leadership figure for the Shia community remains the 86-year-old Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri. As such, it is anything but assured that this partial retreat of Hezbollah would produce increased consensus within the Lebanese political system.
Scenarios one and two assume that Hezbollah remains a militant organization in some shape or form. However, the third scenario addresses the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the potential disarmament of Hezbollah.
Scenario Three: Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701
The disarmament of Hezbollah remains a crucial factor in the full implementation of Security Council resolutions regarding Lebanon. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, a staunch opponent of Hezbollah, invited the party to renounce its weapons and remain solely a political party. Geagea’s approach signals flexibility on the part of the opposition, which realizes and begrudgingly accepts that Hezbollah is a rooted presence in Lebanese society and the Shia community and cannot be removed. Additionally, there are fears of sectarian clashes and at worst a potential reenactment of the civil war. In this context, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem declared that the party trusts Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri on reaching a ceasefire agreement with Israel. Yet Nabih Berri declared his commitment to 1701, which would seem to signal a potential readiness on the part of Hezbollah to offer concessions. If Resolution 1701 were to be implemented, Hezbollah would most likely carry on as a powerful and influential political party for the foreseeable future.
Uncharted Waters Ahead
The most beneficial scenario for Lebanon and Hezbollah remains the implementation of Resolution 1701, as this would preserve the Shia community and maintain the consociational nature of Lebanese politics without excluding any partner in the national parliament and government. Lebanon and Hezbollah ought to carefully maneuver the sweeping changes that are presently unfolding, changes that will almost certainly have regional repercussions for years. Any potential disarmament of Hezbollah would have consequential impacts on regional politics, specifically for the United States, Israel, and Iran, who may face new realities or potential gains. For Iran, the loss of Hezbollah as a proxy is unconceivable due to its extensive support and investments into the group. On the other hand, the United States and Israel would embrace such a scenario, seeing an opportunity to organize a second round of “Abraham Accords” in the near future.
