The direct intervention of North Korea in the Ukraine war represents a test benchmark for the Korea’s People Army, whose battlefield actions are now challenging the traditional Western opinions that have always drawn it as an obsolete and ineffective power.
Looking beyond the dominant media’s narrative, North Korean involvement allows us to analyze with a better precision the operative capabilities of an army which is historically shrouded in secrecy.
A deepening North Korea-Russia bilateral relationship
The Kim Jong-un regime, Moscow’s historical ally, has constantly demonstrated its support for Russian expansionism in Ukraine. In 2017, the DPRK recognized Crimea as part and parcel of the Russian Federation, and then endorsed the invasion of February 2022. A few months later, the North Korean regime recognized the sovereignty of self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The latest significant diplomatic action between the two countries dates back to November 2024, with the ratification of an important military cooperation agreement which includes a mutual protection clause, sealing the strategic agreement we now see in action.
In addition to political support, Pyongyang has provided an ever growing and more relevant military contribution. The first military supplies date from the end of 2022, when it appeared clear to Moscow that the conflict would last beyond its initial forecast, requiring external support in order to compensate for the military production shortfalls of Russia’s defense industry. The first North Korean aid included large deliveries of artillery munitions, but, according to data out of Ukraine, about half of the rounds fired were defective. Pyongyang continues to provide a great amount of its own ammunition production to its Russian ally.
After the signing of the November 2024 agreements, this output has risen, now including self-propelled howitzers, short-range missile systems, and even soldiers in support of the Russian army – a fact still denied by Moscow and Pyongyang.
The strategic rationale behind Pyongyang sending its men to support the Ukraine war resides in various conditions laid out in the above bilateral agreements. In exchange for what Moscow sees as mere frontline fodder, the North Korean regime gains significant advantages, including access to sophisticated Russian satellite technology and the ability to acquire foreign currency to finance their nuclear and missile programs. In addition, North Korea benefits from Moscow’s sharing of advanced military technology and a reassurance of Russian support in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Unpacking the composition and tactics of the North Korean deployment in Kursk
According to reporting out of Ukraine, the North Korean force sent in support to Russia amounts to between 10,000 and 12,000 men in five infantry brigades. After receiving basic training in Vladivostok, the troops were moved by air over 7,000 kilometers to the outskirts of Kursk, placed under the Russian military command, and here they’d have received Russian uniforms and equipment, in addition to forged identity documents that attribute them to the Russian region of Tuva, thereby concealing any evidence of North Korean involvement. The troops are supported by an estimated 500 officers and three North Korean generals, including Kim Yong Bok, commanding 1,500 men from the special operations forces of the People’s Army of Korea (조선인민군 특수작전군) whose presence was also confirmed by the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS).
The North Korean deployment in Kursk has been used to launch continuous assaults, keeping Ukrainian forces engaged such that the Russians can concentrate on other critical areas of the front. The first North Korean attack on Ukrainian lines is likely to have been launched on 4 November, confirming Western fears dating back to August, when unit movements from Pyongyang were first detected near Vladivostok. The estimated 10,000 men deployed by the Pentagon at about 50 kilometers from the Ukrainian front, were initially considered part of a defensive contingent aimed at guarding the Kursk region, which had been the subject of the Ukrainian counteroffensive a few months earlier.
Military tactics, ideology, and battlefield performance
Assessments gathered by Ukrainian forces suggest that these North Korean forces are totally unprepared for modern war. The tactics they employ are obsolete, based on military concepts that are at least four decades old, notably in the advancing of infantry fronts without mechanized support. But above all, these strategies completely neglect the decisive role of drone warfare in modern conflicts, which the North Koreans hitherto had no experience with.
Despite the outdated tactical approach, the standard equipment provided to North Korean soldiers appears qualitatively higher than the average Russian. Weapons recovered from the dead confirm the presence of AK-12 assault rifles with a dozen magazines, between five and ten grenades, several mines and an updated version of the Russian tactical backpack containing very scarce water reserves and supplies. The surprising mobility of Pyongyang’s troops, facilitated by the absence of armor and bulletproof vests, makes these fighters particularly difficult targets to hit for drones.
On the disciplinary level, North Korean soldiers are distinguished by a physical and mental resistance much higher than the worn-out Russian ranks. Their absolute dedication to the orders received lends itself to treacherous frontal assaults. There are numerous reports of North Korean soldiers who, instead of surrendering, preferred to be blown up with grenades.
Ideological indoctrination seems to play a central role in the behavior of these units. According to some testimonies, North Koreans would eliminate the wounded comrades in order to avoid falling prisoners, just as the Russians have opened fire several times on retreating North Koreans, in the fear that capture may reveal their true identity. As part of the role played by propaganda, notes were found on the bodies of the fallen soldiers, in which they extol the superiority of North Korea and the willingness to sacrifice themselves for the glory of their own country at any cost.
Offering a counter view to this alleged ideological fanaticism inherent to North Korean soldiers, there are some revelations confirmed by both the NIS and the former National Security Communications Advisor of the White House J. Kirby. It seems that the North Korean soldiers are forced by high command to commit the unthinkable in order to avoid capture, because being taken prisoner by the Ukrainians risks serious reprisals against their families back home. Particularly relevant are some documents found on officers’ bodies, including disciplinary records that outline punishments for crimes such as stealing food from supplies or hesitating to commit suicide attacks.
Captured prisoners provide window into the North Korean deployment
Although the news that filters through the North Korean regime is scarce, according to the NIS, the five North Korean brigades consist mainly of conscripts called up for military service from the age of 17. The mandatory service period would be around eight years, which would explain the great physical and mental resistance of the troops, as well as the good combat skills reported by the Ukrainians.
Precisely because of the poor knowledge about these soldiers and the extreme difficulty in taking them prisoner, Ukrainian troops have been on a mission for over a month to capture at least one North Korean. As reported in an interview with the Kyiv Independent, the operation that led to the capture of two North Korean soldiers in mid-January was plagued by numerous difficulties. The two prisoners had been wounded during the fighting and were lying on the battlefield; the capture operations in both cases proved particularly complex, due to the immediate Russian reaction. Although they had never fired a single shot before, when the Russian command understood that the soldiers were being recovered, they opened fire in a deliberate attempt to prevent their capture. The two prisoners are currently in the custody of the Ukrainian secret services and are subject to numerous interrogations aimed at extracting as much information from them as possible.
One of the soldiers, identified as Lee Jong Nam, born in 1999 in Pyongyang, a 25-year-old sergeant, enlisted in 2016, serving in a reconnaissance platoon as a sharpshooter. His first combat mission dates back to 8 January, during which he was wounded in the jaw. All the other members of his seven-man unit were killed in operations prior to his capture.
The second prisoner, born in 2005, remains unidentified. Captured by the Ukrainian media in a film from his hospital bed, he stated that he was wounded on the ground for “three, four or five days.” He also revealed that the name on his Russian military card was false, stating that he did not remember it and that it did not correspond to his real identity. The soldier revealed that he was convinced he was in the middle of a drill. According to a recent statement by prisoners, many of his fellow soldiers were even convinced that they were fighting against South Korean troops.
An ongoing learning experience with wider implications
According to Seth John, an academic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, North Korean losses are difficult to quantify accurately. However, he estimates that they may be between 30% and 50% of the total, with at least 1,000 men killed in the course of the operations. The figures vary according to the sources: the South Korean NIS, for example, claims that Pyongyang has lost about 300 men, with 2,700 wounded and missing, while for Kyiv the number of casualties is estimated at 4,000.
In any case, the losses are substantial, mainly due to the threat posed by drone warfare and the language barrier between North Koreans and Russians, which significantly complicates coordination on the ground.
In light of this high human cost, according to Ukrainian reports, the North Korean contingent was temporarily withdrawn from the front to reintegrate personnel and receive further training, probably focused on drone tactics. There are also rumors of a possible new troop deployment by Pyongyang, in compliance with the military cooperation agreements ratified last November.
As per an article published by the BBC on 7 February, the North Korean contingent has since returned to combat, however the news remains to be confirmed.
Although the North Korean intervention is not essential in determining the outcome of the war, it offers us interesting insights from multiple perspectives, not only for the organization of the North Korean military, but also in the context of a wider geopolitics. The North Korean deployment in Ukraine is already producing significant effects: troops are gaining first-hand experience on the modern battlefield, mitigating against decades of tactical backwardness. At the same time, the use of domestically produced weapons and equipment in a high-intensity conflict allows Pyongyang to assess their effectiveness. Armed with this knowledge, Pyongyang, with strong Russian support, could establish itself as a relevant regional actor in East Asia.
