The ongoing war in Myanmar, recognized as the world’s oldest conflict, is producing significant adverse effects for neighboring India and Bangladesh. Myanmar’s Chin State shares borders with both India and Bangladesh, while India also shares a border with the Sagaing Region, and Bangladesh shares a border with Rakhine State. The conflict has led to a refugee influx, economic disruptions, border tensions, and heightened security concerns, all of which contribute to regional instability.
The conflict in Myanmar is predominantly waged along ethnic lines, with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) confronting the military junta that seized power after overthrowing the democratically elected government in 2021. In Chin State, the Chin people constitute the majority ethnic group, while the Bamar (Burman) ethnic group is predominant in the Sagaing Region. Rakhine State is primarily inhabited by the Rakhine people, alongside the Rohingya Muslim minority group. Each of these ethnic groups has endured repression under various military regimes that have governed Myanmar for the past 70 years, and the atrocities perpetrated against the Rohingya have been officially recognized as genocide by the United States and numerous Western governments.
In mid-January, the Arakan Army (AA), one of Myanmar’s numerous Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), took control of Paletwa township, situated near the port city of Sittwe. This area holds strategic significance as it is integral to the Indian-led infrastructure project, the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which seeks to connect Kolkata in eastern India with Myanmar. In addition to the threat to its investments and disruption of economic activity, India is concerned about the security repercussions of potential spill-over effects from the conflict, including the influx of refugees and fleeing soldiers into Indian territory. Consequently, the Indian government is constructing a border wall and has initiated the repatriation of 600 Myanmar military personnel.
The Arakan Army (AA), along with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), together constitute the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA). This alliance launched a highly successful military campaign called Operation 1027 on October 27th of last year. Operating primarily in Rakhine State and Shan State, the combined forces have achieved significant victories, reclaiming territory previously controlled by the country’s military junta. Additionally, they have disrupted not only Indian investment but China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects as well.
As Myanmar junta positions weaken, especially those in the India-Myanmar-Bangladesh trijunction, soldiers often seek refuge in India or Bangladesh. Bangladesh has reported instances of armed Border Guard Force members, police, and government personnel from Myanmar crossing into their territory in search of shelter. Communities along the border in Bangladesh are particularly apprehensive, facing threats from stray bullets, mortar fire, and fleeing combatants encroaching on their areas. This recent influx of soldiers and refugees adds to the burden of the approximately one million Rohingya refugees that Bangladesh has been hosting since 2017. Dhaka has been attempting to facilitate the repatriation of Myanmar refugees, but the dysfunctional state of Myanmar government institutions has made this endeavor nearly impossible. Furthermore, with the recognition of the Rohingya genocide by Western governments, Bangladesh faces pressure not to return them to potential danger.
Another consequence of the Myanmar crisis is internal displacement within Bangladesh. Schools and ferry services along the border have been shut down, prompting Bangladeshis to flee the border region and seek refuge in government shelters in safer areas.
India is currently accommodating approximately 75,000 Myanmar refugees, with around 50,000 of them arriving since the 2021 coup. Among those crossing the border are civilians and armed fighters seeking refuge in India’s northeastern states such as Mizoram and Manipur. This places significant strain on local resources and infrastructure, sometimes leading to tensions between refugees and the local communities. Moreover, the influx of refugees, including some with weapons, heightens the risk of insurgency in border regions already marked by ethnic tensions.
Last year, Imphal, the capital city of India’s Manipur state, was gripped by mob violence. Temples, churches, and entire villages were set ablaze, resulting in the loss of 70 lives and the displacement of 48,000 individuals. These incidents were fueled by ethnic tensions, exacerbated by disputes over refugees. The region has a long history of conflict among its three major ethnic groups: the predominantly Hindu Meiteis, who hold the dominant political position, and the two largely Christian minority groups — the Nagas and the Kukis. The Kukis share strong ethnic ties with Burma’s Chin ethnic group, who have been fleeing across the border in large numbers. The Meiteis have blamed the Chin for looting and burning Indian homes and have accused them of trafficking opium into the region.
While the Chin in Myanmar endure persecution by the Tatmadaw, prompting many to seek refuge in India, the situation is further complicated by the presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), an insurgent group from Manipur distinct linked to China’s People’s Liberation Army. For years, the PLA has waged war against the Indian government while finding refuge in Chin State. Similarly, the Eastern Command of the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), another Indian insurgent army, is also operating out of Chin State. Both armies have been recruited by the Tatmadaw to fight against ethnic armed organizations.
Before the coup, Indian and Myanmar armed forces conducted joint operations in Chin State to combat the PLA and other insurgent groups. However, since the coup, New Delhi has refrained from overtly supporting the Tatmadaw, although it has not publicly denounced the coup either. Additionally, India has not officially recognized the Chin as refugees, partly to maintain friendly relations with Naypyidaw, the administrative capital of Burma. The instability in Myanmar has hindered India’s Act East policy, which aims to enhance trade with Southeast Asia. Infrastructure projects and cross-border trade have been adversely affected by the ongoing conflict.
A stable Myanmar would offer India a direct trade and investment route to Southeast Asia. On a global scale, India and China are engaged in a competition for leadership in the developing world. Many Southeast Asian countries perceive India as a less colonial option compared to China and are keen to see India assume a greater role in the region. Within Myanmar, similar to the broader region, India and China are vying for influence, economic opportunities, investment, and trade.
China serves as the main financial supporter of the Myanmar junta, but it has also provided backing to various ethnic resistance armies over the years, playing both sides against the middle and manipulating conflicts for its own benefit. India, on the other hand, has faced accusations of selling jet fuel and military equipment to the junta, contravening international sanctions. These actions highlight the priority both nations place on seizing financial opportunities and solidifying their positions in Myanmar, rather than prioritizing human rights or a restoration of democratic rule. Although both countries would benefit from a stable Myanmar, stability does not necessarily have to come in the form of democracy.
While the collapse of the junta could be welcomed by most of Myanmar’s population, it could also result in a power vacuum that might not be promptly filled by a democratically elected government. During this transitional period, Myanmar could become susceptible to exploitation by China. By offering financial support and aid to the emerging government and its military, Beijing could strengthen its foothold in Myanmar, potentially marginalizing India entirely.
India and China currently have a territorial dispute in the Himalayas. New Delhi has raised concerns about a Chinese spy base and a Chinese-funded port, which can accommodate People’s Liberation Army-Navy vessels, located on Myanmar territory along the Bay of Bengal. Needless to say, the presence of a China-aligned state on its border with Southeast Asia would not be advantageous for India.
