Shortly after his father’s death, twenty-five-year-old Pavel Prigozhin took over the reins of his father’s company, but with limited legitimacy. Little is known of Pavel’s childhood or teenage years, except that he was pampered and traveled on private yachts and jets. He fought in Syria alongside the Wagner Group, earning the organization’s “Black Cross” for outstanding military service. He also fought in Ukraine, where allegedly, his social media posts gave away his position, leading to his unit being bombed. Western sanctions have been extended to the children of Yevgeny Prigozhin, making it nearly impossible for Pavel to travel internationally.

Pavel’s age and lack of his father’s skills were ultimately his downfall, and most analysts believed the Kremlin would cut a deal to completely remove him from the picture, allowing Pavel to continue to earn money with the many other companies his father left him in a multibillion-dollar empire. Under Pavel’s leadership, Wagner began recruiting again, but then suddenly stopped. By October or November of 2023, Pavel was no longer leading the Wagner Group. There’s no official confirmation on Pavel’s whereabouts or what happened to him. He may have been sidelined or removed from power struggles within Russia. It’s also possible he’s involved with the PMCs in a less public role. Information about the Wagner Group and its leadership is often opaque and shrouded in secrecy.

While Pavel’s role, and even if he is still alive, remain unknown, it is known that Wagner’s commercial and military interests have been divided between Russia’s numerous intelligence services and Putin’s allies. Parts of the Wagner Group may have been absorbed into Rosgvardia, also known as the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. However, command over the largest part of Wagner’s overseas operations has been assumed by General Andrei Averyanov, a high-ranking officer in Russia’s military intelligence (GRU). General Andrey Averyanov, the former leader of a targeted assassination group, rose to international infamy for the failed poisoning of Russian dissident-in-exile, Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK in 2018.

The Defense Ministry established a number of other private military companies (PMCs) to recruit former Wagner men for operations in Africa or the Middle East. A PMC called Redut, established in 2008, has been fighting in Ukraine, while another PMC, Convoy, was established in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2022. Wagner’s Ukrainian operations now come under the name of the Volunteer Corps, while other arms-length, covert operations have been incorporated into the Expeditionary Corps. Effectively, the multibillion-dollar PMC business has been taken over by the Kremlin, with the Expeditionary Corps dubbed “Wagner 2.0.”

Russia’s strategy in using the PMCs is to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow’s influence while maintaining plausible deniability. They provide security for foreign leaders while also offering training for their troops and sometimes engaging in ground combat, providing combat support, or conducting special operations. The PMCs aid Moscow’s foreign policy objectives by carrying out military operations, projecting Russia’s power, furthering Moscow’s political influence, gathering intelligence, and generating revenue. In Mali and Sudan, the Wagner Group was instrumental in securing gold and diamond mines, ensuring that certain local military leaders continue to benefit from them, while also transporting precious metals and stones back to the Kremlin.

The Wagner Group was active in Libya from 2018. Russian PMCs are also fighting in Syria and Ukraine, and possibly in as many as 30 countries in total. Wagner had been propping up regimes across Africa, as well as controlling mineral extraction activity, namely in gold. Operations in Africa are continuing with mercenaries fulfilling existing contracts. The Kremlin is offering a “regime survival package” to governments in Africa in exchange for access to natural resources. The Russian government is also working to change mining laws in West Africa, attempting to unseat Western companies.

Now, those operations in Africa are continuing under the Africa Corps. Russia is negotiating with the Central African Republic to open a new military base there. The group is also active in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. The original plan was to recruit and place 40,000 Russian fighters across Africa. This target was reduced to 20,000, but by the end of 2023, even this reduced target had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the empty billets are being filled with recruits from Africa. Particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), former fighters are finding that they are unemployable after a UN ceasefire. So, they are taking jobs with the Russian PMCs.

Another region where Russian PMCs are active is the Sahel, encompassing countries bordering the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. It has become known as the ‘coup belt’ due to a recent surge in military takeovers. Since 2020, at least five successful coups have plagued the region, including two in Mali, two in Burkina Faso, and one in Niger. The three nations withdrew from the regional bloc – The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – and created their own “Alliance of Sahel States.”

These coups all shared a similar theme: the new military leaders distanced themselves from Western powers. French troops, deployed for years to combat jihadist activity from groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), were expelled or faced pressure to leave. Additionally, the juntas want the US military out of the region. It’s important to note that public dissatisfaction with government corruption and inability to address security concerns, including the rise of these terrorist groups, were also significant factors behind the coups, not just Western influence.

The United States is struggling to maintain its foothold in Africa’s Coup Belt, particularly after French troops were expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso. Washington seeks to prevent Russian PMCs from filling the security void. However, Moscow holds a certain appeal for the region’s newly established military juntas. Unlike Western powers, Russia doesn’t pressure them on human rights issues or democratic reforms. Additionally, the U.S. operates within the constraints of the international rules-based order, limiting its flexibility in negotiations. In contrast, Russia prioritizes its own interests and operates with less transparency, allowing it to deny involvement with PMCs. This opacity gives Russia an advantage, allowing them to cultivate influence in the region without directly committing troops.

The U.S. has several reasons for wanting to remain in the region. First, reports suggest the effectiveness of Russian PMCs in combating terrorism is debatable. Second, the U.S. is concerned about the potential for a detrimental economic impact on these already poverty-stricken countries. Cutting ties with Europe and facing potential sanctions could leave them economically dependent on Russia, with most of the wealth and benefits concentrated among the military rulers.

Furthermore, the coups have resulted in a curtailment of human rights and basic freedoms, with no expectation of full restoration. Unlike Western partners who would pressure for democratic reforms and respect for human rights, Russian PMCs like the Wagner Group are unlikely to exert any such influence. This lack of pressure is likely to further erode the quality of life for average citizens in these already struggling nations.

The presence of Russian PMCs is expected to expand in Africa, and with it, Russia’s influence. U.S. influence will decline unless Washington finds some way to dislodge the Russian PMCs. And unfortunately, citizens of these African countries will see a deterioration in their quality of life, standard of living, and general safety.

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No country believes in the geopolitical importance of CAR more than Russia, which had hitherto enjoyed preeminent influence in the country. However, the situation changed in December, when a private US military firm got involved with the administration of President Faustin Archange Touadéra, realizing a widely believed desire on the part of Touadéra to diversify the CAR’s foreign ties away from Moscow.

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While the specifics vary considerably – also due to the many contradictions of that day – almost all analysts agreed on one fundamental point: The mutiny was a clear signal of the fragility of Putin’s power apparatus, and likely the first falling tile triggering a domino chain that would ultimately result in his downfall, a (pro-democracy) regime change in Moscow, or even to the dissolution of Russia as a unified polity; which, in turn, would lead to Ukraine’s victory.

However, I disagree with this interpretation. On the contrary, I believe the event shows that Putin’s power system – and Russia as a state – are actually resilient. What underlies my conclusion is that, rather than focusing on wat has happened, we should concentrate on what did not.

Surely, the rebellion showed that there are cracks within Putin’s system, an unintended result of his divide et impera policies, combined with months of mounting rivalries between the Wagner Group and the regular military, exacerbated by the Ukraine war. Still, one month after the events, Putin remains in power, Russia is still a unified state, and the fighting in Ukraine continues with no foreseeable end in sight. Putin’s apparatus had to face a largely unexpected crisis, sustained the blow, and has so far managed to survive. This is almost a handbook example of resiliency. Quite literally at the end of the day, no top military or government official decided to switch sides and support Prigozhin – in contrast to what he had likely expected or at least hoped.

Here, I will open a brief digression on his possible motives. Many regarded his actions as an attempted coup to oust Putin and seize power. Some even drew parallels with precedent cases in Russia’s history – like the 1991 coup against Gorbachev, or the 1917 Revolution – and saw it as a prelude to the imminent collapse of Russia’s central government. But in my opinion, such historical analogies are oversimplistic and likely misleading. Prigozhin was neither an “old guard” military officer determined to defend the status quo, nor a revolutionary leader who strove to overthrow it. Instead, Prigozhin mainly echoes two non-Russia figures: the Athenian general Alcibiades and the 17^th-century commander of the Imperial-Catholic forces, Albrecht von Wallenstein. While differences naturally exist, all three were influential wartime leaders with considerable personal fortunes who, due to their power and deeds, eventually came to be regarded as a threat by their own side. Alcibiades defected first to rival Sparta and then to Persia, arch-enemy of the Greeks. Von Wallenstein was considering joining his Protestant enemies before being assassinated at the order of the Hapsburgs, the ruling Imperial family. Similarly, I believe that Prigozhin mutinied out of self-preservation. Frustrated and at odds with his own leadership, he decided to act boldly and march on Moscow, in the hope (if not the expectation) of garnering internal or external support along the way. However, things unfolded differently. He found himself politically and materially isolated, and had to back down. He then lost his position and almost all he had, except his life – at least for the time being. Putin, on the contrary, remains in power.

Of course, something might still be going on in the Kremlin’s black box, invisible to external observers, and other sudden events should not be ruled out. The mutiny also damaged – at least in the short term – the president’s image as a strong leader facing no internal opposition. But now the situation appears to be under control, and the main takeaway of Prigozhin’s mutiny and its aftermath appears to be that Putin’s power system is resilient to shocks.

Naturally, this is not intended as a definitive long-term assessment. As noted above, things might change yet again. But this conclusion provides insights with profound policy-making implications.

Other than the potential misleading effects of simplistic analogies, it is also important to avoid other cognitive fallacies, most notably wishful thinking. A consistent theme when reading and discussing about Prigozhin’s mutiny is that many interpretations seem driven by the conviction that Russia and Putin will surely be defeated. Many predict Putin’s and/or Russia’s ultimate collapse, regarding it as the inevitable and “just” outcome of the Ukraine war. Russia undeniably has considerable problems, and its defeat is a plausible scenario. However, Ukraine is also facing difficulties, and events on the ground remain inherently unpredictable. As such, moral considerations notwithstanding, there is no guarantee that Russia’s defeat is immanent, and neither that it will have the results that many wish.

In fact, the consequences may be very different. To begin with, even if Putin is ousted, it is well possible that his successor will not be a pro-democracy pacifist, but instead a hardliner ready to escalate the conflict. Similarly, if Russia falls into chaos and, and especially into civil war, Ukraine would probably win; however, new major challenges would also likely arise in the form of refugee flows as well as criminal organizations and external powers exploiting the power vacuum. This would also imply serious nuclear proliferation risks, as Russia’s vast arsenal would no longer be under the command of a single centralized entity, but rather scattered among multiple newborn polities or rebel and non-state armed groups, potentially raising the prospect of nuclear smuggling.

But most importantly, we should keep in mind that the outcome of wars is determined by material capabilities and strategic decisions; and the current situation on the battlefield is that both sides are struggling, leaving the outcome uncertain. Things might change in the coming weeks and months, both on the frontline and within the Kremlin, but as of now, the outcome of the Prigozhin mutiny shows the resiliency of Putin’s apparatus. Regarding Putin’s downfall and taking a Russian defeat for granted – both are cognitive fallacies that risk negative effects on the policy-making process.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Wagner has taken part in military operations in Syria, North African, Ukraine, and the Central African Republic. Their operations have left a bloody trail of civilians, with numerous massacres allegedly linked to the paramilitaries.

The Wagner Group is currently headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Kremlin insider who is associated with the hardliner clique. Prigozhin has nurtured a cult of personality through the activities of the organization, openly attacking the Russian Ministry of Defense for battlefield losses in Ukraine and, more recently, opening a ‘Wagner Center’ in Saint Petersburg to help incubate IT start-ups with potential military applications.

Dmitry Utkin, a far right GRU officer, also leads the mercenary outfit. Wagner has sought recruitment from the far-right sector of not only Russia, but also among foreigners who can make use of the group’s tactics back home if needed. For example, the Rusich Group, a subsidiary of Wagner, openly recruits neo-Nazis, fascists, and Duginists into its ranks.

Wagner gained its notorious status as a shadowy organization igniting flames in the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014, taking part in military operations at the behest of the GRU by arming pro-Russian militias. Wagner mercenaries were also part of the ‘unmarked’ Russian troops that deployed and annexed Crimea.

In Syria, Wagner would routinely take part in extortion and civilian massacres, all with the Syrian government’s tacit approval. Their prominence continued to grow as they helped the ill-equipped regime take back territory, particularly against Islamic State. In 2017, four Russian mercenaries savagely beat a Syrian army deserter to death, videotaping the murder and using a sledgehammer to torture and kill the man.

In February of 2018, the organization apparently tried to solidify its status as a premier fighting force by attacking a U.S Special Forces outpost in Eastern Syria. Several hundred Wagner mercenaries alongside Syrian government forces formed a convoy to assault thirty US Special Forces and their SDF allies, reportedly resulting in several hundred Wagner and Syrian casualties compared to one SDF and zero US killed or injured. Russia was embarrassed in the aftermath, downplaying the number of casualties among the Wagner mercenaries, despite first-hand testimonies from survivors describing scores of dead.

Taking advantage of power vacuums in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Wagner deployed forces to Africa in support of warlords aligned with their (national) geopolitical or (private) profit-making interests. The mercenaries played a role in the Second Libyan Civil War, fighting for General Khalifa Haftar when his rival government attempted to storm the capital of Tripoli. A Human Rights Watch report stated the group indiscriminately placed mines across the country, which continues to affect locals. The mercenaries were also tied to civilian executions before a ceasefire ended the fighting.

Wagner’s reputation only worsened amid involvement in African nations such as Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The organization has been tied to several massacres in the Central African Republic, to the point where the United Nations began probing their links to civilian executions this year.

In Mali, Wagner has propped up the military junta, which has been beneficial to Russian interests amid government requests for Russian weaponry and diplomatic support for stopping investigations by human rights groups into widespread crackdowns on dissidents. Wagner has been tied to civilian massacres in Mali as well.

In Sudan, Wagner has propped up the military junta that has repressed Sundanese civilians for the past several years. In exchange, the junta has allowed Wagner to smuggle gold on the black market. Sudanese miners have given first-hand accounts of the mercenaries threatening them with violence if they do not hand over their gold quotas, killing miners who disobey.

Wagner has taken a leading role in combat operations during the Ukraine war, where Yevgeny Prigozhin has used the group’s status to demonstrate their combat expertise vis-à-vis a faltering Russian MOD. Wagner is taking the lead in the Battle of Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast. However, this front has seen gains of just a few meters a day and no capture of this key logistical city despite months of fighting. The area represents the only place where Russian forces have managed to progress following the arrival of Western heavy weaponry.

Prigozhin has earned praise from Russian bloggers, ultranationalists, and other hardline oligarchs, despite his criticisms of Putin’s handling of the war — criticisms that Putin has rarely allowed during his autocratic rule. Along with these rebuffs of Russian MOD tactics, Prigozhin has gone out of his way to create self-defense forces along the Russian border of Ukraine and release convicts from Russian prisons into Wagner’s ranks, regardless of their crimes.

As Putin’s reputation deteriorates as the international community is more inclined to calls his bluffs, for example on tactical nuclear weapons or his faux withdrawal from the Black Sea wheat deal, Prigozhin looks to prop up Wagner and himself as Russia’s only trustworthy fighting force, and a potential successor if Putin’s regime collapses.

The Kremlin has yet to make a move despite the Wagner Group’s increasingly bold operations, suggesting that Putin is now in the position of needing its support despite widening encroachments on his authority. Regardless, the group’s trail of atrocities around the world make it a natural fit for a terrorist designation, which perhaps could help bring about an end to the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Kremlin to come to the negotiating table sooner rather than later.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

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In just a few years, the Wagner Group has emerged as one of Russia’s most (in)famous organizations, in particular for providing security services to pro-Kremlin factions in various warzones around the world. The outfit officially does not exist; it has a shadowy leadership, and it maintains close ties with the military and intelligence services of the Russian Federation. Often described as a private military company (PMC), meaning a mercenary enterprise offering security services to customers operating in dangerous areas, the Wagner Group is actually a conglomerate of firms whose ownership can be ultimately traced to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a rich businessman with close ties to the Kremlin. Besides security-focused entities, it includes energy and mining ventures – the typical clients of other PMCs. This is not only an example of a group controlling separate firms that operate in synergy, but is also an expression of Russia’s peculiar governance structure, where a few oligarchs who control strategic economic sectors are granted access to Putin’s circle and therefore exert considerable political power. The end result is significant overlap between public and private interests; and this has been a major driver of recent Russian foreign policy and how the Wagner Group has been dispatched around the world.

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The Wagner Group has been present in Libya at least since 2018. The country has a strategic importance for Russia’s energy firms, as it is rich in high-quality oil and is close to Italy, a key market and a gateway to Europe. Since 2014 Libya has been ravaged by a civil war between the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), which is protected by General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). Moscow backs the HoR, and oil represents a major driver in this decision. In 2008, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) concluded an agreement with Gazprom, followed by a deal with Rosneft in 2017, concerning oil fields in the east – the same area controlled by Haftar’s forces. According to a US Department of Defense report to Congress, as many as 2,500 Wagner-affiliated mercenaries were in Libya in the first quarter of 2020; and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has published evidence of Russian warplanes and of Wagner Group activities in the country, suggesting a Syria-like pattern.

The Wagner Group is also present in the Central African Republic (CAR). The country is torn by a conflict involving the central government and various rebel groups, notably the Muslim-majority Séléka and the Christian-dominated anti-Balaka. To deal with them, in early 2018 the authorities contracted Russian mercenaries to train local security forces and protect President Touadera, who even raised the possibility of hosting a Russian base in the country. But the CAR is also rich in mineral resources, particularly gold, uranium, diamonds and oil. Russian mercenaries were soon deployed to defend the mining sites and in 2019 a firm belonging to Prigozhin’s conglomerate (Lobaye Invest) was granted gold and diamond extraction rights. These activities seemingly took a sinister turn in 2018, when three Russian journalists who were investigating Wagner’s involvement in mining were mysteriously killed. Bellingcat’s inquiry reveals that ‘Mazay’ had been in the CAR just three weeks before their assassination. Later, other reporters who tried to clarify the circumstances of their death were harassed.

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Russia’s use of irregular forces

Russian law technically forbids the existence of private military contractors (PMCs), yet observers have spotted Russian mercenaries deployed in conflict zones ranging from Syria, Ukraine, and most recently in African countries. Since PMCs don’t technically exist in Russia, their activities aren’t directly tied to Kremlin policy, granting them flexibility over the scope of their operations. PMCs act as tools of Russian foreign policy, creating opportunities for Russia to increase its presence in Africa. The Wagner Group, a Russian PMC allegedly headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch and close friend of Putin, spearheads Russian mercenary operations across Africa. Nevertheless, the Wagner Group’s forces remain cheap and ill-equipped compared to American PMCs. As a result, the United States and its European allies could potentially gain influence in Africa by collaborating with local governments, increasing economic cooperation, and forging genuine diplomatic ties in regions where Russia has failed.

Mozambique

Mozambique’s rampant terrorist insurgencies led its government to host Russian mercenaries, but they have thus far failed to contain the threat. In September 2019, Wagner Group forces deployed to Mozambique to combat the so-called Islamic State’s Central Africa Province’s (IS-CAP) insurgency in the northern Cabo Delgado province. Before deciding to host Russian mercenaries, Mozambique entertained offers from both U.S. and Russian PMCs, declining an offer from an experienced American firm in favor of cheaper Russian forces. Mozambique’s President, Felipe Nyusi, likely felt an obligation toward Russia for its decision to forgive over 90% of the debt Mozambique owed to Moscow; the president also thanked Russia for the former Soviet Union’s role in aiding Mozambique’s independence movement. As a result, Russian advisors and equipment arrived in hopes of aiding President Nyusi’s campaign against the insurgents. Additionally, Russia and Mozambique struck deals allowing Russian businesses to extract liquefied natural gas. The deal, whose feasibility relied on Wagner’s success in Mozambique, held the potential to increase economic cooperation and even expand new pipelines across southern Africa.

The Wagner force’s inability to combat IS-CAP’s insurgency in Mozambique led to a humiliating withdrawal from the region. When Wagner forces arrived, the mercenaries failed to understand the local environment or cooperate with the Mozambican military, regularly sustaining casualties from IS-CAP ambushes. In late October, IS-CAP killed seven mercenaries and 20 Mozambican soldiers in two separate attacks, after successfully blocking roads and attacking convoys. The attacks stemmed from Wagner’s inability to cooperate with the local military, and the mercenaries were said to not even have the capacity to communicate in the same language.

In November, Wagner’s forces evacuated Cabo Delgado – proof of the group’s failure to contain the IS-CAP’s insurgency. Nine months later, in August, the insurgents successfully captured the strategic port town of Mocimboa da Praia. American PMCs, unlike the Russians, could potentially move into the region and collaborate with local forces while successfully navigating the terrain. American businesses, as a result, could develop ties in Mozambique and craft deals to extract natural gas reserves, increasing influence in a region traditionally allied with Russia.

Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) remains one of Russia’s key allies in Sub-Saharan Africa, granting Moscow economic concessions in exchange for military advisors and training. In 2018, Russia sent President Faustin-Archange Touadera, the CAR’s President, 175 instructors to train military personnel and police to protect against rebels in the country’s seemingly endless civil war. Since then, Russia has provided the CAR with military assistance and developed economic ties. The CAR granted Russian businesses key diamond mining concessions and allowed Russia to organize newspapers and radio stations in its capital, Bangui.

The Wagner Group implements most of Russia’s military and economic assistance to the CAR, often working with other Russian businesses belonging to Prigozhin. These businesses exploit the CAR’s local divisions in the Kremlin’s favor, driving profits for Russian businesses while prolonging the civil war. Over 80% of the CAR remains under rebel control, and despite Touadera’s access to Russian weaponry and expertise, his forces have struggled to establish control in the rest of the country. Wagner, along with providing military training, allegedly collaborates with these rebels to exploit the local population. Wagner forces reportedly coordinated with rebel forces to allow a Russian mining company to access diamond mines in insurgent territory, undermining their wider objective in the region.

As the CAR’s civil war reaches its eighth year, Russian forces have failed to end the conflict. Militia groups continue to engage the government and each other as religious and ethnic divisions complicate any peace prospects in the region. All the while, Russian mercenaries profit from the CAR’s diamond mines while advising the country’s leaders. Despite granting Russia heightened influence in the CAR, Wagner forces failed deliver any decisive victories in the civil war to the Touadera government. Quite the contrary, peace seems unlikely as ever in the near future, and mercenaries remain stationed in Bangui with little international oversight.

The CAR’s case exhibits the exploitative practices of Russian PMCs. African states should realize that Russia will likely prolong conflicts when it deploys its mercenaries. Collaborating with the United States and its allies by crafting detailed plans of action could bring stability to various conflict zones and security to local populations.

Opportunities for the United States

Russia’s limited resources as a state, ignorance of African geography and cultures, and sub-standard equipment prevent the Kremlin from achieving decisive military objectives in the region, presenting the United States and its allies with key opportunities for cooperation. Developing economic ties with states that Russian firms have failed in, such as Mozambique, could potentially balance against the Kremlin in Africa. Additionally, African investments could grant the United States key inroads in the region, building allies as American businesses fund important projects. U.S. firms, unlike Russian ones, could lay the groundwork for partnerships in Africa, allowing the United States to balance against its adversaries while helping to alleviate the region’s security concerns.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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