The fall of Goma, the administrative center of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu Province, to the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in late January has significantly upped the ante in the country’s longstanding unrest. What had until now been a localized civil war between the Kinshasa government and a pro-Rwandese rebellion threatens to set ablaze the region.
By taking Goma, the M23 and Rwanda crossed a Rubicon, as Kinshasa’s leaders cannot brook an all-out invasion of North and South Kivu without a response. The two provinces counted prewar over 15 million inhabitants and are home to fabulous natural resources. After the fall of Goma, angry Congolese rioters descended upon Kinshasa to ask for an international reaction against the Rwanda-M23 challenge. These people are unlikely to tolerate government inaction for much longer. That the Alliance Fleuve Congo, the political arm of the M23, vowed to march on Kinshasa renders the status quo all the more untenable for Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi. Even if government forces managed to contain the M23 in the Kivu, the region might become an enclave from which a nationwide offensive might start at a later date. One recalls the fate of the Assad regime, recently crushed by a rebellion long confined to Syria’s northwest and believed to pose no serious threat. For all these reasons, Kinshasa has little option other than to mount a massive military response to retake its eastern borders.
On paper, the Congolese military should easily triumph over the M23. It has over 130,000 troops, against the M23’s perhaps 8,000 and Rwanda’s 30,000. However, the Congolese army might need months to prepare for a reconquest of the country. It is primarily a light infantry territorial defense force ill-suited for large offensive operations. Its equipment remains overwhelmingly antiquated. The morale is low, explaining why the M23 faced little resistance despite having only a few thousand warriors. It also lacks air power, which would be critical to help stymie and push back the M23 in such an immense country.
Other factors complicate the DRC’s task. The rugged mountain and rainforest terrain of the Kivu makes an offensive against an entrenched M23-Rwanda coalition perilous, asking for heavy firepower and a large and motivated army. Uganda is another conundrum. It has long supported M23 and wants its part of the eastern Congo pie. It is a major threat, as it musters a competent, well-armed military. In February, Ugandan troops entered DRC territory, officially to help Congolese forces secure the Ituri province. But it is unclear to what extent the Ugandans imposed their presence upon Kinshasa, and the move resembles a soft takeover made under duress. In any case, the DRC needs forces to keep an eye on this ambitious neighbor. In addition, there is a plethora of other armed groups roaming Congo, making it hard to concentrate the whole Congolese military against Rwanda-M23.
In that context, Congo will need a large and high-spirited force to reclaim its territory sooner rather than later. Unsurprisingly, the Congolese president has called for young people to enroll in the military massively. Some form of conscription or mobilization might be necessary to achieve sufficient troop numbers at a reasonable cost. Indeed, Kinshasa has a very limited treasury, and it will be hard-pressed to provide simultaneously additional personnel, weaponry, and improved training and pay to redress morale and combativeness.
Rwanda, too, cannot back down. Now that its auxiliaries in Congo have seized Goma and the DRC has no choice but to prepare for war, Kigali must go all in or all out. It seems the decision is already made; Rwandan soldiers are engaged in Congo in the thousands and have lost many men in the conflict. The M23 is actively establishing an administration of conquered areas, suggesting a long-term takeover, and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame shows no sign of changing course. Indirect control or even direct annexation of the Kivu would allow Rwanda to acquire the region’s mineral wealth, grow its population, and secure a territorial buffer in its west. Meanwhile, If Congo were to reclaim its borders and become a stable, strong state, small Rwanda would face the unpleasant long-term prospect of facing a giant neighbor several times more populous and wealthier.
The Rwandans are likely aware that Congo cannot leave this challenge unanswered. If the DRC successfully mobilizes, Rwanda will be unable to win an attrition war. Its active military is relatively small, and the country’s population is only 14 million. Also, the DRC has more men of military age than Rwanda’s entire population. It would have to mobilize large numbers of people, and its economy would suffer heavily. If Congolese forces were to gain the upper hand, there is also no guarantee that the fight would stop at the border. Goma is a border town, so clashes could easily spill over in Rwanda. In a worst-case scenario, the Congolese may wish to take revenge and eliminate the threat by invading Rwanda and overthrowing the Kagame government, which indeed appears concerned about such an outcome. Rwanda cannot win an attrition war, and a mobilized Congo might rend Rwanda.
All of this will push Rwandese leaders toward preemptive and quick military action. Rwanda-M23 cannot afford to face a mobilized DRC. Better fight in central Congo now than in central Rwanda tomorrow. This would hardly be a first, as Rwandese forces pushed deep into Congolese territory during the First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars. Kagame will be tempted to repeat such a feat and stifle the DRC before it is ready for action. In any case, bringing forth a ‘Greater Rwanda,’ as some in Kigali yearn for, will require securing the Kivu region and decisively weakening the DRC.
Moreover, the passing of time increases the risk of an international coalition forming to liberate eastern Congo, which would weaken Rwanda’s hand still more. Burundian forces are already fighting alongside the Congolese military against the M23, with perhaps 10,000 troops. Rwanda and Burundi have a poisonous relationship and wish to outmaneuver each other in eastern Congo. The Burundians fear being next on Rwanda’s target list if the Kivu falls and will likely fight hard to salvage the DRC’s position. The recent spate with South Africa served as a warning that other African powers could join the fray, too. All of this further pushes Rwanda toward immediate military action. Better defeat Congo now than to wait until it mobilized and received foreign reinforcements.
The predicament that befell Congo has no easy fix, and the spiral toward war is unlikely to be stopped from the outside. The West, absorbed by the war in Ukraine and already confronting strategic crises all over the globe, has little bandwidth for direct intervention in Central African matters. Russia and China, historically close to the DRC, may provide some support, but they, too, are busy on other fronts, and decisive intervention is similarly improbable. Those with stakes in the area should thus brace for a major clash of arms.
