In late August, officials in Benin announced they had accepted a sizable military donation from China, consisting mostly of artillery. The gift was precisely timed, as the Beninese Armed Forces struggle to suppress Islamic extremists in the north. However, the geopolitical implications behind the transaction amount to far more than just a helping hand. It was just the latest installment in a series of investments that Beijing has been quietly making in the region for some time. From railways to howitzers, China’s diligent pursuit of total integration into Benin’s economic and political institutions is a model they have replicated across Africa for years.
China’s strategy in Africa, often described as the “New Great Game,” involves a multifaceted approach combining economic investments with military assistance to bolster its influence across the continent. This strategy is designed to integrate China into African nations’ economic and political frameworks, leveraging substantial investments in infrastructure and strategic sectors to build long-term dependencies.
Beijing employs a dual strategy: deploying significant financial resources through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and offering military support to enhance its geopolitical leverage. By positioning itself as a crucial partner in development and security, China aims to create an environment where African countries increasingly rely on Chinese support, thereby solidifying its influence and securing its interests in the region. This approach is not unique to Benin but is part of a broader pattern observed throughout Africa, where China’s economic and military investments are reshaping the geopolitical landscape.
Benin and China formally established diplomatic relations under Mathieu Kérékou, the paradoxical Marxist African dictator who helped found his nation’s democratic system. Kérékou frequently visited Beijing while in power and maintained friendships with several Chinese leaders over the years. In the decades since, the relationship between the two states has primarily focused on economic development and trade, particularly after the announcement of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Africa policy in 2013. To date, these investments have ranged across a wide variety of critical industries, establishing a dependence on Chinese aid in sectors that are pivotal for national security and sovereignty.
In 2022, China exported $1.49B in goods to Benin, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). These included raw materials such as Iron Pipes and Woven Cotton, as well as Motorcycles targeted toward Benin’s developing commuter class. Growing at a rate of nearly 1% each year, Chinese trade with the West African state has largely originated from the Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces in southern China. However, these numbers do not reflect the significant investments that Beijing has made in Benin’s business sector.
China has been heavily involved in Benin’s economic development since the early 2000s. This has resulted in a favorable market for Chinese products, something which businesses from the mainland have taken full advantage of. Among these are Zhejiang Teams International, which helped construct the Economy and Trade Development Center in 2009. This helped encourage nearly 700 Chinese companies to set up shop in Benin, ranging from cosmetics to oil. In addition, Beijing has directly subsided several public works projects, including the creation of the Cotonou Friendship Stadium and a $4 billion investment in Benin’s railway system. In total, China has loaned $536 million to Benin since 2000.
Additionally, Beijing has also played a significant role in Benin’s healthcare industry. The first Chinese medical team in Benin arrived in 1978, facilitating a longstanding healthcare mission that remains prominent in the country to this day. Over the years, 576 Chinese doctors have performed nearly 80,000 surgeries and treated 3 million patients. This support has become even more critical in recent years, particularly as viral epidemics have become more commonplace in West Africa. During the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, Chinese officials trained more than 1,600 healthcare workers in safety protocols and medical treatments for the disease.
This complex and aid-based relationship was formally cemented in 2023 when the two states initiated a widely publicized strategic partnership. Announced during a state visit to Beijing in September, the deal included renewed commitments toward developing Benin’s infrastructure for healthcare and education. This included the construction of the Luban Workshop, a trade school for residents, and a continuation of the joint China-Africa (Benin) Vocational and Technical Education College, established in 2016.
China’s investments in Benin are progressively embedding Beijing into the nation’s infrastructure and institutions, reflecting a strategic blueprint that extends across the continent. By financing major public works projects, such as the construction of the Cotonou Friendship Stadium and significant investments in the railway system, China is not only contributing to Benin’s physical development but also creating a framework where Chinese interests become integral to national growth. This strategy includes establishing long-term projects like the Luban Workshop and continuing educational collaborations, which embed Chinese influence into the educational and vocational sectors.
Such integration ensures that Chinese interests are safeguarded and promoted within Benin, effectively intertwining the nation’s progress with Chinese support. The political motivation behind these investments is clear: by making itself indispensable through infrastructure and institutional support, China positions itself as a key player in Benin’s future, leveraging this dependence to exert influence and secure favorable policies.
To avoid falling into the aid trap and becoming overly dependent on Chinese support, Benin should pursue a more diversified approach to international partnerships. Expanding relationships with countries that offer alternatives to the Western and Eastern blocs can provide a buffer against potential over-reliance on any single power. Engaging with nations like Brazil, Turkey, and India can offer Benin access to varied economic and political resources, fostering a more balanced and resilient international standing.
Strengthening intra-African collaborations through frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can also enhance economic self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on external aid. By fostering regional integration and exploring diverse partnerships, Benin can build a more stable and autonomous economic environment, mitigating the risks associated with over-dependence on any single foreign actor.
There is no such thing as a free meal; in life or foreign policy. While Beijing may present itself as an egalitarian alternative to the traditional Western presence in Africa, its motivations will prove just as imperialistic. President Xi Jinping’s New Great Game strategy is a carefully constructed mechanism by which China is integrating itself into the culture, politics, and economic systems of African states. By sending cheap weapons and handing out loans, Beijing aims to become indispensable to these developing countries and use that dependence as leverage to influence governance in those states. It’s a predatorial diplomacy that in essence creates international hostages and presents a significant geopolitical threat of which African states should be wary.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
