Maritime security scholars and practitioners are on a constant watch in assessing developments in seas. Today the scope of maritime security has widened because geopolitical conceptualization has become its major tenet. As rightly noted by Germond, “the geopolitical dimension of maritime security accounts for the way geography constrains and informs (directly or indirectly) maritime security policies, regulations, measures and operations, as well as how states take (tacitly or explicitly) geography into account when developing their maritime security strategies.” It is thus the very logic of the geographic realm that defines opportunities and constraints in the seas which directly affect regions and state behavior.
There is abundant literature in social sciences that explains maritime security issues from a traditional lens such as drug trafficking, illegal fishing, piracy, and environmental crimes. However, the contemporary understanding of geopolitics in spheres of maritime security in wider policy debates remains inadequate. The recent AUKUS deal signed between Australia, the UK, and the US is a geopolitical development with strong linkages to maritime security. Simply, the most imminent challenge posed by the AUKUS is evolving strategic competition in the region. This logic can be elucidated from Bueger, Edmunds, and Ryan’s understanding that “the contemporary maritime security agenda should be understood as an interlinked set of challenges of growing global, regional and national significance, and comprising issues of national, environmental, economic and human security.” Therefore, geopolitical developments in the seas are integral to maritime security as they can affect freedom of movement, seaborne trade, and sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
The AUKUS is a strategic defense alliance between Australia, the US and the UK that came into being in September 2021. A joint statement issued by prime ministers Johnson and Morrison and President Biden stated that AUKUS is an “enhanced trilateral security partnership.” In addition, there is consensus between AUKUS members that it “will help sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” To some degree, this signals a paradigm shift in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) maritime structure.
We must understand why geopolitics remains at the core of contemporary maritime security. Great and regional power competition in the seas has historic origins. For instance, we can review the balance of power structures during World Wars I and II and how it led great and rising powers to develop formidable navies to secure new economic resources. Today, it can be observed that the cross-currents of political geography such as US-China and US-Iran tensions have threatened maritime trade and freedom of navigation. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Secretary-General Mukhisa Kituyi concerning US-China tensions 2018-2019, “the dip in maritime trade growth is a result of several trends including a weakening multilateral trading system and growing protectionism.”
One way to understand the effects of geopolitical events on the maritime economy is rising marine war insurance premiums. For instance, S&P Global notes that “marine hull war rates for ships heading to the Gulf jumped in mid-2019 following a spate of attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, a key shipping channel, in May and June of that year, and the seizing of British-flagged vessel Stena Impero in July.” In addition, reported by the Wall Street Journal international operators such as Maersk Line and Mediterranean Shipping Company were winding up their shipping operations in Iran due to the US sanctions in May 2018.
Now the recent US, UK, and Australia “AUKUS” agreement for transferring the latter; nuclear submarine technology, high-end artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum technologies, and undersea capabilities including underwater sensors and drones, raises important questions. At the diplomatic level, one, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted “five harms to the region” mainly nuclear proliferation, a new round of arms race, undermining regional prosperity and stability, sabotaging the building of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia and the resurgence of the Cold War mentality. Two, AUKUS temporarily hampered French ties with the US and Australia. This raises novel policy concerns in regards to China’s response and the cohesiveness of the American-led alliance system.
More recently in December 2021 Australia, the UK and the US held trilateral meetings of the Joint Steering Group for Advanced Capabilities and the Joint Steering Group for Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program in the Pentagon. The text by the White House reinforces how the AUKUS deal seeks to enter a new phase of geopolitical competition that would set a tone for a paradigm shift in maritime security. Primarily, the text highlights commitment to Australian capabilities and emphasizes the security of the Indo-Pacific alongside four central areas of focus “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.”
While AUKUS remains a long-term project, however, once Australia acquires nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, the maritime security dynamics in the APAC region may face political risks. According to the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans “from one point of view, it is not bad that China gets the message – as it no doubt also has from the emergence of the Quad grouping, bringing together the US, Japan, Australia, and India – that there is an evolving will among other significant regional players to build stronger defense capability and cooperation.”
Further, regional economic stability due to seaborne trade also remains a pressing concern. It is crucial to mention that the Asian region’s global maritime trade accounted for 41% of total goods loaded in 2020. Moreover, the Asian region’s port significance includes eight out of the top ten ports which include five in China. Therefore, the security and stability of the SLOCs are vital for regional states in Asia.
What remains a concern in the South China Sea for geopolitical and trade experts is that “a worst-case planning scenario entails all three straits (as well as other possible Southeast Asian SLOCs) being unavailable for commercial traffic, forcing vessels to sail around the southern coast of Australia.” This would result in weeks of delay in the global supply chain and through economic modeling, it is found that “Singapore’s economy would fall by 22%, according to the baseline estimate. Hong Kong, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia would suffer falls of between 10% and 15%…Australia would suffer a drop of between 1.9% and 3.1%. The economies of Japan and South Korea would fall by between 2% and 3%.” In such a hypothetical scenario closure of maritime access due to longer port distances would result in changing global trade costs.
The complex security dynamics are also at interplay because of missile technology transfer under the AUKUS. According to Ogilvie (2021), and Rear Admiral (R) John Gower Former Assistant Chief of Defense Staff (UK), “the transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Australia highlights two issues: a potential broadening of the risks of accidental war and a weakening of the Export Control Regime that deals with sensitive missile technologies (the MTCR).” Further, Moloney observes that for Australia after signing the AUKUS deal “for starters, where will the fuel come from? Will Australia eventually be required to process and enrich uranium?” Importantly, the dimensions of nuclear proliferation under the AUKUS must be carefully calculated.
The AUKUS deal is a geopolitical development with strong linkages to maritime security. While the deal is yet in its early stages, it does provide strong indicators through texts such as by the White House that the US through its alliance-based structure seeks to reinforce its policeman role in the so-called Indo-Pacific. Lastly, Australian direction under the AUKUS yet poses several puzzles, therefore, overestimations of a geopolitical conflict remain adverse to social scientific norms. Scholars and policy-makers must carefully weigh and evaluate the sequence of events that unfold through the AUKUS.
Mohid IFTIKHAR (PhD) specializing in IPE and Geopolitics is Director (Research) at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS)
Muhammad Usama KHAN is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS). He has a Bachelor’s degree in Ship Navigation and is soon to graduate with a Master’s in International Relations. His research interests include maritime security and great power competition.
