Last week, we discussed how Shinzo Abe’s victory in recent upper house elections will affect the Japanese economy going forward. But economics is just one part of the picture. How Prime Minister Abe manages political and military issues, particularly the sticky question of amending Japan’s pacifist constitution, is sure to send ripples throughout Asia and beyond. This article will attempt to draw a line between what Prime Minister Abe would like to do, and what he could feasibly do now that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its allies are firmly in control of the legislative process in Japan.
Prime Minister Abe has long campaigned on his desire to amend the Japanese constitution, particularly Article 9 which renounces the use of force as a tool for settling international disputes. Supporters of such a move argue that Article 9 hampers Japan’s ability to respond to the threat posed by a growing China, and in a more tangible sense, it leaves Japan unable to participate in bilateral military maneuvers with its ally (and co-China skeptic), the United States. Of course, if Abe and his allies were successful in their push to amend Article 9, several of Japan’s bilateral relationships would suffer as a result, mainly those with China, South Korea, and the handful of other Asian countries that still bristle from what they see as a lack of contrition over Japan’s World War II aggression.
Yet even though Abe’s LDP took 115 of the 242 seats in the upper house, establishing control over all three levels of government, a constitutional amendment will likely remain elusive. The Japanese constitution calls for a two-thirds majority in both houses, followed by a popular referendum before any amendment can be adopted. The LDP is currently lacking in the numbers necessary to push through an amendment of Article 9, and its coalition partners like the New Komeito Party have made it clear that they’re not willing to support the more hawkish aspects of Abe’s policy platform.
Without the support in place to amend Article 9, it’s expected that the Abe administration will begin by targeting the more innocuous (yet potentially more damaging) Article 96, the article that stipulates the need for a two-third majority in both houses before a national referendum can be held. The LDP wants to change it to a simple majority in both houses; a substantially lower threshold that would make it easier for future administrations to snipe down Article 9, or any other article in the constitution that doesn’t suit their present interests. Standing in the way of a revision of Article 96 is the fact that, questions of skeptical coalition partners aside, the LDP coalition only accounts for 135 of the upper house’s 242 seats, falling well short of the 162 needed for a two-thirds majority.
If the Abe administration is going to waylay Article 9 via the side door of Article 96, it will need to convince a few dozen opposition lawmakers of the wisdom of its policies. Doing so will be complicated by two factors: Firstly, Abe’s motivations for an Article 96 amendment are widely known, making it difficult to avoid the uncomfortable truth that a vote to change one is inevitably a vote to change the other. Secondly, Abe’s push to amend Article 96 will come up against some resistance, both within and without his coalition, from lawmakers who are uncomfortable with setting the bar for constitutional reform so low as to afford any party in control of both houses a good shot at changing the fundamental laws of the land.
But perhaps the biggest hurdle faced by the Abe administration stems from its own population. Depending on the poll consulted, Japanese people range from tepid to ambivalent on the issue of constitutional reform, with those in support numbering between 39-56%. Even the upper limit of 56% is hardly the kind of popular mandate that could grease the wheels of the LDP charm offensive to garner enough votes to amend Article 96. In fact, these poll numbers seem to indicate a national referendum that would be hard fought and far from assured should the LDP somehow manage to pull together a two-thirds majority in both houses.
Thus, even though the recent LDP electoral success indicates a continuation of Abenomics and some of Abe’s security policies such as a deepening of Indo-Japanese relations and a boost in military spending, the oft-discussed project of amending Japan’s pacifist constitution is set to remain as just that: discussed, not realized.
