Nearly every day, the U.S. and its allies face cyber-attacks originating from some combination of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, along with other hostile actors. Russian and Chinese spies operate within Western societies as well as in key allied nations in Asia, such as Taiwan and Japan, much like during the Cold War era. And in more kinetic terms, the Houthis, an Iran-backed proxy, continue to routinely launch attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, damaging the supply line security of the wider global economy, and the Ukraine war rages in eastern Europe. In the financial realm, billions are being siphoned out of public coffers or laundered via crypto or financial crimes. And inter-state conflict is now reaching into outer space, where China and Russia are actively developing weapons able to target Western satellites critical for navigation, communication, and targeting systems.
Few could deny the veracity of the above trends; taken together, they are reflective of a new era, one where the boundaries of warfare have broadened, and conflicts extend far beyond traditional military engagements. This is a shift back toward ‘total war,’ where entire societies and economies are mobilized and in turn become targets. Once again technology is playing a leading role; for example, advances in drone warfare, cyber attacks, and space-based operations enabling novel ways to strike at military, economic, and civilian targets. Yet unlike the recent past, notably the 9/11 era where perceived threats were primarily land-based, today’s major geopolitical revolve around the sea, particularly in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where tensions between the United States and China play out, as well as in the Black and Red seas.
This new form of total war often overlaps with the concept of limited war. For example, the US Navy considers itself already in a state of war in the waters off Yemen, yet the United States is not technically at war with the state of Yemen, and if hostilities were to escalate further, Washington and its allies would likely respond by intensifying airstrikes rather than a formal declaration of inter-state war.
Past experience does little to prepare the U.S. and its allies for the challenges of modern total war. Unlike the open, pitched battles of World War II or the mutually accepted rules of engagement of the Cold War, today’s conflicts stretch across numerous domains, intertwining military, economic, and civilian spheres in unprecedented ways.
While the Cold War saw intense competition, it contained only a fraction of what defines modern total war. The superpowers clashed indirectly, engaging in proxy wars, arms races, and psychological battles to assert their ideologies and extend influence. Espionage was rampant, with the CIA and KGB conducting covert operations to sway foreign governments and gather intelligence. Propaganda and psychological warfare shaped public perception through broadcasts and cultural projects, while economic sanctions and trade wars drove further division. The competition extended into space with the “space race” and on the ground with alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which solidified opposing blocs. Even sports and cultural exchanges became platforms for ideological superiority, as both sides sought to expand their influence and maintain a balance of power without triggering open warfare.
In contrast, modern total war encompasses all these elements but on a far broader and more complex scale. For example, in the contemporary context the internet has amplified the impact of psychological warfare and influencing operations, allowing propaganda to be disseminated more broadly than ever imagined during the Cold War. Espionage can now be conducted from thousands of miles away through hacking, while human agents can travel freely between countries without raising suspicion. Sanctions, too, have become more efficient and enforceable, with adversaries expelled from financial networks at the flip of a switch and banks that violate sanctions swiftly penalized. The space race has also evolved into a competition to weaponize space, expanding anti-access/area denial umbrellas to include enemy satellites.
The nature of the arms race has also changed, driven at the speed of technological advancement. Great powers pour money into research as they race to develop superior weapons. Military scholar J.F.C. Fuller’s concept of “the constant tactical factor” suggests that each next-generation technology or weapon inevitably gives rise to a counter-weapon. For example, drones that initially appeared to be game-changers in the early months of the Ukraine war were rendered obsolete by drone-jamming technology introduced within the same year. Similarly, Iran’s launch of sophisticated missiles against Israel was thwarted by Israel’s advanced defense systems, which inevitably will force Iran to upgrade its own capabilities for future strikes.
This relentless cycle of innovation and obsolescence evokes one of the economic dimensions of modern warfare, and it clearly favors those states with the largest research budgets. The Iran-Israel example also highlights the economic burden of defense, as Israel’s defense systems cost dramatically more than the Iranian missiles they intercept. The same costly technology is required to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Deterrence and the threat of mutual destruction kept the world relatively stable during the Cold War and arguably still does today. Credible threats remain essential tools of both deterrence and total war. For instance, the U.S. wields sanctions as a deterrent, and their credibility is evident in the number of countries under U.S. sanctions. China, for example, curtails its actions regarding Taiwan and limits its support for Russia in the Ukraine war out of fear of economic repercussions. Similarly, Russia leverages its nuclear arsenal as a threat, with the U.S. and EU showing caution by hesitating to provide certain weapons to Ukraine or restricting the use of others.
The 2022 US National Defense Strategy has been described as “deterrence by resilience,” but for deterrence to be effective, it must be credible. If a threat is never acted upon, it risks losing its power, as adversaries may begin to anticipate it and adjust their strategies accordingly.
After the Cold War ended, the next major era in defense began with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The “war on terror” shifted military focus away from inters-tate conflicts, sidelining traditional warfare concepts. While war remained central, it was mostly contained, limited in scale, and fought in remote regions against elusive non-state actors, ranging from individual terror cells to large organizations like Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. For much of this century, US military planning de-emphasized the likelihood of major wars among states, treating conflicts with powers like China as distant possibilities rather than immediate threats.
Alongside traditional terrorist threats, non-state actors have included foreign mercenaries and volunteer forces. The war in Ukraine, for example, has seen the largest number of foreign fighters since the Spanish Civil War. Russia’s use of private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group is reminiscent of the feudal era, when kings would hire large foreign forces to fight on their behalf.
Coalition-building has become a defining feature of modern warfare, evolving beyond NATO, which was originally established to address threats during World War II and the Cold War. In Afghanistan, the U.S. operated as part of a 40-nation coalition. In the Red Sea, the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of 55 nations, protects merchant vessels from Houthi attacks. Though each nation flies its own flag and pursues its own national interests, they share a common objective, enabling them to operate alongside one another. In Ukraine, the U.S. provides Kyiv with defense intelligence and satellite support for navigation, communication, and targeting, while offering similar support to Israel in its conflict with Hamas. Likewise, Beijing has supplied indirect support to Russia, and troops from North Korea have been sighted on the Ukrainian battlefield.
With new technologies and a deeply interconnected global economy, modern conflicts now target civilian infrastructure, economies, and information networks alongside military assets, extending well beyond traditional warfare models. The Ukraine conflict highlights the need for resilient supply chains, rapid mobilization, and advanced intelligence, while the Israel-Hamas conflict shows how asymmetrical tactics and information warfare shape global opinion. These blurred lines between civilian and military targets are defining features of total war, where entire societies become involved.
To prepare for this new paradigm, the U.S. and its allies must bolster defense in a similarly comprehensive way, safeguarding critical infrastructure, technology, and supply chains, while recognizing at the highest policy levels that modern hostilities don’t start and end on the battlefield.
