Russian use of hard power has been displayed on the global stage for nearly 20 years. Since the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and subsequent invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s apparent tool of choice in foreign policy has been military action and coercion through force. With the appearance of “little green men” in Crimea in 2014, the use of deniable means by the Russian government signaled a shift in the methods by which it sought to further its national interests. Among these methods, the Russian private military company (PMC) or сhastnaya voyennaya kompaniya (ЧВК) has grown in utility and effectiveness to achieve the objectives of the Russian government. The most overt actions of Russian PMCs often correlate with hard-power applications such as the use of Wagner PMC in combat for strategic cities in Ukraine and its use in Donbass in 2014-15. However, PMCs have become more than just a hammer for battlefield operations; they have become a critical component of the Kremlin’s “hybrid” or gray zone doctrine.
Since 2014, Russian PMCs have emerged as Russia’s most successful tool of soft power diplomacy, allowing the Kremlin to increase its influence and power across the globe by expanding alliances and partnerships, accessing resources and minerals, and challenging US interests abroad and in the Western Hemisphere. In Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America PMCs have opened the door to bolster relationships and regional access by providing security services or security force assistance. In Africa, PMCs have enabled the Russian government to successfully convert positive Russian sentiment and approval into formal trading agreements, increasing the Kremlin’s grip on local natural resources. Finally, across the globe, Russian PMCs have undermined US interests. Chief amongst these are their operations in Latin America, which have given Russia a foothold in the American hemisphere, threatening the idea of US regional or even global hegemony.
Soft Power and The Structure of Russian PMCs
I have asserted above that Russian PMC’s are utilized both in hard and soft power applications, while their use in soft power has yielded greater success across the globe. Before I continue developing this argument, I must first define “soft power” and how PMCs fall into the category of soft power tools for use by the Kremlin. The most precise definition, and the one that will underpin this article, is provided by Illona Kickbusch and Austin Liu as “a diplomatic approach to achieve particular objectives through co-option and attraction, rather than through coercion and payment.” Joseph Nye further enhances this definition by explaining that co-option is for one state to get another nation to want what they want or to align their mutual interests. In essence, the Kremlin’s use of soft power seeks to establish mutual interests and attraction between Russia and other nations, then exploit these relationships to achieve their foreign policy objectives.
Considering this definition, we can accurately describe Russian PMCs as tools of Russian soft power foreign policy by their structure and services. The current control structure of Russian PMCs, most notably Wagner Group, has shifted since the downfall of Yevgeny Prigozhin, fundamentally changing their relationship with the Russian government. Before the so-called “fall of Prigozhin,” PMCs were operated as unregistered entities within Russia, only operating outside of Russian borders due to the illegal nature of PMCs by the Russian criminal code. However, these PMCs were permitted to operate as the owners, such as Prigozhin, were oligarchs operating within Putin’s inner circle and, therefore, operated in lockstep with Russian interests abroad through unofficial channels.
In the post-Prigozhin era, PMC ties to the government have become more defined. The Russian intelligence service (GRU) has largely assumed direct control of Russian PMCs operating in Africa and elsewhere. The GRU has reorganized PMC activity under two companies named Redut and Konvoy, both financed by oligarchs but overseen directly by the Russian Ministry of Defense. This reorganization has allowed the Russian government to retain the advantages of PMC use it had previously enjoyed, such as deniability and lower transparency at home and abroad, while increasing coordination and control of their activities and reducing the potential of individual interests interfering with Russian policy objectives.
In addressing its foreign policy and national security objectives, PMCs provide a host of mission options to the Kremlin. Aside from the widely publicized combat role, most PMC missions are best suited for soft power activities. These include spreading ideology and propaganda, providing protective services, conducting train-advise-assists (TAA) efforts for host nation security forces, and even site security of critical infrastructure. Missions best suited for use in environments where partnership building and attraction strengthening are paramount, in essence, soft power objectives. Whether through proxy control or direct MoD control, the Kremlin has been able to direct the application of these services to areas that advance its interests without force or coercion, making PMCs an undeniable tool of Russian soft power diplomacy.
Friends in Various Places: The Expansion of Russian Alliances
Over the past ten years, and particularly in the past five, Russian PMCs have proven to be an extremely effective tool in the hands of the Kremlin. This claim is most evident in the success Russia has had in recent years, continually expanding its sphere of influence and its lists of partners and allies despite its continued campaigns of aggression in places like Ukraine and Syria. The expansion of Russia’s sphere can be attributed to its use of PMCs. In Africa, the Kremlin employed The Wagner Group as early as 2014 to establish a foothold in areas outside Europe and the Caucuses. Deniable ties, namely the surgical use of contractors rather than Russian soldiers, has allowed the Kremlin to deploy a small footprint of contractors that can open doors and provide access. This effort has provided a dramatic return on a relatively low investment on the side of the Kremlin, with an exponential growth rate year over year in African countries hosting Russian PMC operations, which speaks to its success.
Russia’s use of PMCs as a soft power instrument does not just end with the Kremlin successfully obtaining a foothold in new regions of the world through active PMC operations. Russia’s true measure of success has been its ability to capitalize on these new footholds by strengthening pro-Russian ties with the leaders of those countries and improving its image across Africa. In 2023, Russia saw the most significant median increase in approval in Africa, with countries in the Sahel with long-standing PMC operations expressing up to 89% approval of Russian leadership even after 2022. These deepened ties and increased positive perceptions of Russian leadership, thanks to PMC operations, have also enabled the Kremlin to convert its influence into more traditional foreign policy activities. One example is the two African summits hosted in 2019 and 2023 by Vladimir Putin, in which 49 African states attended. While still in their infancy, these efforts have allowed Russia to re-introduce its Cold War sphere of influence over the African continent and complicate US efforts in the region. All of this could not have been possible without Russia first employing the Wagner or Redut PMCs to strengthen and expand Russian alliances through efforts of mutual interest, such as “coup-proofing” or “regime security”.
Security for Resources
Moscow’s use of PMCs has successfully enabled Russia to expand its partnerships and improve its image abroad and has provided the Kremlin access to resources and critical minerals. As alluded to in the section above, the Wagner Group first pursued a strategy of regime security paid for in resources or commercial offerings in its early operations. Since then, with PMCs firmly under MoD control, Redut and Konvy have maintained this operations model by offering “regime survival packages” in exchange for access to natural resources. By training and advising host nation security forces or addressing a nation’s security concerns, Russia has gained unprecedented access to the economies and resources of the countries where its PMCs operate. While this may skirt our definition of “soft power,” the agreements between the host nation, the PMCs, and the Kremlin are seen to be in their own mutual interests and not the result of coercion.
PMCs have not only successfully granted Russia access to mineral resources in Africa but new efforts across the globe have resulted in expansion of trade, access to fossil fuels, and avenues to circumvent sanctions. As competition for critical minerals and fossil fuels grows, Russia is well on its way to placing itself in a position of strength. The Kremlin wields this strength through the trade and commercial links it has established with regimes across the globe. However, each began as a PMC operation invited in or hired by the host nation’s government. This is another clear example of how PMCs have successfully enabled Russia’s worldwide expansion of influence.
Free to Roam: PMCs Permit Russia to Counter US Interests
John Mearsheimer, on the topic of hegemony, stated that the hallmark of a regional or global hegemon is the “freedom to roam.” The freedom to expand its interests outside of its own backyard while countering the “freedom to roam” of other nations seeking to expand their influences and interests. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has been largely successful at countering the roaming of other rising powers in most of the Global South. However, Russia has increasingly been successful at roaming in Africa, the Middle East, and even in Washington’s backyard in Latin America, challenging US global and regional hegemony. PMCs have been the main tool for this increasingly successful campaign to counter US interests around the globe.
The first example of this is the Middle East and Africa. Russian PMC employment in Syria and Libya has directly countered US interests by providing training efforts to local rebels who engage in combat either with US forces or for objectives that further Russian interests. This example may again skirt the bounds of soft power. Thus, PMC use in Africa can paint a “softer” picture. African nations have sought Russian PMCs to fill the void left by Western forces, as seen in the French withdrawal from Mali, and provided counter-terrorism training to countries that typically seek US intervention. As the appetite for US military adventurism wanes in the fight against terrorism, Russian PMCs have rapidly picked up these missions. Increased Russian “roaming” has decreased US influence, causing it to lose its place as the most influential global power in Africa.
While Russia successfully increased its ability to roam and expand in Africa, the most concerning expansion of influence is in Latin America. In 2017, Russia used PMCs to guard Russian businesses and energy infrastructure in Venezuela. However, following the 2019 presidential election widely criticized as illegitimate by Western countries, Russian PMCs increased their role in the country by providing security and technical protection to Maduros government. This relationship has provided Russia with an expanded partnership, solely by employing 100 contractors in Washington’s backyard. The ripple effect of PMC operations in Venezuela is the perception that Russia can provide greater security and stability than the United States, leading to the potential spread of PMC activities across Latin America. A Global Guardian risk map captures this sentiment by showing that since 2019, with few exceptions, most Central and South American countries are now “very susceptible” or “susceptible” to Russian PMC operations.
Conclusion
Over the past ten years, Russian PMCs have enabled Russia to expand its influence and project its power globally. Providing a level of deniability, while still working under the auspices of the Kremlin, PMCs have proven to be the most successful soft-power tool to achieve Russian foreign policy objectives. PMC operations in Africa, the Middle East, and globally have fostered increased partnerships with various regimes, enabling a resurgence in pro-Russian sentiment, particularly in Africa. These relationships have provided Russia access to mineral and energy resources, further expanding Russia’s status as a powerbroker for global energy affairs while futureproofing its hold on critical minerals. Lastly, PMCs have enabled Russia to begin countering US influence outside of Europe for the first time since the Cold War. Small groups of contractors “flying the flag” on behalf of Russia, particularly in South America and Africa, have directly challenged U.S. influence and, in many ways, undermined their interests.
Despite Russia’s success with PMCs, the United States can combat PMC activity and stymie Russia’s spread of influence. While the MoD now oversees the new Redut and Konvoy PMCs, they remain susceptible to human rights violations and negative impacts due to their use of contractors. The United States can exploit this weakness by offering to host nations the services of a uniformed military. The US Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades provide an economy of force mission capable of deploying multiple teams of 10 advisors to train, advise, and assist partner forces and government institutions. These forces can operate in permissive or semi-permissive environments, providing the same “service” as a PMC without requiring payment in resources, eliminating human rights abuses, and providing a lower-risk option to the American public than combat troops. The United States can employ this method in conjunction with several CSIS recommendations, including financially targeting PMCs, pursuing accountability of PMC contractors under local or international law, and, in some cases, intel sharing with allies and partners to kinetically target PMC contractors in active conflict zones. However, until the United States develops a synchronized plan to counter PMCs, Russia will continue to relentlessly expand its use of PMCs in pursuit of its objectives due to the successes that they have delivered so far.
Major Eric J. Uribe is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer, with an area concentration in Europe, and currently a graduate student in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has served in a variety of armor assignments, including command at the company level and has deployed to Afghanistan and Eastern Europe. He holds a BS in political science from the United States Military Academy.
