The Bolivia economy, once among South America’s most successful, is currently in crisis, beset by a severe shortage of U.S. dollars, declining gas production, and mounting debt levels. Dwindling foreign reserves has led to high inflation and fuel shortages, with citizens increasingly struggling to access basic goods. Against the backdrop of this worsening economic outlook, a failed military coup was launched in June, triggering a cycle of protests and strikes that continues to present.

These economic issues are further complicated by a political rift within the ruling Movement for Socialism (MAS) party, which has seen President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales battling for control ahead of the 2025 elections. The resulting political instability has paralyzed the government’s ability to respond to the crisis, exacerbating an already dire economic situation.

Failed June coup attempt reflects wider dissent

On June 26, 2024, General Juan José Zúñiga launched an abortive coup attempt to “restore democracy,” ordering military forces to occupy the presidential palace in La Paz and demanding the release of political prisoners. The coup quickly collapsed after President Luis Arce confronted Zúñiga, resulting in the general’s arrest. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, Arce swiftly restructured the military, detaining other high-ranking officials to prevent further unrest and restore civilian control over the armed forces.

The coup was widely condemned both domestically and internationally, and served only to heighten instability in Bolivia’s fraught domestic politics. In particular, the incident underscores both the fragility of Bolivia’s democracy and the deep divisions within the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. It also reflects the broader economic crisis destabilizing the country, where ongoing protests and political infighting threaten Bolivia’s economic development and stability going forward.

The shifting fortunes of a highly resource-dependent Bolivia economy

Bolivia, a landlocked country in South America, gained infamy in the 1980s and 1990s as one of the world’s largest producers of cocaine. Since then, the government has worked to diversify the economy by shifting away from illegal drug production and focusing on natural resources such as oil, gas, gold, tin, zinc, lithium, and agricultural products like soybeans. Over the years, the general standard of living improved, primarily due to government subsidies funded by foreign reserves. However, these reserves have now been depleted, and the resulting economic strain is one of the key drivers behind the current unrest.

The post Bolivia Economy on Knife’s Edge ahead of 2025 Polls appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The number of people exposed to extreme heat is growing exponentially due to climate change in all world regions. Heat-related mortality for people over 65 years of age increased by approximately 85% during 2000–2004 and 2017–2021.

From 2000–2019, studies show about 489,000 heat-related deaths occurred each year, with 45% of these in Asia and 36% in Europe. In Europe alone in the summer of 2022, an estimated 61,672 heat-related excess deaths occurred. High-intensity heat wave events can bring high acute mortality; in 2003, 70,000 people in Europe died as a result of the June–August event. In 2010, 56,000 excess deaths occurred during a 44–day heat wave in Russia.

Birds are falling out of the sky due to the heat. Reptiles come out seeking shade. Mammals and other wild animals are affected by a severe water shortage. Yet all of this less and less transforms into fresh news nowadays.

But with drought, one day comes food scarcity. Not only for the animals. And it will become a piece of news all the same.

Can humans do something with an immediate effect to prevent at least the food deficit?

Well, they already do it with cloud seeding.

A Brief History of Cloud Seeding

Some states manipulate clouds using a technique called ‘cloud seeding.’ The first cloud seeding techniques date back to the 1940s and involve making clouds merge and grow. This method has evolved into coalescing the particles inside clouds, which fall on the earth drawing down with them other particles encountered on the way, thus making rain or snow. To achieve this, substances had to be artificially introduced into the cloud, most often silver iodide, but various other techniques still exist. Some states also desalinate ocean or seawater, but it is a more expensive approach.

Cloud seeding before being elevated to a geo-engineering technique to combat climate change has gone through a reputation marring. The United States used the technique in the Vietnam War to slow the advance of opposing troops by causing flooding. In 1976, in response to the same use, the United Nations banned environmental modification techniques for military purposes with the ENMOD Convention. From that date onwards, it was forbidden to rain down clouds for ‘hostile’ purposes. However, the hostile nature of manipulation is sometimes difficult to demonstrate; in 1986, the USSR was said to have seeded clouds following the Chernobyl accident to make it rain over Belarus and thus protect Moscow from radioactive rain.

Later came the incidents of ‘stolen clouds.’ In 2011, Iran accused Europe that it had stolen its clouds and afterward in 2018, the story was repeated by an Iranian army general who blamed Israel. The latter case was more dramatic and approached a conflict situation because, in 2018, there was a severe drought in the country and the local farmers were protesting vehemently. Luckily, the head of the Iranian meteorology office intervened by denying the possibility of stolen clouds, which likely helped defuse the conflict. Nevertheless, Iran once again accused Turkey that it also was appropriating its clouds during a recent winter, as the mountain peaks on the Turkish side of their mutual border were snowy while the Iranian peaks on the opposite side were bare, allowing Turkey to attract more tourists.

Today, a country can do whatever it wants with the clouds that cross its airspace, and in many countries, research programs and experiments are multiplying. China has invested colossal sums of money into these techniques, to influence the weather during the Beijing Olympics in 2008, for example, or to combat drought. In 2020, it announced its intention to deploy its cloud seeding program, which until then had been tested on a very targeted basis, over half of its territory by 2025, with the aim of avoiding the droughts and hailstorms that can affect its agricultural production. The Gulf States are also applying seeding techniques using electric discharges in clouds. In France, an association called ANELFA is developing research in this field, with the aim of combating the hail that damages vineyards.

Not Without Its Controversies

In a podcast recorded for France Culture, the writer Mathieu Simonet and the climatologist Olivier Boucher point out that, for the time being, the effectiveness of cloud manipulating techniques remains highly controversial. For one, it is extremely difficult to know whether rain from a seeded cloud would not have existed without seeding.

The techniques raise two important questions for the future. The first concerns the ownership of water resources. While it may seem a trivial subject today, as water resources become scarce over time, there might be a risk of water conflict between neighboring countries over which ‘owns’ the rain. Indeed, if a country decides to ‘make it rain’ on its territory, it may be ‘stealing’ rain that would have fallen later in a neighboring country.

The second question concerns the environmental and health impacts of the substances being used to seed clouds. In large quantities, silver iodide is dangerous for biodiversity, particularly in aquatic environments. An English study carried out by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology in the early 2000s revealed that silver iodide, below a certain concentration, is not toxic for the environment, but the substance is described as “extremely insoluble.” The risk is therefore that it accumulates and can be harmful over the long term. This obviously can make things more urgent than a creeping food deficit.

Today there are about 50 states which manipulate clouds to ensure ‘ordered’ rain. China has invested $1 billion only for five years in processing clouds. Experiments with cloud seeding are regularly made in the United States, Canada, Gulf countries, France, and Israel, just to name a few.

One proposed method to mitigate global warming with immediate effect is the making of something as a protective coat around the Earth. However, there are opinions that if it were to happen one day, a side effect of it would be nothing less than the disappearance of the blue sky. Here poetry and politics converge. But is that for a good reason when any hope for a prospective disrupting innovation is primarily precluded?

The Water Wars of Tomorrow

Looking 100 years into the future, technologies related to cloud seeding will be undoubtedly highly advanced and at that point, barring a global regime outlining their rightful use, the richest countries, would be able to invest most heavily and ultimately control the clouds.

Apart from everything else, a fundamental problem remains with cloud seeding. The technique works – to the extent that its effects can actually be set apart from natural processes – when there are clouds. But what about if there are no clouds in the sky? What will be squeezed then to make rain? And what can guarantee that the available clouds will always be able to deliver as much as is necessary for crops? Further, even if a cloud is seeded successfully, it does not mean that the rain or the snow will fall exactly on the spot where it is wanted.

And finally, with regard to the expensive process of desalinization, this establishes economic and political dependencies for countries that have no direct access to oceans and seas. How could cloud seeding thus be applied effectively and equitably in a world of growing politico-economic hostilities and fragmentation?

The post Cloud Seeding and the Water Wars of Tomorrow appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The geopolitical threat environment is evolving, and with it is the way that Canadians approach military spending. A 2024 poll by Angus Reid found that 29% of Canadians view military preparedness and Canada’s global position as a top political priority, up from 12% a decade ago. Moreover, a growing cohort of 53% supports ending Canada’s longstanding membership to the rapidly shrinking club of NATO members that fail to meet their spending pledges under the alliance.

The Trudeau government appears sensitive to these shifts, publishing a new defense policy concept and spending commitment entitled Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence in April of 2024. In the face of an increasingly hostile global environment, the document says all the right things, highlighting new threats represented by climate change, great power competition, and technological change – all of which demand new thinking and new capacity in Canada’s national defense complex. Its publication was accompanied by pledges from the Trudeau administration to take a ‘major step’ toward reaching the NATO target of 2% of GDP, with the Liberals projecting defense spending levels of 1.76% by the 2029-30 fiscal year.

Yet there are those who remain skeptical that even this modest target can be reached, first and foremost the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), which issued a report contravening the Our North, Strong and Free numbers ahead of a NATO summit in July, depriving the prime minister of even a pretense of compliance during the event. The PBO projections see Canada defense spending languishing at around 1.42% by 2029-30.

This report reviews the major takeaways in Our North, Strong and Free and assesses whether Canada can put itself on track to meeting NATO’s 2% spending target. It wouldn’t be the first time that Ottawa has issued defense spending pledges only to ignore them when the time came to allocate the funds. Will this episode be any different?

Background

Canada in a New Security Context

The policy report identifies global developments that threaten Canada’s security and prosperity; it also singles out Canada’s northern regions as a major concern given the increased accessibility to the area brought about by climate change. Major axes of instability and flux in the global system include:

Climate Change. Climate change is cited as a significant security challenge for Canada, especially with regard to the Arctic – a region that is warming four times faster than the global average. This rapid change is opening the region to foreign actors seeking to exploit its resources and strategic advantages. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are increasingly involved in responding to climate-related emergencies, such as the severe fire season in 2023 that necessitated widespread evacuations and military assistance. This is a trend that is expected to intensify over time, as the Arctic’s accessibility will increase dramatically by 2050, carving out a vital shipping route between Europe and East Asia and attracting heightened interest from Russia and China. Russia for one has already enhanced its military presence in the Arctic, while China aims to become a “polar great power” by 2030, expanding its naval capabilities and infrastructure in the region.

An International Order in Flux. The policy statement notes that the established, post-Cold War international order is under severe strain due to the actions of states like Russia and China, which are challenging established norms and seeking to reshape global relations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in particular exemplifies a disregard for sovereignty and international law, posing a direct threat to European security and stability. Canada, as a founding member of NATO, is committed to collective defense, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region, where it leads multinational forces in Latvia and provides extensive military support to Ukraine.

Strategic Competition. Strategic competition is now a feature in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, and the report notes that Canada’s security is intertwined with these theaters owing to geographic position and economic ties. For example, in the Euro-Atlantic, Canada supports NATO’s largest reinforcement effort in order to counter Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. In the Indo-Pacific, Canada is increasing its military presence to protect international laws and norms, especially in the context of China’s expansive ambitions and ongoing military buildup, all of which represents a threat to regional stability.

Global Instability. Global instability is identified as another threat, driven by state fragility, terrorism, and malicious cyber activities. Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors are contributing to regional and global security challenges. Cyberspace and technological advancements create new vulnerabilities, complicating the defense of national interests. The report concludes that Canada must address these threats through capacity development, multilateral efforts, and maintaining technological advantages.

Technological Change and Conflict. Technological advancements like AI, quantum computing, and autonomous systems are transforming warfare and national security. AI enhances cyber capabilities and decision-making, while quantum technology threatens data security. The increasing complexity of cyberspace and the militarization of space require new investments in novel defense platforms. Moreover, hypersonic missiles and low-cost drones pose are altering longstanding tactical certainties on the battlefield, necessitating advancements in air defense and drone countermeasures. Finally, hybrid attacks exploit vulnerabilities in cyber and information domains, challenging traditional military responses.

The Abysmal State of the Canadian Military

The goal for Canadian policymakers is not simply to reach NATO’s 2% benchmark and spare Canada criticism from its NATO allies on the world stage. Rather, it is to reverse the longstanding hollowing out of the CAF, caused by decades of underfunding and cuts. The Canadian military has been asked to ‘do the same with less’ for too long, to the point that its operational capacity is severely compromised.

A brief history of alarm bells rung and ignored:

• 1990 was the last year that Canada spent the equivalent of 2% of GDP on defense. By 2000, this figure had dropped to 1.1%, reflecting years of deep cuts to the Department of National Defence (DND) by Liberal governments.
• The Harper government’s 2006 Canada First defense policy calls the CAF a ‘hollow force,’ lamenting the drop from 89,000 regular force personnel at the end of the Cold War to under 60,000 in the 1990s. (As of 2023, there were approximately 71,500 regular force personnel enrolled in the CAF). The report also notes an ‘overall degradation’ of CAF equipment through the 1990s across all three branches of the military – a trend that continues to this day.
• By 2014, the Harper government had reduced defense spending to 1% of GDP, down from the 1.13% level it inherited in 2006, representing the lowest amount of spending relative to GDP in Canada’s history.
• Staffing cuts through the Chretien and Harper years contributed to a Canadian procurement system that is at best slow and inefficient and at worst wholly unfit for purpose. Incidentally, the difference between the PBO and PMO projections on how close Canada will come to 2% in 2029-30 boil down to the former’s accounting for the delays and lapsed appropriations inherent to Canada’s procurement process.
• A recent internal presentation at the DND found that only 58% of the CAF would be able to respond in the event of a crisis, and almost half of all military equipment is considered ‘unavailable and unserviceable.’
• In 2024, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) temporarily stopped training pilots in Canada in favor of international training facilities.
• Months later, Defense Minister Bill Blair declares that the CAF is locked into a recruitment ‘death spiral.’ It has since emerged that applications have actually spiked since 2022, though the CAF bureaucracy has failed to translate this interest into higher enrollments.

Carving Out a Path to 2%

The vision of the global system articulated by Our North, Strong and Free is unambiguously expensive so far as Canadian policymakers are concerned, as it envisions new operationality capacities for the CAF. And while it’s a positive that the policy carries an additional $7.9 billion in DND funding through 2024-2028, one must bear in mind that the CAF is still operating at a deficit in terms of staffing and equipment levels. In other words, additional billions would have already been needed for the CAF to meet its obligations under previous defense concepts, let alone those envisioned in Our North, Strong and Free.

To highlight a few points: 1) climate change will require the construction of new logistical infrastructure in the North, along with new icebreakers and planes and vessels that are able to cover large expanses of territory; 2) the global instability and threats to Euro-Atlantic peace have demanded and will continue to demand military assistance from Canada that diverts from domestic modernization and procurement priorities; 3) the policy’s view of strategic competition envisions a ‘blue water’ role for the Royal Canadian Navy as it increases presence to ‘protect international norms’ in far-flung theaters; and 4) the technological change represented by AI and drone warfare is nothing less than a paradigm shift, one that renders old platforms obsolete as it necessitates new and agile procurement strategies.

The policy statement also provides a detailed list of the capabilities and platforms that the Canadian military will pursue in order to adapt to the evolving threat environment. They include:

• Renewing and expanding the submarine fleet (Canada’s four Victoria Class diesel submarines were built in the late 1980s and early 90s).
• Deploying maritime sensors and building new satellite ground stations and operational support hubs in the Arctic.
• Acquiring a modern tactical helicopter capability.
• Acquiring airborne early warning aircraft.
• Acquiring modern surveillance and assault drones.
• Acquiring new ground-based air defenses to protect critical infrastructure.
• Acquiring long-range missile capabilities, including air- and sea-launched platforms.
• Acquiring new vehicles and new offshore patrol vessels able to operate in the Arctic.
• Establishing a Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Command.
• Modernizing Canadian artillery.
• Upgrading or potentially replacing Canada’s tanks and light armored vehicles.

The above represents a hefty shopping list, not overly surprising given the fact that every aspect of the evolving threat environment would have come as a surprise to most defense planners at the turn of the century. Our North, Strong and Free can’t be faulted here: it does a good job of outlining changes to the global order that are playing out in real time, and proposes a three-pronged defense concept to respond: assert Canadian sovereignty (focusing on the Arctic), defend North America (focusing on revamping NORAD), and advance Canada’s global interests and values.

But will Canadian policymakers be up to the task of actualizing these recommendations? This has always been the devil in the details of Canadian defense policy, with prime ministers past and present making a habit of promising more than they can deliver. The political headwinds typically emanate from the same place: Canada’s privileged geopolitical position, buffered on all sides by either ocean or a friendly superpower to the south. Canada is a “fire-proof house, far removed from flammable materials,” in the view of Liberal politician Raoul Dandurand circa 1924. In other words, it does not actively prepare for threats because the threats lurk far beyond the horizon.

It follows that this threat perception must change before Canadian voters will start holding governments to account on the defense spending promises they make. The world described in Our North, Strong and Free moves in that direction; for example, worsening mass migration and natural disasters attributed to climate change and hypothetical Chinese and Russian forays into the North represent encroachments into the fire-proof house’s backyard. So too do the cyber and political threats represented by hostile and authoritarian governments, though these receive less attention in the document. There is growing internal pressure for increased defense spending from Canadian voters, and there is also mounting external pressure from Canada’s allies, especially given the fact that some 20 NATO members have brought themselves into compliance with the 2% target over the past decade. This pressure is compounded by Canada being one of only two members in breach of the second NATO commitment of spending at least 20% of the defense budget on equipment.

The stars appear to be aligned for a sea change in Canadian defense policy, albeit one that will play out slowly, as reflected in both the PMO and PBO spending projections.

A Shift in Canada Defense Spending?

As the above graph shows, Canada has increased defense spending relative to GDP over the past decade – just not enough to bring it into NATO compliance. In absolute terms, Canadian defense spending grew by 67% between 2014-2021. The Our North, Strong and Free platform includes an additional $7.9 billion in funding from 2024-2028. The question thus becomes: Where can the Canadian government find the additional money to reach the 2% target on a realistic timeline?

Like its neighbor to the south, the Canadian government’s interest payments are expected to balloon in the near future. According to government projections, debt servicing will increase from $47.2 billion in 2023-24 to $64.3 billion in 2028-29. By way of comparison, the DND’s entire budget for 2023-24 came in at an estimated $26.5 billion. Debt costs could be higher or lower depending on the direction of interest rates and economic growth, but government spending priorities will be squeezed under all scenarios given the size of the federal debt (speak nothing of growing provincial liabilities). Recall that some of the most savage defense spending cuts came during the deficit- and debt-heavy days of the 1990s. Back then, at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, the DND was viewed as low-hanging fruit politically and as such it absorbed the brunt of cuts. Whether or not that dynamic has changed remains to be seen.

Outlook

Our North, Strong and Free represents a maturation of Ottawa’s strategic thinking, and polling suggests that the Canadian public is a receptive audience. However, the state of federal finances leaves little room for sweeping defense spending increases beyond those outlined in the policy; and if history is any guide, even these increases should not be taken for granted. The best-case scenario for the rejuvenation of the Canadian military and eventually meeting NATO targets would play out something like this:

One, Our North, Strong and Free is actually implemented, helping to fill longstanding gaps in Canada’s military capacity and, since it’s so procurement-heavy, bringing Canada into compliance with NATO’s 20% equipment spending threshold.

Two, long-term political will for defense spending is sustained by a Canadian public whose worldview continues to align with that of the DND. Though it’s clear that the 2% defense spending to GDP target is unlikely to be reached in the next five years, grassroots political support will help insulate the DND from the kind of funding cuts it has been routinely subjected to in the post-Cold War period.

Three, Our North, Strong and Free achieves one of its key stated objectives in building up Canada’s industrial base. In addition to the inherent risks of outsourcing core military production to private interests, the policy statement rightly identifies the pro-job creation and pro-growth aspects of developing Canada’s defense industry. Bolstering Canada’s homegrown capacity for artillery and ammunition production – capacities that are proving a game-changer in the Ukraine war – is cited as one such example. In pursuing these opportunities, Canada can establish positive economic feedback loops that sustain and validate defense spending over the long term.

Though Canada is destined to remain on the wrong side of NATO’s 2% dividing line for the immediate future, there are some signs that the latest Our North, Strong and Free defense policy marks the beginnings of a paradigm shift, one that will continue to play out as Ottawa navigates an increasingly volatile international environment, eventually replacing the political quicksand under the DND with more solid ground.

*This article was originally published on July 12, 2024.

The post Canada Defense Spending: A “Fire-proof House” under Threat? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Housing

Harris and Trump share the idea that the US state should help people from certain social groups with the purchase of housing units. The Republicans noted in their party platform that they “will reduce mortgage rates by slashing inflation, open limited portions of federal lands to allow for new home construction, promote homeownership through tax Incentives and support for first-time buyers, and cut unnecessary Regulations that raise housing costs.” Here are the key elements of Harris’ housing plan:

• Up to $25,000 in down-payment support for first-time homebuyers.
• A $10,000 tax credit for first-time homebuyers.
• Tax incentives for builders that build starter homes for first-time buyers.
• An expansion of a tax incentive for building affordable rental housing.
• A new $40 billion innovation fund to spur innovative housing construction.
• Repurposing some federal land for affordable housing.
• A ban on algorithm-driven price-setting tools for landlords to set rents.
• Removing tax benefits for investors who buy large numbers of single-family rental homes.

Housing has to serve two functions at once. It is both a consumption good and an investment asset. A house is a place to live, but it is also something that is supposed to make you wealthier over time when its price goes up. These two objectives directly conflict — if owner-occupied housing becomes more affordable, that makes most Americans poorer. The homeownership rate is two-thirds in the United States, with only small fluctuations. And for middle-class Americans, most of their wealth is in the value of their home. But even so, the U.S. actually has the lowest percent of wealth in housing out of any OECD country (slightly above 25% while the OECD average is above 50%). This statistic reveals the strong wealth polarization in US society (modest home ownership vs. abundant possession of financial assets), which has significantly deeper roots than the housing shortage itself.

Under these circumstances, the state subsidizing housing demand is just a reallocation of wealth from homeowners to homebuyers and that is why it fits only partially to solving the problem of wealth polarization. Such a reallocation might be discriminatory for the owners in abstract terms, but it is not so if there is a housing deficit, which inevitably impacts price trends in the real estate market. Harris wants to overcome this deficit, estimated to be around three million homes nationwide, by stimulating a higher supply. Increased supply will require more construction workers, approximately 30% of which are immigrants currently, and in the case of intensified construction activities that percentage will likely grow further. Apart from this, Harris intends to support a higher birth rate achievement in society, which if successful, will put automatically additional pressure on homes demand. Republicans also envision support for working parents; i.e., they are similarly keen on improving the US demographic situation.

Both parties’ endeavors promise long-term upward pressure on housing prices. The only way to keep the market balance far from price extremes and thus prevent subsidies inflationary devaluation is to continue to uphold the supply with new subsidies or cancel them completely. Thus, subsidizing cannot be a long-term and sustainable solution to the housing problem, though it may be a solution to the available housing shortage in the here and now. The more sustainable solution is linked with reaching a more labor-productive economy and higher incomes, instead of supporting insufficient incomes by reallocation of wealth within society.

Immigration

The second cornerstone of the presidential campaign is the promised mass deportation of illegal immigrants by the Republicans. Trump’s running mate, JD Vance, has said that we should “start with deporting a million people.”  This, however, casts a heavy shade on the understanding of how the planned construction boom might occur and how to synchronize demographic aims with deportation ones in the party platform.

Will it happen via increased inflation in the economy due to the attempts to hire more construction workers among only the non-illegal US population? But even that is not easy to do. The U.S. only has 6 workers for every 9 available jobs every month, and according to the US Chamber of Commerce, the country is “missing” 1.7 million workers compared to February 2020.

To top it off, the employment deficit is at hand in parallel with very modest unemployment in the country. The national unemployment rate in December 2023 was 3.7%. But in Maryland and North Dakota, for instance, unemployment has fallen below 2% for many months. Notably, 77% of the approximately 45 million immigrants in the United States are of working age (18 to 64 years) – a much higher figure than the 59% of those born in the U.S. Even though immigrants represent only 14% of the U.S. population, they constitute 17% (around 29 million people) of the labor force.

Their percentage is even more significant in critical sectors of the US economy. Immigrants represent around 73% of all agricultural workers, over 30% of construction workers, 25% of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) workers, and 28% of all highly skilled healthcare professionals—such as physicians and surgeons. In the coming years, the country’s aging population stands to benefit from immigration in another way. In addition to addressing population decline, foreign-born workers are critical to care for an increasingly elderly population. Immigrants account for 25% of personal care aides and 38% of home health aides, projected to be one of the fastest-growing occupations in coming years.

It is strange to proclaim with a party platform that your party (i.e., the Republicans) intends to promote economic policies driving down the cost of living and the prices for everyday goods and services while at the same time slashing the number of lowest-cost employees in the agricultural and construction sectors – workers that are directly shaping the cost of living. Such cuts may not cost just short-term inflationary spikes but also longer-term structural shortages in manpower.

Controls on Food Prices

The third cornerstone of the candidates’ presidential campaign is Harris’s goal of controlling food prices, as she wants to initiate the necessary steps in her first 100 days as president. It was mentioned many times in the mainstream media and by Trump himself that this might result in a Soviet-type outcome of empty shop shelves. But even if the actual deployment were not so utterly bleak, one day the price controls would have to be renounced. At that point, sudden price inflation will not only compensate for the lost profits during the freeze, but also surely incorporate an additional bonus for the trouble caused.

In fact, the declared price controls are a “solution” for problems that do not even exist. CPI inflation is back to its 2% target. Every month it has been below target for three months, while on a year-over-year basis it is down below 3%. Many Americans will argue that what they care about is not grocery inflation itself — which is the rate of change of prices over a month or a year — but the price level. And this makes sense — if prices rise a lot and then stop rising, people will still care that they rose in the past.

But it is also true that grocery prices were unusually low in the 2010s. Instead of continuing the trend of slow, steady increases from earlier decades, they remained flat for a while. In that sense, maybe half of the big price increase of 2021-22 was just “catching up” to the old trend.

The other half of the problem stems from the inertia of the COVID years – a lot of employees did not produce much then but received generous compensations and their PPP increased for the short-term future without the economy able to circulate any increased production output in the meantime. More importantly, what people probably care about even more than the price of groceries is how much groceries they can afford. When we divide wages (average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers) by the price of groceries, we see that while purchasing power did take a hit in 2021-22, regular workers are able to afford more groceries in 2024 than in 2019.

There is no indication that grocery store profits have anything to do with the rise in grocery prices in 2021-22. The grocery stores make almost no profit, and their profits barely increased at all when grocery prices went up. You can see from this chart that the big increase in prices did not translate to a big increase in grocery store profits. A 3% profit margin is very low — the S&P 500’s average profit margin is 11.5%! Grocery stores are a notoriously unprofitable business in general. Add to that the fact that the biggest retail grocery store chain in the U.S. has only 16% market share and you probably do not need to doubt whether capital over concentration is behind grocery pricing.

Moreover, if Harris wants to charge the food business economically to unburden the Democrats politically for the price hikes of the past three years, she may choose to do that more elegantly. She could propose progressive tax levies on the net incomes of sales regardless of the companies’ profits. Then, she would be able to reallocate the extra revenue to her subsidizing programs. But what is much better is to open the domestic market to cheaper imports from friendly countries without controlling any prices.

Tariffs and Trade Controls

The fourth cornerstone of the candidates’ presidential campaign is Trump’s priority of imposing steeper customs tariffs on all imports and especially ones from China. The Republicans thus expect to support US industry and return key supply chains to the United States. Rife examples of imports from Mexico and Vietnam of Chinese commodities and spare parts should say enough on the subject, as well as the fact that nothing of the expected industrial and supply chain outcomes occurred during the first Trump mandate when he introduced his initial round of tariffs against China. Moreover, it was precisely in these years that the manufacturing productivity of the US economy registered its largest slumps after 2010. It is also ridiculous that the Republicans have not described at least some tangible anti-inflationary measures in their plan to isolate the US economy from world markets via tariffs, apart from writing bluntly in the party platform that they will reduce inflation. Even populism and egoism should possess a bit of product quality when exhibited on a shop window.

Conclusion

To sum up, neither Harris’s nor Trump’s platforms deal with fundamental for the US economy problems, such as enhancing the US economy’s competitive strength through relevant geopolitics (focused on re-shoring, friendly and near-shoring) or reducing the massive US budget deficit. None of them answers how the United States could beat China on the global supply chain markets if it produces 1.7 times less industrial output. While US labor productivity grew at an average of 3.4 percent per year from 1987 to 2007, then it fell down to –0.5 per cent from 2010 to 2022, implying a slowdown of an average 3–9% vs. 1987 – 2007. Under these circumstances, why should key supply chains and industries return to the country, with its high customs tariffs and labor force shortages?

Why does the U.S. have the most expensive healthcare worldwide and life expectancy like Cuba?

Can you subsidize housing needs forever if the labor productivity in the economy is not sufficiently competitive globally, and thus incomes do not grow enough sustainably?

How would the US economy be competitive in the AI development field if the CHIPS Act supports only advanced chips production while global supply chains depend on mature chip volume production, a sector where China is a growing champion?

So, are the current presidential elections in the United States a costly and hollow political show of business sponsors, in which the ordinary voter could just choose between the bigger and the smaller disadvantage for himself?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Former President Donald Trump, the current Republican candidate, holds an unconventional perspective on the future of the coalition compared to his Democratic opponent. Trump has frequently sent mixed messages about America’s commitment to collective defense and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw the United States from the coalition. This stance sharply contrasts with the actions of President Joe Biden, who has consistently focused on strengthening and expanding NATO, particularly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In reaction to Trump’s threats, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act last year, requiring a two-thirds majority in the Senate or separate congressional approval for any president to withdraw the United States from NATO.

NATO, established in 1949, was created to prevent another European war involving the United States, ensure the security and prosperity of the North Atlantic community through free trade, and uphold the post-war international order. Over the decades, NATO has not only faced numerous challenges but has also strengthened and consolidated U.S. dominance on the global stage. Despite internal and geopolitical challenges during and after the Cold War, NATO remains resilient. U.S. presidents have consistently maintained their commitment to NATO, and congressional support has remained robust, even amidst a rise in isolationism within the Republican Party, largely influenced by Trump.

Having said that, the upcoming 2024 elections and Trump’s potential re-election are critical for the future of the coalition, despite its current support and last year’s legislative resolution backing NATO. Can Trump, if re-elected, withdraw the United States from NATO even with Congress’s increased role and reduced presidential powers per this resolution?

Regrettably, this congressional initiative may not entirely shield NATO from potential destructive actions during Trump’s second term. Even if legally constrained from withdrawing the U.S. from NATO, Trump could still wield influence to undermine the alliance, potentially eroding longstanding U.S. support beyond recognition.

A historical assessment reveals that the powers of American presidents in foreign policy have significantly increased over time. Conversely, Congress, once an indispensable force in foreign policy from the Second World War to the 1990s, has seen its influence severely diminished. The growing polarization of domestic politics in the United States has greatly weakened Congress’s supervisory and bargaining power in foreign policy, reducing its ability to influence the president’s decisions, particularly in global affairs.

For a president inclined to weaken NATO, numerous military and diplomatic options exist to undermine and paralyze the alliance. Diplomatically, the president could choose not to send an ambassador to NATO or refrain from dispatching the secretaries of state and defense, along with other officials and experts, to NATO meetings at both ministerial and expert levels. While Congress retains the authority to summon government officials for explanations and accountability, its power and capacity to oversee foreign policy have significantly diminished over time.

As commander-in-chief, the president has the authority to take significant actions. For instance, the president can withdraw U.S. equipment, weapons, and military forces, effectively nullifying the country’s obligations, even those enshrined in contracts or treaties. The president could also choose not to appoint a NATO Supreme Allied Commander, a position traditionally held by an American. Additionally, as Trump recently suggested in a controversial campaign rally speech, the president can determine and declare that the United States may not necessarily invoke or comply with Article 5 to assist a NATO member under attack.

It’s important to consider that even if a president’s adversarial efforts against NATO do not fully succeed, such actions could exacerbate existing uncertainties and deepen divisions within Europe, particularly amidst domestic challenges spurred by the rise of the radical right. Consequently, formal withdrawal from NATO might not be necessary for the U.S. president to weaken the alliance significantly.

While the Congressional resolution symbolizes ongoing bipartisan support for NATO, if the U.S. president decides that NATO membership is no longer beneficial, the alliance should be able to proceed without the United States. The war in Ukraine has underscored Europe’s dependence on U.S. support for its security. Even if Europeans increase their defense spending as Americans desire, achieving the necessary capacity will take decades. NATO remains effective, but its future is now tightly linked to the 2024 U.S. election. Trump’s re-election poses an existential threat to the coalition.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The shift is being driven by Costa Rica’s strategic geographic location and its’ comparatively lax maritime security, which allows for greater access to shipping ports and easier maneuverability for small vessels, mostly fishing boats, to engage in trafficking. As a result, crime in Costa Rica has been marked by a significant rise in drug-related homicides and the empowerment of well-armed local criminal groups engaged in the battle for territory and control of the narcotics trade.

Costa Rica and the Narcotics Supply Chain

Costa Rica’s central position in the isthmus connecting South and North America renders it an attractive route for smuggling. The country’s extensive coastlines on both the Pacific and Caribbean seas provide a myriad of entry points for drug shipments, especially the Eastern province of Limon, which borders Panama to the south and Nicaragua to the north. The country’s tourism sector also provides a lucrative market for domestic narcotics sales to upper-income tourists, most of whom travel from North America and Western Europe. Drug consumption by locals is also exacerbated by increased trafficking, with crack cocaine steadily climbing in use by Costa Ricans and slowly displacing cannabis as the traditional drug of choice.

Historically, Costa Rica has been viewed as an insignificant transshipment point and hideout for both Mexican and Colombian cartels. Mexican drug cartels, notably the Sinaloa Cartel, have been instrumental in waging a proxy war by arming Costa Rican gangs. Furthermore, the influence of Colombian criminal groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which had a sizable role in Colombia’s drug trade prior to its disarmament and demobilization, has enflamed competition in Costa Rica. Colombian drug trafficking organizations have replicated similar expansion effort in the past in Venezuela and Ecuador.

These transnational groups have not only used Costa Rica as a warehousing operation but have also established bases in the country, arming local gangs and integrating them into their logistics network. Notably, these criminal entities are increasingly engaging in direct drug purchases from Mexico and Colombia, financing themselves through ostensibly legitimate businesses, and expanding the scope of their criminality to include synthetic drug production, contract killing, and human trafficking. Proceeds from the drug trade are also entwined with the Costa Rican economy through money laundering, especially in its’ real estate sector.

Costa Rica’s efforts to combat drug trafficking are further complicated by strained political relationships with neighboring countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras. In recent years, Costa Rica has seen an influx of migrants and refugees from Nicaragua, and the two countries remain entangled in a long-standing territorial dispute, which nearly erupted into armed conflict in 2010. Last year, a short-lived diplomatic spat between Costa Rica and Honduras was ignited by Costa Rica’s concerns over its safety. In addition to drug violence, Honduras is also reeling from a damaging scandal implicating former President Juan Orlando Hernandez and his aides in state-sponsored drug trafficking during his government.

The public perception of security in Costa Rica has deteriorated significantly, with crime being seen as the predominant electoral issue. The socio-economic conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic have led to higher unemployment and growing social discontent, which in turn facilitates gang recruitment and breeds an illicit economy. The ramifications of increasing crime rates and drug-related violence in Costa Rica is likely to hinder tourism, which contributes over 8% of Costa Rica’s GDP and nearly 9% of its’ employment.

The Security Dilemma and Exporting “Bukeleism”

Costa Rica’s lack of a formal military is a double-edged sword; while it has supported the image of a peaceful nation, it also makes Costa Rica attractive to traffickers who face less formidable resistance in asserting control. This scenario has drawn comparisons to the situation in Haiti, which abolished its military in 1995 before reinstating it in 2017 when UN peacekeepers in the country concluded their mission.

The response from the Costa Rican government, mirroring the aggressive crackdowns seen under Nayib Bukele in El Salvador—often referred to as “Bukeleism”—suggests a potential shift towards more draconian measures. However, the effectiveness of such approaches remains a point of contention given the substantial differences in political and historical contexts between Costa Rica and El Salvador. The central issue is a concern over the erosion of democratic norms and the associated human rights violations that have historically accompanied harsh crackdowns across Latin America.

Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves has introduced legislation that increases penalties for crimes, extends the use of preventive detention, and allows for more aggressive policing tactics. These measures mark a radical departure from Costa Rica’s traditional approach to crime prevention, and they were ultimately rejected by the Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly. While aiming to curb immediate crime rates, the policies also raise concerns about their impact on Costa Rica’s traditionally strong democratic norms and rule of law, potentially leading to increased authoritarianism in governance. Chaves’s government has also been accused of following Bukele’s footsteps by holding private negotiations with international criminal groups, which Chaves denies and has now resulted in an official probe.

In response to the escalating drug-related violence, the Costa Rican Ministry of Public Security launched the “Secure Plus 2023-2030” plan last November. Though lacking in specific strategies to combat crime, the plan sets a criterion for safety based principally on targeted reductions in crime metrics and an improvement of public perceptions of crime. Costa Rica has appealed to the EU for security assistance and has a long-standing partnership with the United States, from whom Costa Rica has received equipment and technical support to improve surveillance and detection capabilities throughout the countries ports.

The post A Crackdown in the Making? Cartel Violence in Costa Rica appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Available evidence suggests that the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, won by a wide margin. According to calculations using the results of 79% of voting machines , González received 6.89 million votes, nearly half a million more than Maduro. However, updated results from the National Electoral Council (CNE) indicated that, with 96.87% of the vote counted, Maduro had 6.4 million votes and González 5.3 million. This counting discrepancy has unleashed a wave of widespread protests and the situation has yet to stabilize.

The election crisis is unfolding against a backdrop of economic collapse. Under Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s GDP declined by 75%, transforming it from one of South America’s richest countries to one of the poorest. Once thriving on oil wealth which peaked in the late 1990s, Venezuela now faces widespread hunger, crime, and corruption. Over 95% of the population lives below the poverty line, and hyperinflation has rendered the currency nearly worthless. Basic goods are scarce, and the healthcare system is collapsing. Malnutrition and preventable diseases are rampant, especially among children. Public trust in the government has eroded, leading an estimated eight million Venezuelans to pick up and flee the country.

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Prophetic Precedents

Since the age of discovery, Cuba has represented a strategic pivot worth controlling. As the largest of the Greater Antilles, this tropical insular position (the heart of the ‘American Mediterranean’ as per geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman) is a gateway for reaching much of the Caribbean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the Northern and Southern landmasses of the American hemisphere. At the height of its imperial power, the dominion of Cuba by the Spanish Crown was instrumental for the military adventures of the Conquistadors and the logistical management of highly profitable trade networks that were established between the Spanish Main and the Iberian port of Seville. Unsurprisingly, Cuba was often targeted by European pirates. In the context of the late 19^th century Spanish-American war, the U.S. —in accordance with the underlying geopolitical prescriptions of the Monroe Doctrine— militarily expelled the Spaniards from their last residual outposts in the American Hemisphere, including Cuba. Shortly after the island’s independence —and based on various shared historical and sociocultural common denominators— Mexico entertained the possibility of annexing Cuba, but the project ultimately did not come to fruition.

After the seismic breakout of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Cuba aligned itself to the geopolitical orbit of the Soviet Union. In turn, the Kremlin secured a beachhead in the American Hemisphere. This mutually convenient symbiosis was a result of strategic, political, and economic factors. Strategically, as a superpower opposed to the U.S. under a bipolar balance of power, the USSR became the full-spectrum security guarantor of the Cuban state, assuming the corresponding costs and risks. Despite their status as junior partners, the Cubans assumed a very proactive role in joint interventions. In support of Moscow’s conventional and covert operations in some of the most contentious battlespaces in the so-called ‘third world,’ Cuban troops and intelligence officials participated in peripheral theaters of engagement like the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. To keep things in perspective, the Cubans fought —in these proxy wars— against enemies like South American right-wing paramilitary squads, South African mercenaries, and even regular soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces. For the Soviets, the Cuban intelligence service was just as valuable —if not more— as the East German Stasi thanks to its expertise in the clandestine implementation of ‘active measures.’ Havana (not unlike Berlin, Vienna, Geneva and Mexico City) became one of the top flashpoints of the Cold War and a nest of espionage activities.

Cuba also joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a Soviet-led economic bloc which also included communist or communist-leaning states like Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam. Considering the underdeveloped profile of the Cuban economy in comparison to more industrially advanced members of the Soviet sphere, Cuba received economic assistance, subsidies, and oil supplies in exchange for agricultural commodities like sugar. The projection of Soviet ‘soft power’ was also strong in Cuba, despite obstacles like geographical distance and the existence of very different cultural codes that are difficult to bridge. Thousands of Cuban students —especially the best and the brightest, as well as scions of the Communist Party’s elite apparatchiks— were educated in the USSR and the Russian language was widely taught in the island. Yet, although the foreign policy of both states was mostly driven by the necessities of Richelovian Realpolitik, both Havana and Moscow shared an ideological commitment to the creed of socialist revolution. This partnership would persist until the fateful collapse of the Soviet Union.

From the US perspective, Cuba did not constitute a meaningful threat in its own right. Nevertheless, the island’s geopolitical position as a platform for the interference of an extra-regional great power was deeply troublesome for Washington. With Cuba as a launchpad, the Soviets could incite armed subversion in much of Latin America, threaten the Eastern seaboard of the United States, strike the Panama Canal, target the mouth of the Mississippi River —a vital artery for the US economy— and place the core of the US oil industry in their crosshairs. These concerns triggered Washington’s strong response in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis (known in Russian as the ‘Caribbean Crisis’). Said standoff ended up in a stalemate. Nikita Khruschev —not without the hesitance of hawkish Politburo members— agreed to abort the plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba and, in exchange, the Kennedy administration withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey and agreed that there would be no direct US military intervention in Cuba, much to the chagrin of the CIA and the most hardline factions of the community of Cuban exiles in Florida.

The Period of Estrangement

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the USSR, Cuba found itself in a precarious position. Without Soviet strategic patronage and cash, Cuba was essentially on its own. In the early 90s’ —in consistence with the ideas of Francis Fukuyama and others about the ‘inexorable march of liberal democracy’— Cuba was commonly seen in much of the Western world as an outdated relic of a bygone era in which a regime change would take place sooner or later. However, more than three decades later, the Cuban government has proved to be resilient enough to withstand natural disasters, economic hardship, geopolitical tensions, intermittent domestic political unrest, and even the fallout of its own mismanagement. During the so-called ‘special period,’ the Cuban state had no choice but to diversify its economic partnerships, moderate its animosity towards the Americans and introduce mild reforms in order to fuel the inflow of hard currency through joint ventures, remittances, state-owned companies, the development of biotechnology, the export of primary goods and the encouragement of tourism. But although the Cuban economy has not imploded, its underperformance and stagnancy have become chronic. According to Harvard’s atlas of economic complexity, the Cuban economy relies mainly on the export of primary goods and the complexity of its structure has diminished dramatically since 1995.

Back then, Russia assumed an indifferent attitude towards Cuba, as it lacked the bandwidth or the resources to focus on the Caribbean. Moscow’s attention was absorbed by internal political crises, the war in Chechnya, economic turmoil, and the reorientation of its foreign policy in accordance with a pro-Western inclination. Furthermore, Russia’s disinterest was reciprocated in kind by the Cubans. Fidel Castro and his ruling were not eager to replicate policies based on the principles of Glasnost and Perestroika because they believed that such course of action would be detrimental, if not outright suicidal. The ensuing era of ‘Weimar Russia’ was no enviable model either. During this decade, relations were formally cordial but lukewarm and without much substance. In 2002, the government of Vladimir Putin decided to close the Lourdes SIGINT station as a result of budgetary constraints. The listening post —which was used to spy on the Americans— was regarded as an expensive remnant of the Cold War that had outlived its usefulness. In turn, Havana mobilized its intelligence capabilities to seek new benefactors in Latin America. Reportedly, Raul Castro was attracted by the success of China’s neo-mercantilist developmental strategy and also interested in fostering economic cooperation with Beijing. In an attempt to further hedge its bets through a policy of detente, Havana welcomed diplomatic overtures that eventually managed to restore the normalization of ties with Washington nearly a decade ago.

Back to the Future?

Despite some symbolic gestures, both Cubans and Russians were disappointed with the United States. Cuba felt disenfranchised because, despite a relatively lesser degree of mutual hostility, the restrictions implemented as a result of the US trade embargo still prevent the proliferation of bilateral economic exchanges and business connections. Far from being lifted or even loosened, these measures of economic coercion have been strengthened by both Republican and Democratic administrations. Russia’s frustration responds to the reluctance of Washington to bless the reassertion of this Eurasian state as a great power in the post-Soviet space, forge some sort of partnership, reshuffle the architecture of European security in a way that accommodates Russian interests or even negotiate the redistribution of spheres of influence. Moscow’s growing discontent with unipolarity has been outspoken since the speech delivered by President Vladimir Putin in the 2007 edition of the Munich Security Conference. Therefore, these circumstances have generated a window of opportunity to revitalize strategic bilateral ties between these states.

The rapprochement between Moscow and Havana began in the late 2000s. Motivated by pressing economic needs —in a context shaped by the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and the destructive impact of extreme weather phenomena— and an interest in embracing strategic pluralism in an increasingly polycentric world order, Cuba welcomed Russian economic assistance. Moscow forgave 90% of the Soviet-era debt, which was likely unpayable anyway. Although the Russians are not necessarily interested in money in their dealings with Cuba, said concession can hardly be described as charitable. The details of the corresponding tradeoff have not been disclosed but, rather than a following a purely commercial interest in Cuban primary products —such as cigars, coffee, bananas, rum or sugar— the Kremlin likely seeks strategic political and economic benefits.

For example, Russian state-owned oil companies have been assessing the potential prospect of extracting offshore deposits of fossil fuels in Cuban territorial waters. Although no substantial discoveries have been found, Cuba has become a consumer of Russian crude oil, a lifeline which helps Cuba overcome worsening energy shortages. Likewise, the Russians have helped ameliorate Cuba’s poor conditions of food security through the supplies of wheat. In return, Cuba has backed Russian diplomatic positions in many controversial issues and military interventions in several corners of the so-called ‘near abroad,’ including Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Rumors about the hypothetical presence of Russian strategic bombers in Cuban airfields and the operational reactivation of the Lourdes SIGINT facility have been circulating for years. Likewise, as an operator of Soviet-made military hardware (including MiG fighters), Cuba traditionally represents an attractive consumer market for Russian weaponry and President Putin himself has threatened to arm states opposed to the collective West as an asymmetric retaliation for the increasing shipment of military materiel to Ukraine by both Washington and Brussels. Nonetheless, the need to redirect military supplies for the Russian war effort in Eastern Ukraine will likely limit the volume of potential sales in a foreseeable future.

Moreover, the position of the Russian Federation as a ‘full-spectrum commodity superpower’ suggests a predictable interest in Cuban nickel, especially considering the strategic applications of this industrial metal for the manufacture of stainless steel, superalloys, and rechargeable batteries. Access to Cuban nickel reserves under preferential conditions would give the Russians a stronger power in the global market of ferrous metals. In addition, Moscow has offered to support the upgrade of Cuban economic and industrial capabilities, especially in key sectors like nuclear energy, infrastructure, telecom, and biotechnology. After all, the relative absence of foreign companies in the Cuban economy means that Russian firms can harness a privileged opportunity to do business in the Caribbean nation with little competition. Although the Russian checkbook is not fat enough to transform Cuba into a world-class developed hub like Singapore, strengthening ties to Moscow constitutes a useful supplementary instrument to prevent overreliance on economic partners like China or Brazil for exports, imports, and investment projects. On the other hand, Cuba is a testing ground for the financial innovations of Russian economic statecraft. In December 2023, the Russian National Card Payment System launched Mir payment cards —counterparts to Western alternatives like Visa and Mastercard— in Cuba. Although the emerging rollout of these cards in Cuban touristic spots such as Havana and Varadero does not have the firepower to challenge US superiority in international finance, it indicates a common interest in experimenting with the development of parallel structures designed to bypass transnational circuits underpinned by the hegemony of the American dollar.

Nevertheless, although this rising partnership serves the national interests of both Russians and Cubans, its scope is limited. Both Moscow and Havana are far less intrepid than during the height of the Cold War. The recent symbolical presence of Russian warships in Havana must not be interpreted as a prelude for the outbreak of hostilities in the American hemisphere. Even if they wanted to, the Russians lack a blue-water navy and the logistical capabilities to carry out expeditionary warfare in the surroundings of Cuba, not to mention a war chest which could fund such a dangerous adventure. The Kremlin is no longer a bidder in the pursuit of global hegemony. For all intents and purposes, post-Cold War Russian statecraft has departed from the quixotic business of remaking the world in the image and likeness of the Soviet model. However, as a revisionist great power interested in reasserting its position in the global strategic chessboard, the likeliest interpretation is that Moscow wants to accumulate bargaining chips, generate distractions to deflect the attention of the Americans away from the post-Soviet space, and to remind Washington that Russia is a force to reckoned with even in the American hemisphere. Considering the growing presence of Russian intelligence personnel in states close to the geopolitical perimeter of American national security, another possible interest is to enlist Cuban collaboration in ‘cloak and dagger’ shenanigans conceived to instigate chaos as asymmetric payback for the Eastward expansion of NATO, the instigation of ‘color revolutions,’ and the delivery of US weapons to Ukraine. The hypothetical spectrum of these low-cost operations  might include psychological warfare and encouragement for the proliferation of irregular militant agitation. Moreover, Moscow and Havana share an interest in supporting ‘Bolivarian’ states that are hostile to US interests —such as Venezuela and Nicaragua— because they are useful to promote a favorable correlation of forces in the region. In turn, the Cubans are no longer committed to an ideological crusade to preach the gospel of Marxism throughout the Global South. Their quintessential priority is much more existential, what they care about is to gather anchors that can ensure a reasonable degree of stability and a regional balance of power that favors the survival of its regime. Moreover, this time there are little ideological coincidences. Both the Russian Federation and Cuba are illiberal states but, in the heterogeneous ideological universe of illiberal political thinking, they do not have much in common. Russia is neo-imperial multiethnic ‘securocracy’ run by former KGB spooks and technocratic cadres (Vladimir Putin himself is no admirer of the Bolsheviks and their legacy), whereas Cuba is one of the last strongholds of communism, at least nominally. Yet Cuba and Russia do not have to be fellow travelers in order to come together as bedfellows whenever both sides have something to gain.

Conclusions

In a nutshell, the attempt to reopen doors to reconnect Moscow and Havana must not be dismissed as Kabuki theatrics or as an empty act of ‘smoke and mirrors.’ Despite the prevalence of profound disparities, there is a substantial strategic potential in bilateral relations waiting to be harnessed, especially as both states prepare to perform confidently in an environment shaped by the realities and needs of a multipolar international system, in which geopolitical rivalries keep rising across many fronts. Such rapprochement —if its development moves forward in the following decades— can influence Latin America’s political and strategic landscape, as the region becomes a contested arena in the game of great power politics. However, existing evidence indicates that the process to rebuild this partnership will be incremental, selective and cautious. Moscow and Havana want to co-operate as partners and maybe allies in certain respects, but not to entwine their fates. The eventual progress of this association would have to overcome challenges like the persistence of mutual distrust, material issues, and a limited availability of resources. Furthermore, the waltz between Russians and Cubans does not have the critical mass to overturn the structure of polarity within the international system, at least not by itself for the time being.

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As NATO member nations gather to celebrate the 75^th anniversary of the alliance at the July 9-11 Summit in Washington DC, it would give European allies a critical boost of confidence to see strong support from prominent members of both parties. But if the hostile, isolationist narrative takes over, we should be very concerned about the future of our national security structures.

It’s true that Western Europe has enjoyed a vacation from history since the end of the Cold War.  Their economies thrived under the assumed guarantee of the US security umbrella, public spending was directed away from defense, while energy reliance on Russian gas was thought to disincentivize conflict. But Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine abruptly awoke Europe from that pleasant dream, and ushered in a new era in which Europe must play a much larger geopolitical role.

Former President Donald Trump and his supporters have sharply complained about NATO, arguing that allies have been taking advantage of the United States. During a speech at a rally earlier this year, Former President Trump shocked observers when he said he would “encourage” Russia or other enemies to “do whatever the hell they want” with NATO countries who aren’t paying enough.

Though we should always be careful to separate Trump’s campaign rhetoric from actual policy proposals, there is a concerning tendency among his supporters to view security alliances on a zero-sum transactional basis. According to their view, many countries “owe NATO billions of dollars” to compensate for past US spending.

This isn’t just deeply misleading, but flatly false. There are no unpaid dues, bills, or invoices among NATO members, no one owes any debt to any other member. There is the commitment of 2% of GDP to be spent on defense, which was agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, and actually, we have seen the strongest growth of defense spending among members in the past several years. This year it is expected that twenty-two out of the thirty-two total member countries will meet or exceed the 2 percent target, including France and Germany.

However, if we must look at NATO from a transactional basis, then we should consider return on investment. Far from being a burden on the US taxpayer as argued by the isolationists, the United States has benefitted enormously from the alliance.

Firstly, in terms of raw defense spending, the United States has not expended budget on behalf of other nations. In fact, without NATO, US defense spending would in fact have to be much higher. Thanks to NATO, the United States is better prepared to defend itself and is able to apply its resources more effectively. The common funding mechanisms and joint military exercises on NATO ensure that member nations share the costs of defense, which helps mitigate the financial strain on a single nation. Additionally, the standardization of equipment and interoperability among NATO forces means that the U.S. can operate seamlessly with its allies, enhancing overall military readiness.

Secondly, the US benefits from the position of leadership in the global economy. By leading NATO, the United States maintains significant influence over global security policies and initiatives. This leadership role allows the U.S. to shape the strategic direction of the alliance, ensuring that its interests and values are represented on the global stage. In particular, we are seeing the emergence of coordinated defense industrial strategies among NATO allies, including the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), which aims to lay out a framework not only to dramatically increase manufacture of munitions, but to compete globally in technology, innovation, agriculture, and energy.

Lastly, there is the simple face value of deterrence from attack. A mutual defense treaty with such a large, geopolitically important bloc greatly improves US national security at a much lower cost than going at it alone.

But Trump and other Republicans are not wrong to criticize and call for reform and modernization of NATO. Europeans cannot be free-riders, and they now need to recognize that unexpected events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, can happen at any time. They need to comply, contribute, and make up for the losses during times of their under-delivery.

Working together, we can reform NATO according to the geopolitical realities of the 21^st century. We need to work together on fair terms to address the threats not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, which include not only military threats but also hybrid warfare, such as economic disruption and disinformation.

By not focusing solely on values but also on economic ties and self-sufficiency, the West can be better prepared to stand ready against the tyrants of the world who fear our freedoms. Indeed, NATO has been one of the smartest investments made by the US government in the past century.

Bilal Bilici is a Member of Turkish Parliament and Foreign Affairs Committee Member.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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What is a drone swarm?

Drone swarm technology involves coordinating groups of three to thousands of drones to execute missions collectively with minimal human intervention. Compared to single drones, swarms offer enhanced efficiency and resilience, performing multiple tasks simultaneously and remaining on mission when individual drones fail. A swarm can be controlled in various ways, including preprogrammed missions with specific flight paths, centralized control from a ground station or a single control drone, and distributed control where drones communicate and collaborate using shared information (fully autonomous). More sophisticated control techniques involve swarm intelligence, inspired by the collective behavior of insects and birds, and artificial intelligence to enable drone swarms to adapt to new or unforeseen situations.

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