Summary

In mid-August, the United States sponsored peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland aimed at bringing an end to the Sudan civil war, a conflict that has been going on for a year and a half. Roughly twelve million people have been displaced, and the country is experiencing what has been called by some diplomats the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Yet prospects for these US-sponsored talks remain bleak so long as the Sudanese Armed Forces continue to boycott them.

 

Background

At roughly 1.86 million square kilometers, Sudan is the second-largest country in Africa by land area. Out of a total of 46 million people, about 30 million of Sudan’s citizens are considered Sudanese Arabs, with ethnic minorities comprising the other 16 million. Situated in East Africa, the country borders the Red Sea in the northeast, Libya and Egypt in the north, Chad in the west, the Central African Republic to the southwest, South Sudan in the south, and Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east and southeast.

The population of Sudan is primarily located along the belt of arable land stretching from the confluence of the Blue and White Nile rivers near Khartoum, the country’s capital and core region, through the south-central parts of the savannah and ending in the south Darfur region surrounding Nyala, the country’s second city. Though around half of the country is comprised of desert, mainly in the north, Sudan has a wealth of arable land that could designate it, if circumstances permit it, one of the leading agricultural powers of the region.

 

The lead-up to the Sudan civil war

The two major combatants in the Sudan civil war are the Sudanese Armed Forces (commonly abbreviated as the SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Initially the RSF was formed from ethnic Arab militias operating in Darfur during the crisis in Sudan’s western region, beginning in 2003, then known as the Janjaweed. These militias, and then president Omar al-Bashir, were implicated in genocide against non-Arab Darfuris, eventually leading to an ICC arrest warrant being issued against Bashir.

In 2018, a wave of anti-government demonstrations broke out, providing the necessary cover for the SAF and the RSF to remove Bashir from office and seize power. In the months following Bashir’s removal, a transitional council was created with representatives from both the military and civilians aligned with the protest movement. At the council’s inception, SAF commander Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka “Hemedti,” immediately took control. A second coup, this time in late 2021, removed the appointed civilian prime minister Abdela Hamdok and returned power to Burhan and Hemedti.

Lingering disagreements between Hemedti and Burhan over the speed of the RSF’s integration into the SAF led to an eventual falling out between the two leaders. It was this falling out that led to the outbreak of the Sudan civil war.

 

Impact

Sudan’s political geography puts it in a precarious neighborhood. All its neighbors besides Egypt have seen major conflict break out in the last 20 years. Sudan’s position on the strategic Red Sea has been coveted by outside powers looking to secure their regional maritime interests near one of the world’s busiest commercial chokepoints. Sudan’s strategic location designates it as a country at the crossroads of Central Africa, East Africa, and the wider Arab world. This geostrategic piece of real estate has dominated the foreign policy thinking of outside powers such as Egypt and the United Kingdom historically, but now too the rising powers of Western Asia, such as the United Arab Emirates.

At time of writing, the RSF controls most of South Darfur and the central areas of the Sudanese population belt, aside from a few SAF-controlled areas under siege. Though neither side fully controls the Khartoum area, the RSF also controls large areas of the Blue Nile that fall in Sudan’s territory immediately to the south of Khartoum.

A key factor in the success of the RSF has to do with its control over vital resources including much of the country’s gold wealth from the Jebel Amer mines in Darfur. These mines are coveted by outside parties like the UAE who have already staked a toehold in Eritrea at the port of Assab and Yemen’s Socotra Island in the Arabian Sea. Though much of the country’s oil infrastructure could be choked off by the RSF given the extent its current territorial control, South Sudan has warned against this due to its own reliance on these pipelines for oil exports.

The attempt by the United States to broker a peace plan in mid-August of 2024 ultimately fell through due to the lack of in-person participation in the talks from the SAF, who instead opted to participate virtually. Initially it seemed that the RSF were more willing to send a delegation to Geneva, the location of the summit, likely because the RSF had more of the territory that was worth controlling.

The deputy head of Sudan’s junta and former rebel leader Malik Agar accused the United States as not being serious about committing to the peace process. He cited the failure of Washington’s designated envoy and former US Congressman Tom Perriello to step foot in the country. The apparent willingness of the United States to entertain what the SAF considers a paramilitary group committing atrocities and war crimes in the territory it controls does not sit well with the SAF, even though its own soldiers have been accused of similar crimes. The SAF sees the complete destruction of the RSF as a key demand for peace.

Added complexities arise from the involvement of foreign powers. So far, only the UAE has been significantly documented to have supported the RSF; however, other reports have implicated Russia, Türkiye, and others in arming the parties to the conflict. The intervention of outside powers in a civil war is usually a sign that the conflict could pan out over years, if not decades, as is the case in Syria and Yemen.

Besides the two major parties, there are at least three other groups that operate independently of themselves and of each other. Two of these groups are fighting against the SAF but aren’t actively aligned with the RSF. The third, the Darfur Joint Protection Force is attempting to act as a neutral “peacekeeping” force in the region yet has been effectively fighting alongside the SAF.

 

Looking ahead

The overriding interest of foreign powers such as the United States is containing the geopolitical fallout of a fragmented Sudan. The fragmentation of Libya, a country with roughly one-seventh the population of Sudan, has already done much to destabilize the region. The deteriorating Sudan civil war thus has the potential to exacerbate crises in neighboring countries, particularly in Chad and South Sudan, though so far violence has yet to spill over significantly.

International stakeholders have a number of tools at their disposal to try and bring an end to the conflict. The US has proposed an arms embargo on the country which, while beneficial, would need to be stringently enforced. This may prove a difficult task. Sudan has nearly 7000 kilometers of border with neighboring countries, many of them struggling to maintain their own territorial integrity, which in turn creates opportunities for arms smuggling and the transit of other illicit goods through neighboring Chad.

Sanctions, also suggested by the United States, could be another tool for pressuring both parties to come to an agreement. So far, the United States’ suggestions are limited to specific RSF commanders and not against either side more generally. Sanctions would need to be wide reaching to have an effect. Key industries like gold and oil would need to be sanctioned, as well as businesses and financial entities controlled by Hemedti and the SAF. This would undoubtably have adverse effects on the entire Sudanese economy, which is likely why the United States is limiting its scope to targeted sanctions. Should the initial round of sanctions be implemented by the UN, more would be likely to follow the longer the war drags on.

To secure a deal, pressure would need to be scaled up on countries backing the various sides of the conflict. The SAF credibly accuses the UAE of supplying the RSF, therefore any peace deal would require an Emirati seat at the table. Incorporating regional actors like Türkiye and Saudi Arabia regardless of the level of geopolitical interest would need to continue. The ignorance of not just much of international community, but also that of regional groups like the African Union, must end if there is to be any political solution to the Sudan civil war.