On 23 July, 14 Palestinian parties reached an agreement for a united front government after the end of the war. The Beijing agreement ostensibly provides a solution to the question of post-war government in Gaza. Hamas, taking a battering over the past several months, had earlier declared it could no longer run the government on its own. The US proposal for Fatah to take over seemed improbable too, because Fatah cannot afford to walk into the vacuum without incurring the charge of following the footsteps of the America-Israel alliance. In stepped China, as an alternative great power enjoying better credibility than the Americans among Palestinians and brokering a national unity deal. The Beijing plan that brings together Fatah and Hamas is now a direct competitor against the Emirati plan to place a temporary international mission that does not include either Fatah or Hamas.
Predictably, the Beijing agreement has been accompanied by military escalation against Israel on all fronts. On the evening of 28 July, Hezbollah targeted a barrage of Katyusha and Falaq rockets at the Golan, killing more than 10 children on a sports field in the Druze town of Shams Abdal. The Houthis have progressively escalated to using ballistic missiles, targeting the southern part of Israel. Iran has issued fresh threats of a naval blockade of the Israeli coast. Syrian leader Bashar al Assad travelled to Moscow to discuss rapprochement with Turkiye and seeking protection from regional escalation. Russia has been warning Israel of consequences.
The recent escalation on all fronts is a coordinated move to pressure Israel to a ceasefire. The vital element in the chain of events is the unity agreement in Beijing, which has now guaranteed the political survival of Hamas, albeit in a wounded and bad shape, as well as solved the legitimacy problem of Fatah in Gaza. A ceasefire now is workable for the Palestinian side because the parties have managed to evolve some common ground. The coming together of 14 parties is an effective show of strength to sideline the anti-Fatah protagonists of the Emirati plan.
From Israel’s perspective, the Beijing agreement is a political setback because its claim of holding Gaza militarily for an indefinite period now carries lesser weight considering a national unity government of and for Palestinians is shaping up to take charge. The agreement will also test Israel’s resolve to keep Hamas out of the government. The success of the Beijing agreement will provide a strong impetus for Israel to take ‘day after’ talks with the United States and the Gulf Arab states with far greater seriousness as the situation has been converted to a race against time.
Internationally, Israel’s growing isolation is emerging as a major factor. Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech in the Congress repeatedly emphasized the necessity of continued and unwavering US support for Israel’s war effort. He tried to impress on the American audience that the war is not Israel’s alone and has a direct bearing on the United States and its fight against terrorism. Despite the rousing reception Netanyahu received in the Congress, the truth is that Israel today is rather isolated against the multi-headed, powerful alliance headed by Iran, bolstered by the military and diplomatic and military support of China and Russia.
Israel-West relations have entered a tumultuous period. Europe is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and even if it weren’t, domestic support for Israel in European countries is far from unanimous. Some European countries have diplomatically recognized Palestinian statehood. The new Labour government in the UK has reinitiated funds transfer to UNRWA and supported the International Criminal Court’s issue of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and defence minister Yoav Gallant. Even the present US government has supported Israel only conditionally, seeking to balance commitment to Israeli security with domestic political compulsions: pushing for a ceasefire, calling for restraint, and placing restrictions on weapons transfers. The fact that 2024 is an election year and a rather large pro-Palestinian constituency supports the Democratic Party in power has complicated the scenario. It is no wonder that Netanyahu linked the anti-Israel protestors running amok in the United States with Iranian sponsorship, as the protests are constantly pushing the red line for US government support for Israel. Growing distance between the US government and Israel will embolden the anti-Israel axis to escalate the war and walk away with a better deal. The true value of the hostages abducted by the Hamas on 7 October is being demonstrated now, creating demoralization and division within Israel and working as effective bargaining chips for Hamas’ survival.
Workable Palestinian unity, increased Russian participation, and the entry of China, combined with Israel’s growing distance from the West and international isolation have momentarily tipped the balance in favor of the anti-Israel axis. Buoyed by the Beijing agreement, the regional anti-Israel axis has upped the tempo with the intention of imposing greater costs on Israel to push it into a corner and extract a ceasefire.
But will this calculation go according to plan? The Hezbollah rocket attack on the Golan will almost certainly lead to fierce Israeli retaliation, possibly triggering war in Lebanon. Further, Israel has an uncanny habit of turning the tables in the most adverse circumstances, as during the wars in 1967 and 1973. However, there is no doubt that Israel’s military and political capabilities will be subjected to their greatest test since 1973. One factor to watch out for will be the Gulf Arab states, largely rendered irrelevant from 7 October, but restored to diplomatic importance post-Beijing agreement as rival influencers of the shape of the peace ‘the day after.’
The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
