How the PLA Navy continues to expand over the short- and medium-term is a matter of mounting concern for US policymakers and military strategists. China’s ongoing shipbuilding and force modernization programs expect to grow the PLA Navy to 395 ships by 2025, and 435 ships by 2030. In contrast, the US Navy was fielding 296 battle ships as of August 2024, and US efforts to catch up are complicated by the yawning gap in shipbuilding capacity between China and the United States. Just how big is this gap? According to a leaked US Navy briefing, China has a domestic shipbuilding capacity 232 times greater than the United States.

The PLA Navy may be winning in terms of quantity, but the US maintains a qualitative edge, albeit one that is rapidly diminishing over time. To quote an unclassified US naval intelligence briefing on China’s shipbuilding program in 2020: “Chinese naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [US Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gaps in any areas of deficiency. There is inevitably some fog of war here in that the PLA Navy remains untested by actual combat with a peer adversary, and the opaque nature of China’s politics typically obscures any disclosure that might suggest the modernization program is not a rousing success, with some notable exceptions such as the reported sinking of a cutting-edge submarine while in dock in September 2024.

This backgrounder will break down the PLA Navy by vessel type, examining force structure, capabilities, new platforms, respective roles in China’s overall maritime strategy:

Aircraft Carriers

• 1 Type 001 Operational (Liaoning)
• 1 Type 002 Operational (Shandong)
• 1 Type 003 in Late Testing (Fujian)
• 1 Type 004 under Construction

China currently possesses three aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian. These carriers, with their expansive flight decks, are central to the PLA Navy’s power projection capacity, as they allow for the launching and retrieval of both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft.

The PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier was the Liaoning (Type 001). Commissioned in 2012, the Liaoning is a refitted Soviet Kuznetsov-class vessel, mainly serving as a training and weapons testing platform, though still fully operational for combat. The Shandong (Type 002), commissioned in 2019, is China’s first domestically built carrier and is regarded as an improved version of the Liaoning, featuring more advanced systems. The most recent addition is the Fujian (Type 003), launched in 2022, which represents a significant leap in capability with its flat-top design and electromagnetic catapults, similar to US supercarriers.

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• Massive external money flows and weak institutions have made Cambodia fertile ground for trans-national criminal networks.
• Crime and governance metrics have rapidly deteriorated since 2021.
• Human and narcotic trafficking, fraud, and smuggling are increasingly common.

Transnational crime in Southeast Asia poses a mounting threat to regional stability and global security, affecting countries as far away as North America, Europe, and Oceania. Chinese-backed networks operating in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia exploit corruption and weak governance for drug trafficking, cyber scams, and human trafficking. In the Kingdom of Cambodia, abandoned Special Economic Zones, casinos, and hotels have become hubs for these activities. Cities like Sihanoukville, Poipet, and Bavet are now regional centers of organized crime, involving not only Chinese and local networks but also groups like the Japanese Yakuza.

After Cambodia joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese investment and tourism surged. Developers began building casinos and resorts aimed at Chinese customers, capitalizing on the demand for both in-person and online gambling, which remains illegal in China. However, a 2019 Cambodian law banning online gambling reduced the profitability of these ventures, and the 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns further devastated in-person tourism and gambling. In response, these operations turned to alternative income sources, leading to partnerships with transnational organized crime groups and human trafficking networks, fueling an increase in criminal activity.

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• Regional powers are catching up to US military capacity in the Indo-Pacific, eroding its former unrivaled position.
  
• Washington lags behind China on economic relationships and diplomatic influence.

The most recent military rankings for Asia released by the Lowy Institute note a significant rise in China’s position, narrowing the gap with the United States, and reflecting the shifting geopolitics of the region. The boost is largely down to China’s expanding economic and diplomatic ties in Asia, as well as the modernization and growth of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Russia, while maintaining its second-place ranking, has seen a sharp decline in military power amid the ongoing Ukraine war, which has drained Moscow’s resources and weakened its presence in Asia. India has also climbed the ranks, surpassing Japan as the fourth most powerful nation globally, and third in Asia. However, India’s ability to project power far from its shores remains limited. While China has greater reach than India, Beijing still lacks a network of overseas military bases, and the PLA Navy is not yet a blue-water force capable of projecting power far from home. On the other hand, the most likely flashpoint for a US-China conflict is Taiwan, a theater where China’s military capabilities are at their strongest.

Breaking down the rankings

The Lowy Institute Asia Power Index ranks the relative strength of 27 countries and territories across the region, from Pakistan to Russia, and as far into the Pacific as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In doing so it focuses on 131 indicators across eight key areas: military capability, defense networks, economic capability, economic relationships, diplomatic influence, cultural influence, resilience, and future resources.

The Global Fire Power (GFP) Index, a separate ranking system, similarly places the United States first, Russia second, China third, and India fourth globally. Unlike the Lowy Index, which considers broader factors like diplomatic and cultural influence, GFP focuses primarily on specifically military considerations such as manpower, airpower, land forces, naval forces, economics, logistics, and military budgets. Based on these metrics, the U.S. remains far ahead of China, with a GDP of about 50% larger and a military budget more than three times greater: $916 billion for the U.S. to China’s $296 billion. However, some analysts argue that due to purchasing power parity—where money stretches further in China than in the United States—the gap between the two countries’ defense spending may not be as large as the nominal dollar figures suggest. The U.S. boasts over 13,000 aircraft compared to China’s 3,000, and 11 in-service aircraft carriers, while China has three: the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian.

Russia currently leads in nuclear capability, with 1,549 deployed strategic warheads and an additional 1-2,000 non-strategic warheads. The United States is close behind with 1,419 deployed strategic warheads and a total stockpile of 3,748 warheads. China, lagging in numbers, has around 500 nuclear weapons, 310 of which are assigned to strategic launchers. However, Beijing is rapidly expanding its arsenal and could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States still dominate in overall numbers, China’s nuclear capabilities are growing fast.

There are important qualitative differences when delving into the rankings. For example, at first glance, China and the United States appear nearly equal in some areas, like submarines—China has 61, just three fewer than the United States. However, the U.S. has a much larger fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, which can stay submerged longer and operate farther from home, while China relies more on less-capable diesel-electric subs with shorter ranges. Simply comparing numbers doesn’t reflect overall military power. That’s why the Lowy Index is more comprehensive, taking into account factors like alliances and diplomatic power on top of military assets.

Diplomatic dimensions of military power

Overall, the United States remains a dominant force in Asia and the world, with power trending upward, though still below its 2018 peak. It leads in six of eight categories, including future resources, resilience, defense networks, cultural influence, economic strength, and military power. It’s not a clean sweep, however, as China surpasses the United States in economic relationships and diplomatic influence. On the latter, the U.S. fell to third place behind Japan due to its commitments elsewhere in the world and less concentrated diplomatic efforts in Asia.

The United States generally avoids joining multinational trade agreements and groupings, while China leads initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This involvement boosts China’s economic and diplomatic influence according to the Lowy Index, but whether this translates into an advantage in a potential war is debatable. The United States is part of NATO, AUKUS, and the Quad, and has bilateral defense agreements with numerous nations, whereas China’s only formal defense agreement is with North Korea. The most powerful country aligned with China in a hypothetical conflict with the United States is Russia.

China and Russia’s growing defense cooperation has strengthened both nations’ military capabilities. China supports Russia’s defense industry, helping sustain its war in Ukraine, while Russia’s arms sales have bolstered China’s air, naval, and missile capabilities. Despite increased joint military exercises, the two countries still lack full interoperability and do not have a formal mutual defense agreement. This partnership complicates US defense strategy as it tries to manage threats in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The U.S. is also tied up with supporting Ukraine and is involved in conflicts in the Middle East. Yet conversely, Russia’s own commitments amid the Ukraine war limit its ability to aid China significantly in a hypothetical war with the United States. While China’s potential alliances remain uncertain, Washington’s capacity to handle a near-peer conflict alongside its global commitments is also in question.

India passes Japan in the rankings

In 2024, India surpassed Japan to become the third-most powerful country in Asia, with a 2.8-point increase in its overall score. Its greatest strength is in future resources, ranking just behind the United States and China, while its weakest area is economic relationships, partly due to limited participation in regional integration. Despite improvements in resilience, diplomatic influence, and military capability, India’s regional influence remains below expectations, as shown by its widening negative power gap. Although India has made gains, its performance in defense networks and economic relationships has declined, slipping to 9th and 10th places respectively.

In comparing India and Japan’s military power, India has a significant advantage in manpower, with an active military about six times the size of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Including paramilitary forces adds approximately 2.5 million more troops to India’s total. India’s defense budget is about 50% larger than Japan’s, and although Japan has a larger GDP, it carries far more external debt, which could complicate war financing. India also outmatches Japan in aircraft, tanks, and has about 90% more naval vessels, though Japan’s merchant fleet is three times larger. Another key difference is that India possesses an estimated 172 nuclear warheads, while Japan has none.

Japan’s strengths lie in diplomatic influence, where it ranked 2nd, surpassing the United States, and in defense networks, with a 13.1-point boost due to increased cooperation with the U.S. and regional allies such as Australia, the United Kingdom, India, France, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, its weakest areas are resilience and future resources, where it ranks 7th. While Japan has made modest gains in military capability, it still lags behind India, whose growing military strength and regional influence have solidified its position as a formidable power.

China’s rise in military strength and diplomatic reach, coupled with Russia’s ongoing involvement in Ukraine, is forcing the United States and its allies to rethink strategies in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. While China’s power has seemingly plateaued below the United States, it remains a dominant force in Asia. Russia, on the other hand, is losing relevance in the region as the Ukraine war drains its resources. India, now the third-most powerful country in Asia, has growing potential but still falls short of fully capitalizing on its resources. Japan, while surpassed by India in terms of military power, remains a top economic power and is evolving into an active player in defense and security diplomacy.

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China remains a critical market for multinational firms. It is the world’s second-largest economy and the largest manufacturing and trading state. China is also among the world’s greatest beneficiaries of foreign direct investment (FDI). As of the mid-2010s, approximately a third of China’s GDP could be traced to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), their supply chains, and the consumer spending of related employees. However, shifting policies, slower economic growth, changing consumer behavior, and geopolitical tensions are now prompting a rethink of China strategy among many foreign companies.

A Shifting Policy Environment Elbows Out Foreign Firms

Foreign firms have always regarded China’s policy environment as challenging. China reserves a substantial portion of its economy for the state or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a Negative List for Market Access. Beijing further restricts the access of foreign companies through its Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access, while the financial sector has its own additional restrictions. And while the number of sectors from which foreign firms are excluded has been substantially reduced over time, China is still among the most restrictive of the world’s largest economies.

China’s industrial policies increasingly aim to shift the balance in favor of Chinese firms. The “Made in China 2025” (MIC25) program, announced in 2015, includes targets for Chinese firms to displace foreign firms in domestic and international markets across 10 key technology areas. Further support in these areas is embedded in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025).

Together, these policies enhance longstanding industrial supports, including subsidies for Chinese companies in R&D, training, specialized industrial parks, foreign asset acquisitions, as well as preferential access to finance and government procurement. The policies reinforce signals to the banking sector, investors, entrepreneurs, and others as to which sectors they should support.

Meanwhile, Beijing continues to force foreign firms to share technology in exchange for market access. The lack of intellectual products (IP) protection in China has cost foreign companies hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenues, and Chinese theft of IP may have cost trillions more.

Stronger local capabilities and the increasing assertiveness of these policies have produced growing concern among foreign investors. Ultimately, foreign multinationals trying to do business in China must ask nowadays the difficult question of whether China is still investable in the long term, as geopolitics and economic pressures further compound the dilemma. Reasonably, all Western strategic investments should pass through a critical analysis of possible ‘Cold War 2’ consequences. This means that China often may turn out a grey zone and the strategy of ‘in-China-for China’ may not be workable even from the most primary business perspective. Practical examples in this regard include Mitsubishi’s withdrawal from the China market and the systematic pressuring of Tesla by electric vehicles manufactured by Chinese companies supported by Beijing.

National Security Restrictions Looming Ever Larger

While many aspects of China’s Cybersecurity Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and Data Security Law are similar to those found in other countries, limits on cross-border data transfers and related requirements on source codes, rights for government access, and for companies to keep data within servers located in China have been described by some as paradigm-shifting and unprecedented. China’s expansion of its National Security Law and raids on foreign consulting companies have raised fears that even normal business analysis could be subject to arbitrary enforcement. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, passed in June 2021 just a week after the Biden administration banned investment in 59 Chinese companies for aiding China’s military and security forces, allows China to seize assets from companies that comply with foreign sanctions on China and to take action against senior managers of such firms – and their family members.

China also requires firms over a certain size to have Chinese Communist Party cells. By 2018, an estimated 73% of private companies in China had set up such cells, including more than 100,000 such cells in foreign-invested companies. The extension of control by China’s party-state over all aspects of Chinese society has become a hallmark of the Xi Jinping era. In 2016, President Xi called for the Party to integrate Party leadership “into all aspects of corporate governance.” This includes the private economy, impacting both domestic and foreign companies.

China’s Economic Indicators Turn Negative

Mounting policy concerns are being compounded by a negative turn in China’s economic indicators. The size and growth of the Chinese market have long been the main attraction for foreign companies. However, slower economic growth, a greying demographic, and an imploding property sector have changed the “China story.” China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) claimed that the goals of overcoming abject poverty and establishing a middle-income standard of living had finally been achieved, relegating the pursuit of headline economic growth in favor of nurturing key technologies, self-sufficiency, and national security. The shift is quite significant in terms of overall growth, with many analysts expecting rates to fall from the 7% averages of previous years to 3-4% annually.

The competitive environment has also changed. While foreign companies were once technology and quality leaders in China, this is often no longer the case. China has become an innovation leader in artificial intelligence, high-speed rail, e-commerce, and e-marketing. Chinese companies have become a global force in electric vehicles, consumer electronics, telecommunications equipment, solar panels, and many other industries, competing not only in the low end but increasingly in premium segments and industries as well. Localization and Chinese cultural branding are becoming more important, particularly to younger Chinese, and Chinese consumers have taken to e-marketing and e-commerce to a greater extent than anywhere else in the world.

Slower domestic growth and increased competitive pressures have made the China investment story less compelling, and this is reflected in FDI numbers that have been in constant decline since Feb 2022, with investment outflows surpassing inflows as of May 2023.

Between 1996 and 2010, foreign companies accounted for more than 50% of China’s exports by value. This share has been in structural decline but remains significant at just below one third at present. In addition, foreign companies enjoy profit margins about 15% higher than their Chinese counterparts, implying greater capital efficiency. For example, in 2022, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) accounted for 20.7% of industrial enterprises’ business revenue but 23.8% of profits. That compares to 2005 when FIEs accounted for 31.6% of revenue but 28% of profits. From a fiscal standpoint, FIEs are also very important, accounting for 17.6% of national tax revenue in 2022. Even so, China’s FDI outflows are gradually surpassing its inflows.

There is also the matter of currency controls, which falls under the prerogative of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). SAFE divides foreign currency transactions into those under the current account and those under the capital account. Capital account transactions are related to foreign direct investment (i.e., changes in a company’s registered capital), the purchase and sale of equity or debt securities, and trade credit or loans. These need approval from SAFE, while current account transactions can be made directly through banks.

SAFE reserves the right to regulate the percentage of foreign currency a company may have as part of its capital account. These fluctuate according to China’s Balance of Payments, which refers to transactions between the entities and individuals of two countries.

Firewall between Trade and Geopolitics Crumbles

Foreign companies in China are finding themselves caught up in global geopolitics to a greater extent than ever before. Several Korean companies found themselves frozen out of the Chinese market after the deployment of the US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-missile system in 2017. Lotte, which once had extensive operations across China, has essentially exited the market. Samsung Electronics, once one of the largest investors in China, closed its last smartphone factory in China in 2019 and its last personal computer and television factories in 2020. In a classic case of Beijing’s selective deployment of non-tariff barriers in service of its foreign policy, Norwegian firms and products were barred from China after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to dissident author Liu Xiaobo. It took six years and a written apology from Oslo to normalize trade relations. China-Australia relations nosedived in 2020 after Canberra criticized China for refusing to share more information on the origins of COVID-19. H&M had retail leases and online access blocked after the company said it would not source cotton from Xinjiang. These individual cases illustrate the findings of an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report that uncovered 152 instances of China employing what ASPI called “coercive diplomacy” against foreign companies or governments between the years of 2010 and 2020, an era that largely corresponds to Xi’s ascendancy.

Despite press commentary to the contrary, it was actually China that initiated the “decoupling” around 2005. China’s “dual circulation” strategy – Xi’s formalization of longstanding trade dogma – aims to reduce China’s dependence on the rest of the world while making the rest of the world more dependent on China. The strategy appears to have succeeded: McKinsey reported that the rest of the world’s exposure to China tripled from 2000 to 2017, while China’s exposure to the rest of the world decreased by a quarter. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is designed to “decouple” BRI countries from the West and Western institutions and couple them with China. The China International Payments System (CIPS), Beidou geolocation system, and “Digital Silk Road” are designed to do the same. It was the MIC25 program that galvanized a bipartisan and bicameral answer from US Congress, elevating an economic conflict that coalesced in kind around the Trump, and later Biden, administrations’ policy responses.

These growing geopolitical tensions, and China’s increased willingness to sanction companies officially or unofficially for acts or statements made anywhere in the world, further complicate matters for foreign firms. Together they dramatically increase the chances that companies will be caught in the tangle of public sentiment and political interests between China and their home countries.

Navigating a Complex Business Environment

China therefore represents an increasingly complex market for foreign firms. While restrictions on foreign investment have long been a fact of life in China, laws and regulations on data and cybersecurity, national security, sanctions, and Communist Party cells are new, have been expanded, or are being enforced to an unprecedented extent. China has always had aggressive industrial policies, but the scope, level of support, and attempts to displace foreign firms through massive state support are unprecedented in scale and scope.

Coupled with a Five-Year Plan that emphasizes self-sufficiency over headline economic growth, the rapidly developing capabilities of Chinese firms, and the emergence of a consumer market that increasingly favors local companies and brands, these factors represent a challenge of enormous proportions for foreign firms. This is particularly true as China’s economy slows, the market opportunity for some firms diminishes, and the potential to get caught up in geopolitical tensions grows.

While some foreign firms have exited the China market, most have stayed. In 2024, European companies were most concerned with China’s slowing economy, with a historically low percentage looking to expand in China. On the other hand, East-West tensions represented the leading concern among US companies operating in China. The situation is challenging, but China remains the world’s second-largest economy, contributes to a substantial portion of global growth, and is home to competitors and customers that may change the nature of industries globally, giving companies a strategic reason to face them in China.

But for firms that continue to invest in China, it has become clear that they must think a lot harder about critical questions: Is their sector open or closed to FDI? Is it of strategic importance to China? Does Beijing’s industrial policy target it? Are they a known leader by productive capability? Are they able and willing to transfer technology and expertise? Are they willing to support China’s key priorities? The nationality of the company matters. As a result, in addition to their traditional market, competitor, and consumer analysis, foreign companies now must assess the changing policy, business, economic, and geopolitical environment in China. They must ask how much of a role China plays in their global strategies. And ultimately, they must ask themselves what their appetite is for competing – and perhaps failing – in one of the world’s most important and challenging economies.

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• US restrictions on Chinese exports and domestic subsidies like the CHIPS Act must be viewed in the context of playing catch up with Beijing’s head start in the electric vehicle sector.
• Such national security considerations are creating a drag on the global competitiveness of the US electric vehicle sector, at least in the short-term.
• Supply chain security remains a key imperative going forward as the United States looks to rebuild its industrial base.

Beijing recently demanded that the United States end the “unreasonable suppression” of its companies, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector. The statement comes in response to increasing US restrictions on foreign, particularly Chinese, technology, often on the basis of national security concerns. China dominates the global supply chain for critical EV components, including minerals like lithium and cobalt, and EV batteries. Moreover, Washington accuses China of unfair trade practices, including government subsidies, and is anxious over its growing reliance on Chinese technology, which generates vulnerabilities in cybersecurity, trade, and national defense. Finally, the prevalence of Chinese tech in the supply chain raises concerns about espionage, data theft, and cyber-attacks through embedded software or hardware.

Reducing Vulnerabilities and Securing the Supply Chain

Efforts to reduce China’s role in US supply chains began under the Trump administration and have intensified more recently. The Biden administration has enacted policies such as the CHIPS Act (2022), which focuses on boosting domestic semiconductor production, a critical component for EVs. The Inflation Reduction Act (2022) also facilitates EV production via tax credits, but only for vehicles made with materials sourced from the U.S. or free-trade partner countries, excluding China. Furthermore, the Defense Production Act, invoked in 2022, encourages domestic production of minerals vital for EV batteries to reduce dependency on foreign sources, particularly China. Such efforts are also increasingly evident in US foreign policy and infrastructure investments; for example, the Lobito Corridor that seeks to establish an Atlantic export route for critical minerals in Zambia and the DRC.

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After years of relative calm under the pro-China Duterte regime, tensions are mounting between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea. The shift can be attributed in part to the policies of President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr., who has adopted a more proactive stance against China’s aggressive maneuvers and gray zone tactics in and around Philippines waters. The pivot has brought about a marked warming of US-Philippines relations; for example, the two countries hammered out an agreement to expand US military bases in the Philippines by four in 2023, including in the highly strategic Cagayan province south of Taiwan. Now options like regular US-Philippine joint patrols in the South China Sea are increasingly being considered, suggesting new tactical possibilities for deterrence, but also new ways to trigger unintended escalations.

Background

The Philippines’ South China Sea Transparency Initiative

The perception of worsening China-Philippines tensions could be amplified by the fact that much of these gray zone tactics and interdictions once took place behind the scenes, unnoticed or unremarked on by Manila during the Duterte years. This changed in May 2024 with the launch of a ‘transparency initiative’ by the Marcos administration, which intended to monitor and expose China’s aggressive actions near the Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin in the Philippines) and elsewhere. As others have pointed out, this is not the first time that the Philippines has tried to name and shame Beijing for its actions in the South China Sea. But the initiative is a clear departure from Manila’s recent passivity, and it lays the diplomatic groundwork for increased support from the United States, Australia, and Japan – all of which fall in the Western camp – if not regional allies in ASEAN.

Manila is launching its own foray in a wider information war with the transparency initiative, evident in a recent incident involving a 60 Minutes crew and other journalists. The crew was invited to observe patrols on a Philippine Coast Guard vessel by the Philippines government, and filmed aggressive ramming maneuvers by the Chinese Coast Guard in the waters near the Sabina Shoal in September. Yet before they had even returned to port, China had already disseminated its own narrative of the clash, identifying the Philippines Coast Guard as the aggressor and the 60 Minutes crew as Western propagandists, complete with pictures.

Where the China narrative may have gone unchallenged before, the transparency initiative offers the possibility of an alternative interpretation; however, this doesn’t mean that Manila’s version is reaching and/or convincing the audiences it wants to target.

China Changes Tack at the Second Thomas Shoal

The transparency initiative has failed to defuse tensions at the Second Thomas Shoal. In fact, research from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative illustrates a spike in the presence of Chinese vessels from mid-2023, mainly on the back of increased involvement from the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The researchers also note that PAFMM, Coast Guard, and PLA Navy vessels have been more likely to employ aggressive tactics (ramming, water cannon, boarding) over this span.

The Second Thomas Shoal is the site of the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine Navy ship turned impromptu military outpost and sovereignty marker. Tensions at the shoal revolve around Philippine missions to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre and attempts on the Chinese side to interdict new supplies.

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In September 2024, India successfully test-fired the intermediate range Agni-IV nuclear-capable ballistic missile. The success of the missile test signaled many parameters of nuclear deterrence. The missile was operationally ready while its technical parameters were also validated through the successful test. Operational readiness of nuclear delivery systems is another key factor that determines nuclear deterrence.

Mere possession of nuclear delivery systems is not enough: they need to be operationally prepared for quick response. Frequent testing of missile systems is one way to ensure operational readiness by validating relevant technological parameters that would enable the missile to not just take off during crisis situation but also be able to deliver the payload to assigned target, thus ensuring reliability. This can be ensured when missiles meet all trial objectives during their flight tests.

Considering that the missile is capable of striking ranges of up to 4000 km, potentially reaching many parts of mainland China, the Agni-IV missile imposes nuclear security challenges for China. The missile is also dual capable, that is capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads, similar to China’s DF-21 ballistic missile series. Dual capable missiles complicate ‘balance of terror’ in nuclear deterrence, as adversaries could be in dilemma about the warhead type of the missile during crisis situation. It also makes survivability of India’s Agni-IV missiles stronger during the crisis phase when the missile is deployed.

Again, as India is exposed to a two-pronged war with China and Pakistan, such long-range capabilities allow for the launching of nuclear weapons against Pakistan from any region. Though other shorter range Agni series exist in India’s nuclear arsenal as deterrence against Pakistan, such long-range missile capabilities that could reach Pakistani territories from any part of India further increases the stakes for Pakistan to launch even its tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). These capabilities close the scope for a ‘flexible response’ from Pakistan as longer range nuclear capable missiles could be launched from any part of the territory as a response to TNWs.

One mode of survivability of nuclear capable missiles is dispersal. Hence, having dual capable nuclear missiles with some of them being conventionally armed, while other systems with nuclear warheads, dispersed in various locations, raises the risk factor for adversaries seeking to destroy such capabilities.

India does distinguish between ‘induction’ and ‘deployment’ of its nuclear forces. ‘Induction’ is a peace time procedure to strengthen nuclear deterrence while ‘deployment’ is a crisis time procedure to strengthen deterrence. In 2023, the Agni-IV missile underwent successful testing for pre-induction night launch.

The road mobility of a missile system strengthens survivability and possessing a mobile land-based nuclear deterrence mechanism reduces the burden on India’s sea-based nuclear deterrence. This fact echoes debates in the United States over developing a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capacity.

‘Credible minimum deterrence’ is key feature of India’s nuclear deterrence. This means that India does not aim to possess quantitatively large nuclear arsenals. Instead, it aims to develop qualitative nuclear arsenals that are able to survive enemy first strikes and can be launched against adversaries’ targets in a crisis situation. Qualitative improvements in missile systems include making them mobile, equipping them with countermeasures against missile defense systems, and improving their accuracy and performance.

In fact, strategic deterrence is strengthened when a state has developed assets that can dissuade adversaries from launching an attack in the first place. Concepts such as ensuring reliability, safety, security, and readiness are key to US nuclear deterrence. The same principles, given the necessary advancements in technology, can ensure the readiness, reliability, safety, and security needed to strengthen India’s ‘credible minimum deterrence,’ which will further solidify the country’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine, keeping the nuclear threshold relatively high and improving strategic deterrence.

However, these parameters of reliability, safety, security, and readiness can only be measured when missiles undergo frequent testing. Failures in flight tests result in correction in technological parameters. Such successful technological parameters can be applied to other missile systems as well. For instance, the Agni-IV itself is an upgraded version of Agni-II Prime, with an enlarged first-stage motor, upgraded second-stage motor, improved guidance and electronics, and new thrust vector control systems that maintain the orientation of the missile during its flight.

Another technical improvement has been the use of maraging steel and carbon fiber in the missile casing, improving overall reliability. Maraging steel provides a high strength-to-weight ratio, enabling a missile structure that is as light as possible. Such metallic materials also provide high fracture toughness to ensure that the missile remains intact during flight stages. Nonmetallic materials like carbon fiber ensures thermal stability, high thermal conductivity and low thermal expansion, retention of mechanical strength, and maintenance of good frictional properties over different temperature ranges. Since the missile contains solid propellant, a composite rocket motor enhances the missile performance even when the missile system is mobile.

In sum, a credible nuclear deterrence implies that missiles do not face technological limitations impacting their functionality during flight tests. This means that delivery systems must be technologically advanced to survive enemy missile attacks, enemy missile defense, along with other external factors like weather conditions and technical glitches. This is the context in which the recent Agni-IV missile tests should be viewed.

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Thus, 60-70% of South Koreans are in favor of their country developing nuclear weapons. This is because North Korea has become a de facto nuclear weapons state and also because people believe that the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump poses a risk of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea.

While there is no indication that the ROK government is considering the development of nuclear weapons at present, the fact that the South Koreans support its development to such an extent is significant.

This is not the first time South Korea has considered the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, Park Chung-hee, a dictatorial president, embarked on a nuclear weapons program before ultimately being reined in by the United States. Little was known about this history, but in recent years, the National Security Archive and the Wilson Center Digital Archive have unearthed the diplomatic archives of South Korea’s nuclear weapons development program and made them available online. Based on these primary sources, this article aims to clarify the history of South Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.

Security Anxieties Prompt Seoul to Explore Nuclear Weapons

Why did South Korea attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the first place? The reason lies in the fact that its security environment had deteriorated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1968 and 1972, there were 722 incidents on the military border with North Korea and 294 incidents in the rear area. Moreover, a series of major incidents related to North Korea occurred in succession, namely the attempted attack on the presidential palace and the Pueblo incident of 1968, and the downing of a US Navy EC-121 aircraft in 1969.

Faced with these provocations, the United States did not retaliate against North Korea, as claimed by the South, instead opting for a restrained response. Furthermore, when the Nixon administration ascended in 1969, the “Nixon Doctrine” was announced, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as the main architect. The doctrine emphasized refraining from direct military intervention, as in the Vietnam War, and switched the focus of US foreign policy to indirect military and economic assistance. In practice, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia, including Vietnam, was dramatic: the number of soldiers was reduced from approximately 720,000 in January 1969 to approximately 280,000 in December 1971. U.S. forces in Korea were also reduced from 63,000 to 20,000.

The South Korean president at that time, Park Chung-hee, became anxious about the situation. Park Chung-hee, whose slogan was “self-reliance in national defense,” was forced to respond to an attack from North Korea and the withdrawal of the US troops. Fearing that South Korea may have been abandoned by the United States, the president chose to commence development of nuclear weapons sometime in 1973.

However, South Korea could not acquire the plutonium required to develop nuclear weapons using its own technology and was forced to approach France to import a reprocessing plant. The idea was that South Korea would be able to acquire plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, though this technology was only to be used for nuclear power generation. Simultaneously, South Korea attempted to import nuclear power plants from Canada as well.

India Test Reshuffles Nuclear Geopolitics

The situation changed after India conducted a nuclear test in 1974. As fears of nuclear proliferation rose worldwide, the U.S. began to keep a close watch on its allies and other countries to see if they were developing nuclear weapons. Before long, US diplomats and intelligence agencies discovered South Korea’s nuclear weapons program, leading to a diplomatic battle over the program’s future.

The main negotiators were diplomats from the US Embassy in Korea. Foreign policy toward South Korea was designed, and detailed instructions were given by the State Department and National Security Council. Kissinger established a foreign policy that did not allow South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. However, in its negotiations with South Korea, the U.S. never directly demanded the country stop its nuclear weapons development program. It only told the ROK that it should stop importing reprocessing plants from France, all while continuing to pretend that it did not know about South Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The ROK side never mentioned that it was trying to develop nuclear weapons. Both sides negotiated with each other while pretending to be unaware of the plan.

The U.S. made diplomatic efforts not only toward South Korea, but also toward France and Canada. France was informed that South Korea was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. would attempt to put a halt to South Korea’s plans. France agreed with the US policy, although it would not cancel the export program on its own. Kissinger also informed Canada of South Korea’s plans and requested that it not reprocess spent nuclear fuel from Canadian nuclear power plants, to prevent South Korea from acquiring plutonium. Canada, aware of the danger of the situation, agreed and placed conditions on its contract with Seoul. Thus, the U.S. created a diplomatic environment to thwart South Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions.

Historical Echoes of a Nuclear South Korea

Owing to a lack of historical documents from South Korea, it is difficult to specify when Seoul abandoned its nuclear weapons development. The import of a reprocessing plant from France was abandoned in January 1976. It is safe to assume that the South Korea’s nuclear weapons program had been written off as a failure at that point. As soon as South Korea abandoned its imports from France, the U.S. promised technical cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

South Korea’s dream of developing nuclear weapons was destroyed in the 1970s. US diplomatic documents reveal that it was difficult for the ROK to carry out its nuclear weapons development under the watchful eye of Washington. The secret plans of the ROK were all but hidden from US intelligence.

However, there were, indeed, new nuclear testing countries, such as India, at that time, and above all, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had just been established, so nuclear nonproliferation norms were not as strong as they are today. Thus, there was a distinct possibility that South Korea may have succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s under different circumstances.

Unlike the authoritarian South Korea of the 1970s, today’s South Korea has achieved economic growth and joined a group of developed countries. It is integrated into the international economy, provides humanitarian aid to other countries and is a guardian of the liberal international order. Although the probability of South Korea embarking on a nuclear weapons development program is low, we must not forget that an ally which feels threatened by abandonment by the United States will do whatever it takes to guarantee its own security.

Kwanghoon Han is a Special Fellow for Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, specializing in international relations in East Asia.

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Eastern European Plain as the Heartland’s Ring of Power

The geopolitical importance of the Heartland lies in the geographical conditions which provide advantages to any power controlling it. In 1904, Mackinder defined the Heartland as territories over the basins of all rivers whose waters drain either into the hardly navigable Arctic Ocean or into land-locked salt lakes, thus being immune from any potential naval invasion. Effectively, the Heartland encompasses lands to the north from the central Asiatic desserts, between imaginary lines from the Himalayas mountains northeast through the Gobi Desert, and from the Zagros Mountains through the Caucasus in the northwestern direction almost to the Gulf of Finland. The steppes of the “Great Lowland” stretch unobstructed from Manchuria in the East to Central Europe in the West, offering high land mobility, employing horses in the past and railways in the present. Mongols were not the first to exploit this geographical advantage, but they were the first organizers who emerged from the Heartland and attacked all sides into the inner crescent and, in the 13th century, hammered out the largest (to date) land empire.

Mackinder highlighted the huge economic potential of those vast spaces in terms of wheat to grow, ores to mine and fuel to extract, sufficient to organize large-scale industries and formidable manpower. These Heartland opportunities were eventually exploited by the Russian Empire, which replaced the Mongolian, and was later resurrected as the Soviet Union. In 1943, Mackinder reaffirmed the validity of all his previous assessments, concluding that the Heartland is “the greatest natural fortress on earth,” being itself able to attack in any direction.

Eastern Europe has always been a geopolitical gateway, whose control is of significant consequence. Mongols, vanquishing as deep westward as the Danube River, and other nomads before them, prompted local inhabitants either to fight, flee, or collaborate, and states of the day to react or fall under pressure of invasion. The Russian Empire occupied peninsular Europe as deep as Finland, Poland, and Romania, threatening the Ottoman’s hold of Asia Minor and attaining great influence over the Southern Slavs in the Balkans in the 19th century. Geopolitical rivalry in the latter region, between the German powers of Prussia and Austria in the central lands of Europe and the Russian Empire, eventually ignited the First World War. Germans aimed to take control over economic and manpower core of the Heartland, which, according to Mackinder, laid within the East European ring of the Black and Baltic Seas and the Volga River. In this period Mackinder extended his definition of Heartland to the Balkans and Berlin, arguing that the potential military seizure of Constantinople or Copenhagen respectively would block access to the Atlantic Ocean and render the Black or Baltic Seas effectively isolated. The Second World War was started in Europe by Berlin and Moscow, an alliance against which Mackinder warned in 1904 as the one bringing into sight “the empire of the world.” Nevertheless, Nazi Germany, driven by its geostrategy of “organic” growth, attacked the Soviet Union to gain additional “living space” by cleansing the East European plain from its non-German tenants. In the aftermath of that war, the Soviet Heartland regained control of the gateway into peninsular Europe and through it once again expanded to the Danube River and Berlin.

Mackinder’s Misconception about Russia

An important historical flaw in Mackinder’s East European argument, aggravated by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, was the consideration of the lands between the Black and Baltic Seas as well as its inhabitants as Russian, while they were merely being occupied by the power from the Heartland. “The real Russia…”, Mackinder writes in 1919, “the homeland of the Russian people, lies wholly… between the Volga and the Carpathians and between the Baltic and Black Seas.”

This misconception begins with a blind trust in the claim that Russia is somehow an heir to the powerful state of the 9th-13th centuries – Kyivan Rus’, which governed lands from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. The state, which took shape around Moscow, namely Muscovy, under Mongolian rule and influence, had distinctively different political, civil, and military institutions from its European neighbors, medieval Kyivan Rus’ or even Byzantium. Muscovites’ government style was characteristically despotic, in contrast to their strongly parliamentarian western neighboring states, whom they set to conquer as soon as Muscovy gained independence in the 15th century. At the same time, Kyivan legal and administrative traditions were first preserved in its western principalities, which became the Kingdom of Ruthenia (Latin for Rus’) in the 13th century, and later adopted by Baltic Lithuania, which took over most of the Kyivan lands down to the Black Sea from Mongols in the 14th century. Ruthenian language, spoken by the common folk in those lands, Snyder concludes, morphed into Ukrainian.

By the beginning of the 18th century, Muscovy gradually subjugated peoples and states between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea. To legitimize their rule, Muscovites took a new aggrandized name, corrupted from the learned history of annexed Kyiv – the Russian Empire. After the First World War, Poles and Balts, among others, in line with Mackinder’s advocacy for the buffer tier of independent states between Russia and Germany, re-established their nation-states, even if only for two decades. Ukrainians, unfortunately, were of lower priority to Western allies at that time. To Russian Bolsheviks, on the contrary, Ukraine held pivotal economic and manpower potential without which efforts to reforge an empire were futile. Eventually, after four years of defending their Republic, the Ukrainian people’s resistance crumbled unaided under brutal Russian invasion. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, by 1991 Russia lost its grip over the lands and non-Russian peoples of Eastern Europe, who ultimately regained independence and internationally recognized sovereignty over their state borders.

Ukraine Remains the Key

Three decades later, Russo-Ukrainian war is a new manifestation of an aggressive power from the Heartland into peninsular Europe. Russians started their invasion of Ukraine in 2014 where they held military opportunity – from its leased military base in Sevastopol into Crimea, annexing it, and where geography historically proved a vulnerability – from Mackinder’s eastern steppes into Donbas. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the naval fleet at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, by 2024 Moscow had lost its dominance in the Black Sea to Ukrainian unconventional military techniques, among which has been a highly effective use of drone warfare.

The more territories Moscow is allowed to seize – the thinner, if any, a buffer zone between the mobilized Heartland and Western allies will remain in the gates of Europe; if the whole of Ukraine’s Black Sea shore is seized, Russia will strengthen its naval power there and will directly threaten the southern European flank.

On top of lands, the occupation of Ukraine aims to replenish and strengthen military and labor manpower, Mackinder’s second condition, to facilitate Russia’s further expansion. Ukrainian Cossacks, upon their partial subordination to the Muscovy’s command in the second half of the 17th century, enabled Muscovites to expand their empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, as Mackinder acknowledged Cossacks’ high-mobility role as far as “at the gates of Indies.” Ukrainians were over-represented within the Soviet army and among partisans who halted and then defeated the German invasion. Absorbing Ukraine again, Moscow would increase its manpower by a few dozen million, while murdering or deporting ‘unreliable’ and resisting Ukrainians. There is plenty of evidence that Russia has already accelerated this process in currently occupied territories, cleansing the lands of Ukrainians, re-educating the youth, absorbing collaborators, and intimidating those vulnerable into labor and even armed forces.

Finally, what Moscow seeks in Ukraine is rich natural and industrial resources. Even though Mackinder foresaw the largest agricultural potential in the steppes of the Heartland and reported globally the largest foodstuff production in 1938 from Russia, he overlooked that the main source of that has always been the lands of the Ukrainian people. Large Soviet agricultural exports and industrial development came at the cost of several millions of people, mainly from Ukraine, intentionally starved to death, deprived of possessions, and deported to labor camps. In 2021, the year before the most recent full-scale invasion, 63% of the world’s sunflower seeds and oil were exported from Ukraine. While ranking fourth in wheat and meslin, exports from Ukraine in terms of territory is unmatched. The total worth of mineral and energy wealth that Russia is stealing counts in the dozens of trillion dollars. The value of Ukraine’s economic, industrial, and manpower resources recalls Brzezinski’s warning in 1994 that “with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”

The Russian World and the Heartland are Boiling

Following Mackinder’s theory, Russia’s expansionist ambitions are not limited to Ukraine, but stretch as far as those are tolerated by the world. As of March 2024, this has also become the public warning of the president of the United States. Conversely, the president and the elites of the Russian Federation call it “Russophobia,” which, according to Kremlin, has become “an official Western ideology.” At the same time, Putin’s catchphrase that “Russia’s borders do not end anywhere” has been publicly promoted, officially endorsed and weaponized by Russians in wars against foreign states, both conventional and informational. Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church call this concept the Russian World (Russkiy Mir in Russian), which transcends any borders and assumes anyone who speaks Russian language, shares Russian values, or praises Russian culture. Expansion of the Russian World, reserving the right to “take enforcement actions… against foreign states and citizens” in protection and support of Russian compatriots living abroad, has been officially entrenched in Russia’s latest foreign policy. Mackinder’s original observation that “German Kultur has gone wherever the German language has given it entry” has transformed into “first comes Russian ballet then come Russian tanks.” In the Road to Unfreedom, historian Timothy Snyder explains how Russian subversive meddling in the internal affairs of other states paved the road for invading Russian soldiers. Allegations of the oppression of Russian speakers in the neighboring countries and discussions of “protective” military operations there, threats of nuclear attacks at wider European and American cities, intense destabilization and disinformation campaigns, and incitement to war crimes and genocide of other peoples have become a routine public rhetoric from state media and government officials in Russia over the last years. Under these circumstances, the term Russophobia is rather strategically used by the Russian Federation to claim victimhood while conducting a war of aggression, which, according to Snyder, “is historically typical behavior” of an empire attempting to justify its crimes.

Russia’s European neighbors are either already fighting an invasion or arming up in preparation of defense. While Moscow is presently expanding its military material and manpower resources, the Baltic states actively strengthen their defense lines along their eastern borders while civilians sign up for defense units and training to prepare themselves. Poland has more than doubled military capacity since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in an anticipation of further aggression. Polish leadership does not consider its actions irrational, which Russophobia implies, especially in the environment of near daily threats of “nuclear annihilation.” Finland, along with Sweden, has formally abandoned its historical non-alignment position, boosted its defense industry, and closed more than 1,300km of its eastern border indefinitely. For Russia’s neighbors, Mackinder’s view of geopolitics is not some academic theory of outdated British geostrategy, but a very real and centuries-long struggle that is full of horrors. People in those states, building on their historic experience, “understand Russia deeply and instinctively, see and smell what others do not.”

To weaken the world’s resistance to its aggressive expansion, the current power in the Heartland allies itself with like-minded autocracies. Mackinder was concerned with the perpetual threat from the Heartland organized solely or by an alliance of powers, especially with an added frontage of the navigable ocean. At the dawn of the 21st century, Colin Gray argued that Mackinder’s geopolitical theory has been proven accurate to date and predicted that in a couple of decades, China might become powerful enough to compensate for Russia’s perceived or real weakness, allowing them to together threaten the post-Cold War world order. Exactly two decades since, Russia’s obvious military cooperation with Iran in the Heartland, combined with its “no limits” strategic partnership with China of the inner crescent, menacingly resembles the Tripartite Pact of the 1940s. For the world’s freedom, Ukraine has become its land line of defense in Europe. Taking into consideration the war in Gaza and brewing broader conflict in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait is the only rim remaining in the inner crescents separating the world from a new global war.

In conclusion, much like a century ago and despite technological innovations in warfare, Mackinder’s geopolitical theory about the perpetual threat from the Heartland still resonates. Mackinder warned statesmen that one “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; [one] who rules the Heartland commands the World-island; and [one] who rules the World-Island commands the World.” With growing calls for appeasement, urging Ukraine and her friends to negotiate with Russia, the importance of these enduring truths cannot be overstated. The Russian invasion of Ukraine reflects geostrategic goals of territorial expansion into peninsular Europe and control over the Black Sea, as well as replenishment of economic means and manpower through the wealth appropriation and cleansing of the independent and sovereign Ukrainian state. The war’s progress and outcome are already serving as a precedent for Russia’s like-minded autocratic partners, such as Iran and, potentially, China, who, learning from the global reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, will decide on its own geostrategic moves. The longer Russia remains undefeated, the higher the chance that these simmering regional wars will spiral into a new and disastrous global conflict.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Taiwan’s world-class technological sector is the result of decades of economic investment and scientific innovation. Since the 1970s, Taipei has consistently made its semiconductor industry specifically the crown jewel of its powerful economy. Boasting 321 companies and over 300,000 employees, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone accounts for 50% of the global chip supply. However, this hasn’t discouraged significant international investment from companies like Google, Amazon, and Microsoft. As recently as 2023, the US-based semiconductor company Micron Technology began construction of yet another facility in Taichung.

Taiwan’s semiconductor sector has cornered the international market in three key areas: IC design, water foundry, and the packaging process. Taipei’s share of the IC design market is nearly 20% and 75% with the water foundry. In addition, the small Pacific Island controls 50% of the global packaging process, inserting itself as a critical waypoint for most international semiconductor sales. National Development Council Minister, Kung Ming-hsin, has recently stated that Taiwan plans to continue investing $210 billion over the next five years in the industry. These investments have international implications as well, with plans to build a facility in Kumamoto, Japan. In addition, TSMC will be spending $40 billion on two more facilities in Arizona, United States.

Unfortunately, Taipei’s exclusion from the United Nations is a matter of longstanding policy. Expelled in 1971 to appease Beijing, Taiwan has repeatedly filed for membership in the years since. UN Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China, has repeatedly been used as a roadblock towards not only Taiwanese membership but even limited participation. However, this has not discouraged some states from continuing advocacy on behalf of Taipei. The aforementioned letter urging the UN to include Taiwan in the upcoming summit, signed by nine states including Guatemala and Belize, represents just the latest attempt to force the United Nations to take the matter seriously.

Beyond bureaucratic appeasement, there is little to no reason why Taiwan should be excluded from the summit in New York. Taipei surely qualifies on a technical basis, and would make valuable contributions to the pivotal discussions shaping the global perspective on technology.

Its omission from the meetings is purely political, as Beijing would doubtless voice protest at the idea of Taipei being lawfully represented at any UN-sponsored conference. However, there is nothing in UN Resolution 2758 that would be contradicted by allowing Taiwanese diplomats to participate in the summit. Allowing contributions from officials in unrecognized territories, while indicative of sovereignty, is not a wholehearted endorsement of it. It is highly unlikely that any state’s existing One China policy would change due to the presence of Taiwanese scientists and diplomats at the summit.

As the global leader in semiconductor technology, Taiwan is more than deserving of a seat at any table discussing international technological development. If the priority of the UN Summit for the Future is truly technological cooperation and advancement, excluding Taipei because of political squabbling undermines the legitimacy of the endeavor entirely. It begs a crucial question: Can an international forum without its most relevant possible member be effective? Furthermore, allowing the frivolous grievances of one state in particular to dominate any UN agenda brings the organization itself into question. If the United Nations wants to be more than a rubber stamp, it must be willing to do what is in the best interest of the international community in all circumstances.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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